Attitudes toward Globalization in Ranked Ethnic Societies

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Abstract

Canonical scholarship has focused on the economic basis of individual support for trade. Separately, studies of developing country politics have specified ethnicity as a crucial driver of political behavior. We develop a novel argument to demonstrate how ethnic identity structures support for global economic integration. In ranked ethnic systems, marginalized ethnic groups are excluded from domestic labor markets and compartmentalized into lower-skill occupations. International trade disrupts this status quo by offering marginalized groups less discriminatory avenues for economic advancement. We present a wealth of observational and experimental evidence from India to show that individuals in disadvantaged communities are significantly more likely to support trade liberalization than members of dominant ethnic groups. Experimental tests reveal that ethnic considerations reinforce the effects of material self-interest for members of marginalized communities. Our findings point to ethnicity as a key determinant of economic policy preferences regarding globalization in culturally segmented societies around the world.

Keywords: *trade, globalization, identity, ranked ethnicities, public opinion*

Introduction

A rich body of scholarship argues that voters' economic interests determine their attitudes toward globalization because trade creates winners and losers among different sectors and factors of production (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Naoi and Kume, 2011; Ardanaz, Murillo and Pinto, 2013). In some societies, however, ethnicity is the relevant system that organizes economic relations, skills acquisition, and market access.[1] Just as trade shifts resources between economic classes, it also holds redistributive implications for members of different ethnic groups (Guisinger, 2013, 2017; Mutz, 2021; Mutz, Mansfield and Kim, 2021). If trade policies disproportionately benefit only some ethnic communities, then groups that stand to gain relatively more from trade liberalization will support trade more.

We argue that ethnic identity is a salient determinant of trade preferences in "ranked ethnic systems": societies where ethnicity and economic class overlap (Horowitz, 1985). Why? First, in ranked systems, low-rank groups face systematic barriers to entry into lucrative employment. Because trade provides opportunities for occupational mobility in less discriminatory environments, trade liberalization is viewed as improving the material prospects of both high- and low-skilled individuals within this ethnic group. Consequently, we expect greater support for trade among discriminated communities (Osgood and Peters, 2017). Second, group-based occupational specialization is a characteristic feature of ranked ethnic systems (Hechter, 1978). If most members of an ethnic group also hold the relevant type of skill that benefits from trade (such as low-skilled workers in developing countries), then the overlap of ethnicity and skills reinforces trade preferences, leading members of this group to support trade more than they would if only skills or ethnic considerations were at play.

We study public opinion on trade in India—the world's largest democracy, a complex multiethnic country, and a crucial case for studying how voters in developing countries formulate preferences over international economic exchange. India's ethnic communities can be viewed as dominant or marginalized regarding their access to socioeconomic resources. Historically, the Hindu caste system has been organized according to ascriptive occupational groups. Castes like Upper Castes

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[1]Following convention, we define ethnic identity as membership into a descent-based group, or more subjectively as "self-identification around a characteristic that is difficult or impossible to change, such as language, race, or location" (Birnir, 2006, 66). This departs from studies of other noneconomic factors, such as nationalism and partisan ideology (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Mutz and Kim, 2017).

(UC) and Backward Classes (OBC) are concentrated in higher-skill, landowning, artisanal, or labor-based occupations, with privileged access to employment opportunities in domestic markets. Lower-ranked Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) have faced severe social and economic discrimination and have been segregated into menial jobs. Outside of the Hindu caste system, religious minorities, most notably Muslims, face systematic economic and social discrimination (Sachar, 2006).

To study the determinants of support for international trade, we use data from three rounds of National Election Studies (NES) conducted after India's national elections in 1999, 2004, and 2009. We find that low-skilled respondents support trade more than high-skilled respondents. This aligns with theories of comparative advantage that predict a country's abundant factor of production gains from international trade and thus supports it (Rogowski, 1989). Next, we find that respondents in discriminated ethnic groups—SC, ST, and Muslim—support trade more than those in privileged groups (UC and OBC). Importantly, the effect of ethnicity on trade remains robust among both high- and low-skilled SC, ST, and Muslim respondents. Because India's states vary markedly in levels of development and ethnic structures, we study state-level support for trade as a function of state-level determinants (Thachil and Herring, 2008; Singh, 2016). Using fine-grained occupational and ethnicity data, we find that states with higher percentages of low-skilled workers and of SC, ST, and Muslims evince greater support for trade openness.

To probe the mechanisms at work in our argument—that marginalized and discriminated ethnic groups will support trade more due to the group-based distributive consequences of liberalization—we employ an original survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of over 4,200 respondents. When we give respondents information about ethnic winners and losers from trade, it's the SC, ST, and Muslim respondents (not members of high-rank ethnic groups) who display sensitivity to co-ethnic gains and losses. Furthermore, our results show that both high- and low-skilled SC/ST/Muslims are sensitive to the co-ethnic treatments, and strongly support policies that benefit their co-ethnics. We find no such comparable effect among high- or low-skilled high-rank groups.

Next, we examine how much the economic and skills profiles of voters of any ethnic identity shape support for trade. Our findings demonstrate that when respondents receive information about the economic winners and losers of trade, high-skilled respondents develop more protectionist

viewpoints. This resonates with studies showing that high-skilled workers in developing countries oppose trade liberalization when their wages decrease from trade (Milner and Kubota, 2005).

We also probe the joint effects of informing respondents about both the ethnic and the economic winners and losers from trade. Among high-rank groups, we find no evidence of an interaction across the ethnicity and skills treatments. But among low-rank groups, support for trade is higher for respondents who received both the skills and ethnic treatments. This important finding substantiates our claim that the overlap of ethnicity and skills leads to greater support for free trade among disadvantaged communities than if either economic or identity-based considerations alone shaped attitudes. Finally, we introduce country-level survey evidence from Nigeria, South Africa, and the Philippines, as well cross-national data from 28 countries to show that our findings hold in other ranked ethnic systems in the developing world.

This paper contributes to a nascent literature on identity in international political economy (Baker, 2015; Baccini and Weymouth, 2021; Li, Pandya and Sekhri, 2022) by drawing on insights from comparative politics on group-based inequalities and domestic redistributive policies (Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Lieberman and McClendon, 2013; Huber and Suryanarayan, 2016). Research conducted in the United States has documented a link between race and trade policy preferences (Mutz and Kim, 2017; Mutz, Mansfield and Kim, 2021; Mutz, 2021; Guisinger, 2017). We speak to these findings by offering an economic mechanism for why identity matters: the skills specialization of ethnic groups and the desire of marginalized groups to escape domestic discrimination might mold trade attitudes within communities. Additionally, remarkably little research exists on even the economic basis of trade support in developing countries (Rudra 2008; Jamal and Milner 2013; Mukherjee 2016). Our finding that low-skilled individuals are more supportive of trade speaks to this growing body of work (Dolan and Milner, 2023), suggesting that the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model predictions are in fact at work in large developing democracies like India. This contrasts with recent studies from the developed world that question factor-proportion models of trade preferences (Rho and Tomz, 2017).

This paper is the first to present evidence on the determinants of trade preferences across states, economic classes, and ethnic groups in India. Scholars of India's ethnic politics have studied how identity shapes domestic policy preferences and political outcomes—from voting to riots to public goods (Varshney, 2002; Chandra, 2004; Wilkinson, 2004; Thachil, 2014). Our paper's novelty

lies in connecting ethnic identities to preferences over foreign economic policy, underlining how globalization scrambles group-based control of resources and markets. These findings may surprise observers of India's integration into the global economy. Typically, trade policy isn't thought to be within the realm of mass politics; prevailing work has explained trade liberalization as an elite-driven phenomenon (Alamgir, 2009). Our findings suggest an alternate explanation for India's gradual embrace of trade liberalization in recent decades; that permissive trade policies enjoy bottom-up electoral support from large sections of society. Additionally, our finding that disadvantaged communities express support for free trade suggests that economic policy might be a profitable electoral tool for upper-caste Hindu politicians (Gaikwad, 2018).

Theory of Ranked Ethnic Systems in a Globalizing World

Economic Determinants

Our theoretical analysis begins from the premise that economic interests shape voters' support for trade policy (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Economic theory predicts that when factors are mobile, following the HO framework, cleavages form between owners of different factors of productions, such as labor and capital (Rogowski 1989).[2] Developing countries typically have a comparative advantage in producing labor-intensive, low-skill goods due to an abundant supply of low-skill labor. Consequently, we should expect the locus of support for trade liberalization in developing countries to lie with low-skilled workers employed in labor-intensive sectors that stand to expand production with access to markets in advanced industrialized nations. Conversely, high-skilled workers in capital-intensive industries that are relatively less competitive in global markets are predicted to oppose trade liberalization.[3] These claims find support in Africa, where a negative correlation between support for openness and skills has been documented (Dolan and Milner, 2023).

Ethnic Determinants

Economic theories of trade preferences assume that material factors shape skill endowments, which in turn create economic cleavages and organize economic production. While scholars have long

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[2]Note, however, that recent research questions how much individuals know about trade (Rho and Tomz, 2017).
[3]Milner and Kubota (2005); Jamal and Milner (2013).

highlighted several non-economic determinants of trade preferences, including ideational, cultural, sociotropic, and geopolitical determinants (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Mutz and Kim, 2017; Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022), recent scholarship has drawn attention to identity-based cleavages. For example, in the United States, whites have been shown to be more protectionist than African Americans and Hispanics (Mutz, Mansfield and Kim, 2021; Mutz, 2021; Mutz and Kim, 2017). Mutz, Mansfield and Kim (2021) attributes this divergence to psychological factors such as higher levels of out-group prejudice, national attachment, racial solidarity, and social hierarchy preferences among whites than minorities, which themselves may arise from historical racial inequalities (Mutz, 2021, 125).

Although different identity groups might hold distinct policy preferences due to a variety of "taste-based" or psychic reasons (Du Bois, 2017; Roediger, 2017), we focus on how *economic* differences between identity groups shape their preferences over redistributive policy (Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Lieberman and McClendon, 2013). In particular, we focus on multiethnic settings where ethnocultural cleavages structure market relations (McNamara, 2020). Members of different ethnic groups could have asymmetric access to market opportunities, and hence stand to benefit differently from employment. Thus, ethnicity may predict winners and losers in domestic markets and, in turn, inform group-based preferences on trade.

In what contexts are ethnic groups demarcated along economic lines? Following Horowitz (1985), we focus on ranked ethnic systems, where ethnicity and economic class overlap and where some groups are wealthy and others poor.[4] In practice, this means high-ranked groups have better-paying jobs, more economic assets such as property and capital, and preferential access to labor market opportunities. Correspondingly, because of discrimination, low-rank groups encounter systematic barriers to economic advancement in domestic labor markets. In *unranked* systems ethnic differences aren't expected to matter for group skills, wealth, or access to market opportunities.

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[4]Ranked ethnic systems exist in societies characterized by sociopolitical oppression. Examples include differences between Blacks and whites in South Africa and the United States (most explicitly during apartheid and the Jim Crowe-era, but informally too in subsequent periods), between Hutus and Tutsi in Rwanda, between whites and indigenous groups in Bolivia, and between high and low castes in India. Writing about ranked systems in Japan and India historically, Newell (1961, 3) notes that "some degree of association with a particular occupation seem to be essential to a definition within the Asian continent at least."

Overlapping Economic and Ethnic Determinants

We now explicate how an *economic logic* of ethnic differences between groups shapes preferences toward global economic integration. We consider how two features of ranked ethnic systems—discrimination and skills-based occupational specialization—shape individuals' relationships to markets under autarky and then under free trade.

Ranked Ethnic Systems under Autarky In closed economies isolated from the rest of the world, ranked differences between groups are perpetuated by formal institutions, legal codes, cultural norms, and informal social practices and networks that sustain labor-market discrimination against low-rank groups. This results in asymmetric access to market opportunities, and forced skills specialization for differently ranked ethnic groups.

Imagine two ethnic groups whose economic relations in the market are defined by their ascriptive/inherited rank, which in turn reinforce the ranked system. Members of low-rank groups face obstructions like:

- Barriers to education and vocational training.

- Impediments to hiring and promotion in lucrative occupations and sectors.

- Lack of geographical mobility due to the pervasiveness of ranked hierarchies in other parts of the closed economy.

- Systematic wage differential for identical jobs.

- Exclusion from high-value career opportunities due to kinship-based professional networks.

This system represents an equilibrium. High-rank groups—benefiting economically and socially from the architecture of the ranked system—are incentivized to maintain these discriminatory systems. They lack motivation to dismantle structures that could promote upward mobility for low-rank groups. They can deploy institutional and cultural strategies to punish members—high- or low-rank—who attempt to transgress these modes of market interactions.

Meanwhile, members of low-rank groups know they face material and cultural sanctions if they challenge the social order. Additionally, anticipating discrimination, they may avoid taking costly measures (such as investing in education) to advance their economic station. Thus, both structural and individual factors reinforce ranked differences in how groups access labor-marker opportunities.

A direct consequence of these cultural modes of exclusion is that low-rank groups are forced to specialize in low-skill occupations, while high-rank groups dominate high-skill jobs. Low-rank groups must perform menial occupations like handling sewage or cadavers, which reinforces social norms of "purity" and "pollution"—and further stigmatizes low-rank groups.[5]

Such discriminatory market arrangements have defined a host of ranked ethnic systems, both in cases where formal institutions perpetuate group-based skills specialization, and where informal institutions do the same. For example, South Africa under apartheid legally enforced segregation, labor controls and the disenfranchisement of the Black majority.[6] State policies gave whites preferential positions in the labor market (especially manufacturing), and protected them from being displaced by cheaper labor, primarily that of Blacks (Simons and Simons, 1969).

As for cases where informal structures perpetuate discrimination and skills-specialization, Hechter (1978) calls this the "cultural division of labor." The historical relations between Irish and English in Great Britain (Hechter, 1975) and between indigenous and nonindigenous communities in Bolivia (Gisselquist, 2013) are examples of societies featuring such systems.

Ranked Ethnic Systems under Globalization We now consider the implications for market arrangements in a ranked ethnic system that begins integrating into the global economy. Imagine a case where all else remains equal, but a policy shift allows domestic market actors to begin trading with international actors.[7]

In the postliberalization economy, the emergence of new sets of foreign actors—employers, buyers, and sellers—asymmetrically reshapes the incentives of different ethnic groups. It's well established that liberalization creates economic winners and losers, but we argue that liberalization also creates *ethnic* winners and losers. Why?

First, foreign employers have little material and cultural interest in perpetuating discrimination related to domestic ethnic-group hierarchies. Osgood and Peters (2017) document that women-owned enterprises in patriarchal countries are more export-oriented because the global

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[5]These arrangements are passed on intergenerationally, as children learn the skills of their kin and reside in ghettoized communities that specialize in particular low-skill occupations.

[6]Several features of South Africa's political and social system echo the definition of a ranked ethnic system. South Africans were assigned a "rank" at birth: White, Asian, Colored, African (Seidman, 1999). The state granted legal and political rights based on this rank and prohibited inter-racial marriages and sex. Segregation under apartheid meant racial separation in schools, restaurants, and public spaces.

[7]For example, the policy change might permit crossborder imports and exports, allow foreign firms to open factories and employ domestic workers, or let citizens emigrate for employment.

economy allows women to escape from domestic gender discrimination. Applying this insight to our analysis of opportunities the global economy affords to low-rank ethnic groups, we underscore how foreign actors:

- Have clear economic incentives to seek best-quality talent and goods for the cheapest price.

- Are less likely to rely on locality-specific hiring; they cast a wider net for qualified workers and production inputs.

- Have less incentive to lean into ethnic networks to achieve economic needs, and might in fact consider ethnic hierarchies detrimental to their organization, as these undermine their management authority and reduce efficiency.

- Might even *prefer* hiring and purchasing goods produced by low-rank groups because the ranked ethnic system itself discounts the labor, wages, and products of these groups. That is, ranked hierarchies give foreign actors opportunities for considerable economic arbitrage.

- May be more willing to invest in upgrading workers' skills, whatever their ethnic background, to enhance productivity and profits.

Consequently, because globalization disrupts ethnically-organized markets, low-rank groups will view liberalization as a chance to compete on a more even footing in the global economy. By contrast, for high-rank groups, weakening ethnic discrimination through liberalization introduces more market competition, diminishing their rank-based employment and wage advantages in markets vis-à-vis low-rank groups.

Recall that low-rank groups, in addition to being discriminated, are concentrated in low-skilled jobs. However, high-rank groups are relatively more diverse in their skills profile.[8] The overlapping skills and group profiles for low-rank groups makes ethnic identity more salient to these groups, while cross-cutting skills and group identity for high-rank groups makes it less likely that their support or resistance to globalization will cleave on ethnic lines.

Theoretical Predictions   In this section we derive a set of predictions by focusing on the skills and ethnic basis of trade support in a developing country:

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[8]As Horowitz (1985, 25) notes, "the clearest indicator of subordination...is the logical impossibility of an acknowledged upper class among the subordinate group. This is not to say that all members of a superordinate group are of upper-class standing...Within limits, a system of subordination can survive some dissonance between the economic status of the groups and that of its individual members, especially members of the superordinate group." The claim that high-rank groups are relatively more heterogeneous in their skills profiles than low-rank groups is reflected in a wide range of cases, such as whites in South Africa and the United States, and as we show later, the upper and middle castes of India.

Hypothesis 1: Members of low-rank ethnic groups will be more supportive of trade than those in high-rank groups.

H1 predicts higher trade support among low-rank group members due to the emergence of group solidarity over shared skills and experiences of discrimination. We do not expect a symmetric negative effect among high-rank groups because while these groups have historically benefited from autarky, their relatively more diverse economic profiles create divisions within the group over trade.[9]

As noted, globalization rewards individuals with particular skills profiles over others. Trade theory predicts that those who own factors of production that are abundant in the domestic economy stand to gain from international economic integration, whereas owners of relatively scarce factors of production lose materially from trade. In developing countries, low-skilled individuals therefore benefit from trade, whereas capital owners and high-skilled labor lose due to stiffer import competition, leading us to predict:

Hypothesis 2: Low-skilled individuals will be more supportive of trade than high-skilled individuals.

Hypothesis 1 focuses on an ethnic basis of trade attitudes, whereas Hypothesis 2 focuses on a skills basis for preference formation.

If members of low-rank ethnic groups are characterized solely by their skills profiles, then accounting for skills should rule out the role of ethnic identity in shaping preferences. But the intersection of ethnic and economic identities could shape preferences in two additional ways.

First, if *discrimination* experienced by low-rank groups in local labor markets is the decisive factor in shaping preferences, both high- and low-skilled low-rank ethnic members may consider a postliberalization context more lucrative.

Hypothesis 3a: Both high- and low-skilled members of low-rank ethnic groups will be more supportive of trade than those in high-rank groups.

Second, if trade support is disproportionately driven by low-skilled, low-rank individuals who hold complementary skills and ethnic profiles, then skills and ethnicity may create a reinforcing effect leading to greater support for trade from low-skilled low-rank individuals than high-skilled low-rank individuals (who face competing economic and ethnic pressures).

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[9]Theoretically, we can imagine a world where high-rank groups are highly homogeneous in their skills profiles. In this case we would expect a symmetric effect on high-rank groups—which is ethnic opposition to trade.

Hypothesis 3b: Low-skilled, low-rank individuals will be more supportive of trade than high-skilled, low-rank individuals.

Thus far, our hypotheses were derived by focusing on the developing world. What might our theory predict for trade support in advanced industrial economies with historically salient ranked cleavages? First, we expect low-skilled workers employed in comparatively disadvantaged industries to be less supportive of trade than high-skilled workers, a finding widely supported in existing work. Second, considerations of the ranked ethnic system provide diverging predictions for members of high- and low-rank groups. The high-rank, high-skilled will support trade while high-rank, low-skilled should be unambiguously protectionist, following their skills-based interests. However, low-rank groups that are overwhelmingly concentrated in low-skilled jobs will be cross pressured. Our expectation is that because low ranked groups anticipate that trade will allow them to compete in a less discriminatory environment, they will be more supportive of trade than high-rank, low-skilled groups.[10]

The Indian Case

We test our arguments in India, where ethnic differences within the caste system—which historically placed individuals into descent-based occupational castes—are central to explaining group-wise economic outcomes.[11]   Caste differences have brought employment discrimination, impeded trade across castes, and weakened access to critical public goods (Munshi, 2019; Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2005). Persistent caste-based economic discrimination creates inefficiencies in labor-market institutions and weakens human capital development (Thorat and Newman, 2007). Additionally, the Hindu-Muslim divide further shapes economic relations (Jha, 2013).[12]

Figure 1 plots the distribution of wealth within major caste groups in India using measures of asset ownership from National Elections Surveys. The figure shows that India's marginalized

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[10]The United States with its historic racial hierarchies is an example of such a society. Trade protectionism has been well documented among low-skilled whites (Baccini and Weymouth, 2021). Our theory provides one explanation for the high levels of support for free trade among African Americans and Hispanics documented by Mutz, Mansfield and Kim (2021); Mutz (2021); Mutz and Kim (2017).

[11]The hierarchical organization of castes along occupations led to SCs being spatially segregated and forced into low-paying, low-skill jobs. SCs have traditionally worked as agricultural labor, scavengers, sanitation workers, leatherworkers, and other professions considered menial by higher-caste groups (Thorat, 2002; Thorat and Sadana, 2009; Vidyarthee, 2015).

[12]Muslims routinely experience labor- and housing-market discrimination. India's Muslims have seen sharp declines in their economic and political status in the postindependence era (Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004; Sachar, 2006).

groups–SCs, STs and Muslims are concentrated in the lower end of the wealth distribution, while OBCs and Upper Castes are more heterogeneous in their class profiles.

Figure 1: Wealth distribution within major ethnic groups

Note: We create an index of wealth using measures of asset ownership from the National Elections surveys of 1999, 2004 and 2009. Privileged groups include Upper Castes and Backward Castes. Marginalized groups include Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Muslims. The lines on each violin plot indicate the median asset ownership index for the group.

India's postindependence economy was largely protected from foreign competition through trade barriers and a highly bureaucratic import-licensing system. In 1991, after a balance of payments crisis, India suddenly shifted to trade liberalization, causing the external sector to grow from 16 percent of its GDP in 1990 to 38 percent in 2020.

It wasn't obvious ex-ante how liberalization would impact the fortunes of low-rank groups. Communities historically excluded from socio-economic networks faced being "marginalized all over again" (Still, 2015, 11-12). But scholars who studied the impact of liberalization on marginalized groups found that trade reduced poverty among SCs in states with greater trade openness (Mukim and Panagariya, 2012).

Two channels emerge to explain this. First, SCs were well positioned to exploit the open economy because they specialized in skills that benefited from international trade. In Karnataka state, for example, SC leatherworkers could invest in international leather production, reducing their financial dependence on UCs and increasing their social and economic mobility (Kumar, 1998; Charsley,

2010). This was partly because their specialized sector was long considered "degrading and polluting" as it involved touching raw animal hides. Charsley (2010) finds that SCs were adept at all aspects of the leather-manufacturing value chain: securing hides, tanning, leather production, and leather financing, leaving them well positioned to gain from international trade.

The second factor driving these successes was the relative lack of ethnicity-based discriminatory practices in sectors that benefited from liberalization. Surveys asking SC respondents to compare their socio-economic outcomes before and after trade liberalization show that Dalits (synonymous with SCs) left their traditional occupations to enter new-economy professions, and reported less discrimination. In this finding, market reforms led to a "rapid erosion in discriminatory processes that stigmatised dalits" (Kapur et al., 2010). Scholars engaging with the cultural, social, and economic consequences of trade liberalization on Dalits have noted that SCs "were entering caste-neutral occupations" (Babu and Prasad, 2009, 25).[13]

Examples abound of low-rank groups benefiting from globalization. Carswell and De Neve (2013, 13) focus on Southern India's Tiruppur garment industry, with exports worth around $2.5 billion and half-a-million employees in 2010. They find that SC workers comprised 20 percent of the workforce. One SC interviewee said, "employers look to the talent, not at the caste." This contrasts with practices in the same state's rural hinterlands, as yet unexposed to global markets, where SCs still faced workplace discrimination, indebtedness, and social exclusion (Carswell and De Neve, 2013, 66). Ethnographic scholarship reveals similar trends in other other states and sectors. For example, the owner of a multinationally owned vehicle manufacturing plant in Punjab noted that the plant is "more modern" and similar to the rest of the global economy precisely because of its impersonal labor practices. Here, the language of globalization "advocates for formal mechanisms for hiring...and meritocratic principles," equating ethnic- or caste-based hiring with practices of the past (Newman and Jodhka, 2010, 69).

These ethnographic accounts appear to buttress the two theoretical mechanisms in our argument—skills specialization and discrimination—by which liberalization shapes the economic

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[13]Dalit activist Chandra Bhan Prasad notes that economic liberalization helped Dalits by leading to the "democratization of manufacturing." This opened up jobs for Dalits in companies and factories, where they benefited relatively more than other groups (that had flourished under India's previously closed economy). Increasing competition from globalization also created opportunities for entrepreneurs, leading to more Dalit-owned businesses and to greater "freedom of the underclass" (Rajagopalan, Shruti. "Ideas of India: On Ambedkarism, Caste and Dalit Capitalism." *Discourse.* February 11, 2011).

fortunes of groups in ranked ethnic systems. Yet scant evidence exists about whether these mechanisms generalize to mass preferences, especially given concerns about the ability of India's discriminated groups to navigate the postliberalization economy (Still, 2015).

In fact, scholars disagree on whether liberalization benefited the poor and low-skilled in the first place. Topalova (2007) shows that the sudden reduction of trade tariffs brought more poverty and greater inequality to trade-affected rural districts. Rudra (2008) argues that the growth in jobs to low-skilled workers, while benefiting the poor, weakened the middle class because of historically weak labor institutions. Others, notably Ural, Mitra and Hasan (2007), find that trade openness didn't worsen poverty; to the contrary, trade-exposed states experienced lower overall poverty, especially in regions with more flexible labor-market institutions.

The following sections describe three tests we conducted to examine how ethnic and economic identities shape trade preferences, offering new empirical insights into these ongoing debates.

Correlational Evidence from Public Opinion Surveys

We use National Election Studies (NES) surveys conducted after the 1999, 2004, and 2009 general elections to examine correlations between ethnic identity, skills, and trade preferences.[14] Survey questions probed attitudes toward trade policy, as well as respondents' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. See Appendix A.1 for descriptive statistics.

Trade Policy Preference: Our primary dependent variable captures answers to:

"Foreign companies should not be allowed free trade in India."
Do you agree or disagree?

The question presents the choice of supporting or opposing trade liberalization in terms easily understood by different categories of respondents, including the poor and less educated. In 1999, respondents were given three choices: "agree," "no opinion," or "disagree." In 2004 and 2009, five choices were offered, ranging from "fully agree" to "fully disagree." We rescaled the variables to hold a three-point value between 0 and 2, with higher values indicating greater opposition to liberalization.

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[14]We used these three years because they posed the same question to respondents. The surveys targeted large samples of voters across the Indian states and were conducted face-to-face in local languages. For example, the 2004 survey was conducted in 22 Indian languages and had 27,189 respondents.

Ethnic Variables: We operationalize ethnic categories as follows:

- Marginalized Ethnic Groups: This categorical variable takes a value of 1 if an individual is SC, ST, or Muslim; and a value of 0 if an individual is UC, OBC, or another religion.

- Politically Salient Ethnic Groups: This categorical variable sorts respondents into six categories, an approach used by scholars working on ethnicity and voting behavior in India (Dunning and Harrison, 2010; Huber and Suryanarayan, 2016). The categories are: UC, OBC, SC, ST, Muslims and other religions.

Economic Variables: We operationalize skills in two ways:

- Income: We use self-reported measures to classify whether an individual is above or below the average income in the sample (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).[15] As higher-skilled workers tend to command higher wages, income serves as a proxy for skill levels.[16]

- Education: We measure whether a respondent's education is below or above the sample average. We use education as an indicator of skills, but it might impact policy preferences through channels outside of material self-interest, such as norms of cosmopolitanism (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006).

Empirical Results

Table 1 examines the relationship between ethnicity and trade opposition. In each of the ordered logit regressions, we include respondents' age and gender, a dummy for the Northeast states, state and year fixed effects, and robust standard errors.[17] Column 1 probes the relationship between a respondent's ethnicity classified as *Marginalized Ethnic Groups*. The results are striking. In line with H1, compared to UCs, OBCs and other religions (the base category), the dummy variable for low-rank groups is negative and robust at conventional thresholds. This suggests that a respondent from a low-ranked ethnic group, holding all else constant, is 6 percent less likely to oppose trade liberalization compared with a respondent from a high-ranked group.[18] In Columns 2 and 3, we examine the effect of skills using the *Education* and *Income* measures. Corroborating H2, the

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[15]Because income wasn't collected in the 1999 survey, we restrict our analysis to the 2004 and 2009 surveys.

[16]Income can influence consumption preferences (Baker, 2003). Thus, we also use education to proxy for skills.

[17]We include state fixed effects to control for any unobserved variables that shape both state-level ethnic and economic structures; the state is the key level at which policy intervention occurs in India's federal democracy.

[18]Following Kleinberg and Fordham (2018), we retain the "don't know" and "no opinion" respondents instead of treating these as missing values. In Appendix Table A.3, we use multinomial logit regressions, and include "no opinion" as a separate category. The coefficient on the low-rank group dummy remains negative and robust.

coefficients for these variables are positive and statistically significant, showing that high-skilled respondents oppose trade more than low-skilled. These results support the HO model's prediction that low-skilled individuals are more likely to support free trade in developing countries.

Recall that H3a predicts that, irrespective of their skills profiles, all members of low-rank groups will support trade because liberalization offers an escape from discrimination. In Columns 4 and 5, we control for respondents' skills and show that the coefficients on the low-rank group dummy, while smaller in size, continue to remain significant across specifications. This suggests that while some of the initially-observed effects of ethnicity on trade preferences can be explained by respondents' skills profiles, their ethnic identities have an independent and robust correlation with trade support. In Columns 6 and 7, we probe H3a further, splitting the sample into high- and low-skilled respondents using the *Education* measure. We find that both high-skill and low-skill low-rank respondents are less opposed to trade compared to high rank respondents with the same skill profiles.

Finally, we explore whether trade preferences cleave across high- and low-skill members of marginalized groups. H3b predicts that low-skill, low-rank individuals are more supportive of trade than high-skill, low-rank individuals because the former do not face competing pressures related to skills and ethnicity. Column 8, which restricts the sample to respondents from low-rank groups, provides evidence to support this claim; low-skilled respondents favor trade more than high-skilled respondents.

Robustness Checks Our results are robust to alternate coding choices of ethnicity and skills. In Appendix Table A.4 we replicate Table 1 using the *Politically Salient Ethnic Groups* variable, which categorizes respondents into six groups, and find that SCs and Muslims are less opposed to trade than high-rank respondents.[19] The skills variables remain positive and robust, and identity is not a significant predictor of trade for other ethnic groups. Additionally, in Appendix Table A.6, we replicate Table 1 using continuous measures of *Education* and *Income*, as well as alternate measures of respondents' skills: (a) *Wealth* created using a count measure of assets owned and (b) *Occupation* using self-reported occupations which we categorize as high- or low-skill; both created from the NES. Each of these specification show that the skills measures remain robust, and all of the substantive interpretations of our findings hold.[20]

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[19]In Appendix Table A.5, we refit the model using multinomial logit regressions, and include "no opinion" as a separate outcome category and find that the results hold.

[20]The NES surveys used random sampling at the state level, with efforts to over-sample under-privileged groups

Table 1: Individual-Level Relationship Between Opposition to Trade and Measures of Ethnicity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) Low Educ	(7) High Educ	(8) SC/ST/Muslim
SC/ST/Muslim	-0.064*** (0.015)			-0.048** (0.015)	-0.059*** (0.016)	-0.042* (0.018)	-0.057† (0.029)	
Education		0.121*** (0.019)		0.113*** (0.019)				0.068* (0.034)
Income			0.089*** (0.016)		0.081*** (0.016)			
N	69609	69665	60562	69609	60506	46599	23010	27254

– Models are estimated using ordered logit, state and year fixed effects with robust standard errors.
– Dependent variable is a three-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 2
– Standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
– Results with controls for age, gender and dummy for the North-East are provided in Table A.2

We also buttress the individual-level findings by examining state-level trade support. We do this because in India's federal system, states retain jurisdiction over many economic policy levers, including tariffs and FDI inducements. India's states also vary markedly in ethnic composition. Appendix B details our research design and approach; we measured skills using fine-grained occupational data. As Appendix Table A.7 shows, after controlling for a host of economic and ethnic factors, a greater proportion of low-rank groups is associated with less opposition to trade at the state level. We also find a robust and positive relationship between the proportion of high-skilled workers and opposition to liberalization. These results corroborate our individual-level analyses.

Our observational data shows that low-rank groups support trade more than high-rank groups. Additionally, both low- and high-skilled members of low-rank groups support trade more than their high-rank counterparts. Finally, among the marginalized, low-skilled individuals support trade more than high-skilled. Together, these findings are consistent with an economic logic of trade support among disadvantaged groups, who hold skills that disproportionately benefit from trade and for whom trade offers less discriminatory avenues for upward mobility. Yet the correlations documented above are only suggestive. Our interpretations are limited by the specifics of the survey question wording and an inability to adjudicate mechanisms. Therefore, we next use a survey experiment to probe the causal mechanisms by which ethnic and economic determinants shape trade support.

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to get a balanced sample. We refit Table 1 using cluster robust standard errors and our main results hold.

Experimental Study

We embedded a vignette experiment within a large, nationally representative survey of voting-age citizens in India conducted in July–October, 2017.[21]

Sample: We used Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing, drawing on the database of all mobile phone and landline connections in the country.[22] To maximize participation, we offered the survey in 11 languages.[23] On key demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, income, religion, caste, and geography), our sample matched India's population according to the 2011 census. See Appendix D.1 for survey methodology, Appendix D.2 for descriptive statistics, and Appendix D.3 for geocoded locations of respondents.

Experimental Design: The vignette embedded in the survey began: "We want to hear your views on trade between India and other countries." We assigned respondents to one of six treatment groups:

- T1 (Control): Suppose trade will increase the wages of **some workers**. But trade will lower the wages of **other workers**.

- T2 (Skills Treatment): Suppose trade will increase the wages of **some workers who are low-skilled and have not passed high school**. But trade will lower the wages of **other workers who are high-skilled and have passed high school**.

- T3 (Co-ethnic Gains Treatment): Suppose trade will increase the wages of workers like **[co-ethnic category and name / non-co-ethnic category and name]**. But trade will lower the wages of **other workers**.

- T4 (Co-ethnic Loses Treatment): Suppose trade will increase the wages of **some workers**. But trade will lower the wages of workers like **[co-ethnic category and name / non-co-ethnic category and name]**.

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[21]This experiment was not pre-registered. However, we presented our theory and observational analyses with the NES individual- and state-level findings at the [Redacted] India Political Economy Workshop on December 2-3, 2016. On the advice of the workshop participants, we fielded survey experiments in 2017 in order to replicate the findings of the observational analysis and probe underlying theoretical mechanisms.

[22]See Appendix C for this study's research ethics.

[23]Hindi, Punjabi, Gujarati, Marathi, Kannada, Malayalam, Tamil, Telugu, Odiya, Bangla and Asamiya.

- T5 (Skills + Co-ethnic Gains Treatment): Suppose trade will increase the wages of workers like **[co-ethnic category and name / non-co-ethnic category and name] who are low skilled and have not passed high school**. But trade will lower the wages of **other workers who are high-skilled and have passed high school.**

- T6 (Skills + Co-ethnic Loses Treatment): Suppose trade will increase the wages of **some workers who are low-skilled and have not passed high school**. But trade will lower the wages of workers like **[co-ethnic category and name / non-co-ethnic category and name] who are high-skilled and have passed high school**.

Following this vignette, we asked: "Based on this information, to what extent do you support or oppose increasing trade between India and other countries?" We coded responses on a scale from 1 ("very much support") to 5 ("very much oppose").

T1 simply informs respondents that trade has distributive impacts, without specifying who wins or loses. T2 follows Rho and Tomz (2017) by giving information about the skills and educational profiles of workers the HO model predicts will either benefit or lose from trade. High-skilled (low-skilled) respondents are expected to decrease (increase) their trade support.[24] T2, along with T5 and T6, provides this information to respondents. We created a variable "Skills Treatment," which took a value of 1 if the respondent received information about the skills-based distributive impact of trade and a value of 0 if not.

T3 and T4 provide information about the religion/caste of workers who gain or lose from trade. We matched this with respondents' own religions/castes to determine an ethnic match or mismatch. In T3, either a co-ethnic or non-co-ethnic gains from trade, whereas in T4 either a co-ethnic or non-co-ethnic is harmed by trade. We predict that members of low-rank (SC, ST, and Muslim) groups will, on average, prefer co-ethnics benefiting from trade compared to non-co-ethnics, in line with our theoretical framework, but we don't expect a similar effect high-rank groups, in line with H1.

To construct these treatments in the context of a culturally diverse national sample, we followed a rigorous protocol.[25] We conducted qualitative research to determine the four or five most populous

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[24]Loss aversion theory predicts that trade opposition stemming from wage or job losses is more pronounced than trade support based on potential future income increases (Hiscox, 2006).

[25]We followed Gaikwad and Nellis (2017) in giving respondents a hypothetical worker's name, designed to convey religion or caste.

religious and caste groupings in each state. We then ascertained the most popular name associated with each state's religious and caste groupings.[26] At the survey's start, respondents disclosed their state of residence; we used this to select which state-specific religion or caste names the respondents would observe in the ethnic treatments.

To code whether a respondent was paired with a co-ethnic or a non-co-ethnic, we matched the respondent's self-reported "jati" (sub-caste and sub-religion categories) to the religion/caste name they'd encounter in the vignette. We followed the NES methodology of allowing respondents to select one of approximately 1,000 jatis that are most salient in the country. We then aggregated respondents' jatis up to broader caste and religious categories to create fine-grained ethnicity matches and mismatches. Each respondent had a 20-25 percent chance of getting a religion/caste match. Based on a co-ethnic match or mismatch, we created a variable, "Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment," that took a value of 1 if a respondent's co-ethnic stood to gain (in T3 and T5) or not lose (in T4 and T6) from trade, and 0 otherwise.

T5 and T6 provides information about the distributive impact of trade in terms of both skills and ethnicity. Respondents learn that trade will differentially affect both high- and low-skilled individuals and members of co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic communities. Our prediction is that ethnicity concerns will be especially pronounced for low-skilled, low-rank communities due to the overlap between skills- and ethnicity-related concerns in this group.

Table 2 summarizes the treatments and Appendix D.4 presents examples. Both our skills-based and co-ethnicity treatments achieved balance on a battery of pretreatment covariates (see Appendix D.5).[27] We include pretreatment demographic controls in our results, but all of our results are robust to the exclusion of these control variables.

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[26]Typically, castes and religious groups are identified by different names across states, and we wished to provide names to which respondents could relate. We subjected the names to manipulation checks on MTurk to confirm that respondents from particular states associated the names with the intended caste and religion.

[27]Across a large number of comparisons, one variable (gender) was unbalanced, as might have been expected by chance alone. We control for this variable in our experimental analysis.

Table 2: Summary of Ethnic and Economic Experimental Manipulations

	Treatments	Experimental Manipulations
T1	Control	
T2	Skills Treatment	Skills profiles that gain or lose from trade
T3 + T4	Ethnic Treatment	One of four ethnic groups in respondent's state gaining or losing from trade
T5 + T6	Skills + Ethnic Treatment	Both skills profiles and one of four ethnic groups in respondent's state gaining or losing from trade

Experimental Results

We analyze our experimental treatments in a step-wise fashion. To test H2, we study whether giving respondents information on the winners and losers of trade evokes opposition among the high-skilled and support among the low-skilled. Table 3 presents the effects of the skills treatment on average opposition to trade (higher values of the outcome variable indicate greater opposition). We begin by compartmentalizing our sample into high-skilled (Column 1) and low-skilled (Column 2) respondents.[28] High-skilled respondents who learn about the distributive impact of trade are significantly less likely to support free trade compared to those who didn't receive this information; economic groups that are poised to be harmed by international trade display protectionist sentiments, in line with their material interests and supporting the HO model.

Table 3: Effect of Skills Treatment on Opposition to Trade

	High-Skilled	Low-Skilled	Interaction with Respondent Skill
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Skills Treatment	0.33***	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Respondent Skill			-0.13*
			(0.07)
Skill Treatment x Respondent Skill			0.34***
			(0.10)
Constant (control mean)	2.13	2.24	2.25
N	1,493	2,681	4,174
Controls	Y	Y	Y

– Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Results for control variables provided in Table A.14.

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[28]We use respondents' educational achievement to define high- or low-skilled. Our results are substantively the same using respondents' incomes.

The skills treatment, by contrast, doesn't have a statistically significant impact on attitudes among low-skilled respondents.[29] Column 3 provides a formal test of H2 regarding the effect of skills on trade attitudes. Here we use a binary variable indicating whether the respondent was high- or low-skilled and a dummy for the skills treatment. The coefficient on the interaction term indicates that high-skilled respondents react negatively to the skills treatment compared with low-skilled respondents. Our results indicate that groups standing to lose from trade evince protectionist attitudes when informed about the distributive impact of trade, and develop different preferences from those standing to benefit.

Table 4: Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment on Opposition to Trade

	UC/OBC	SC/ST/MUSLIM	Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment	-0.01	-0.30**	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			0.20**
			(0.07)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			-0.29*
			(0.12)
Constant (control mean)	2.19	2.34	2.18
N	2,745	1,122	3,867
Controls	Y	Y	Y

– Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Results for control variables provided in Table A.15.

We now turn to testing our central theoretical claims regarding trade support in ranked ethnic systems. Recall, H1 states that low-rank groups are more supportive of trade than high-rank groups. We study whether giving respondents information about the ethnic winners/losers of trade evokes co-ethnic support among the low-rank but not high-rank groups. In Table 4, we partition our sample into UC/OBC (high-rank) and SC/ST/Muslim (low-rank) respondents. A striking pattern emerges. Low-rank individuals are significantly more likely to support trade when informed that their co-ethnics will benefit from trade, all else equal. But among high-rank individuals there is no

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[29]One explanation is that individuals weigh anticipated losses more than gains and hence are more sensitive to cues informing them of material harm. For example, Hiscox (2006) establishes that antitrade information provokes opposition to trade among American survey respondents, whereas protrade information doesn't congruently generate trade support. Plausibly, material considerations are more pronounced for trade losers than winners.

similar effect. Column 3 interacts the treatment with a dummy variable for low-rank groups and demonstrates that marginalized communities are more positive toward trade following the co-ethnic benefits treatment than are privileged ethnic groups.

Our results show a co-ethnic treatment effect for marginalized groups, and a null effect for privileged groups, in line with H1. This supports our contention that international trade provides opportunities for occupational mobility for ethnic groups suffering from discrimination in domestic labor markets. Marginalized communities develop groupwise solidarity when formulating attitudes on trade policies because they view trade as improving the material prospects of *all* group members. By contrast, privileged ethnic communities don't view their fortunes as tied to those of their co-ethnics, so far as trade is concerned.[30]

Table 5: Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment on Opposition to Trade, by Social Group and Income

	UC/OBC High-Skill	UC/OBC Low-Skill	UC/OBC	SC/ST/Muslim High-Skill	SC/ST/Muslim Low-Skill	SC/ST/Muslim
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment	-0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.31†	-0.30*	-0.30*
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Respondent Skill			0.08			0.09
			(0.08)			(0.13)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x			-0.06			-0.01
Respondent Skill			(0.14)			(0.22)
Constant (control mean)	2.20	2.19	2.17	2.33	2.34	2.32
N	1,056	1,689	2,745	317	805	1,122
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

– Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Results for control variables provided in Table A.16.

Next we probe H3a, which claims that both high- and low-skilled members of low-rank groups will support trade. In Table 5, we uncover evidence of a consistent co-ethnic treatment effect among low-rank respondents. Both high-skilled (Column 4) and low-skilled (Column 5) individuals support trade when informed that a co-ethnic will benefit. The lack of a significant interaction

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[30]We constructed the variable "Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment" as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a co-ethnic benefits and 0 if either a non-co-ethnic benefits or if the respondent is assigned to the control group. Appendix Table A.10 distinguishes between the latter two categories. We find that marginalized groups are more supportive of trade when informed about a co-ethnic benefiting, while privileged groups treat non-co-ethnics and co-ethnics similarly.

term in Column 6 indicates that high- and low-skilled individuals in this group respond similarly when informed that trade will improve the fortunes of their co-ethnics relative to non-co-ethnics. In contrast, among high-rank groups, the co-ethnics benefits treatment has no effect among either the high-skilled (Column 1) or low-skilled (Column 2), and both groups are effectively indistinguishable from each other in responses to the experimental treatment (Column 3). This is unsurprising because members of groups who don't face domestic market constraints (that is, high-rank groups) formulate trade preferences based on their varied skills profiles, not their ethnicity.

Appendix Table A.11, which investigates the effect of the skills treatment by ranked ethnic groups, reinforces this point. High-rank, high-skilled respondents are more antitrade when informed about the skills-based impact of trade, while high-rank, low-skilled respondents are not. We discern no such variegated response to the skills treatment among high- and low-skilled respondents of low-rank groups. This suggests that high-rank groups primarily base their views on trade using cues about skills.

We purposefully designed our experimental manipulations to be able to study the joint effects of the ethnicity and skills treatments. We do this by priming respondents in T5 and T6 about *both* the skills and the ethnic winners and losers of trade.

Table 6 interacts the skills treatment and the co-ethnic benefits treatment for each group. When members of low-rank communities are informed about both the skills and ethnic impacts of trade, their support for trade rises markedly (Column 2). This suggests that co-ethnic solidarity emerges when respondents gain knowledge of the skills-based distributive impact of trade. In contrast, the skills and ethnicity treatments don't have an interactive effect for privileged groups (Column 1). Column 3 runs a triple-interaction model, interacting the skills treatment, co-ethnic benefits treatment, and a dummy variable for marginalized groups; the co-efficient on the triple interaction term is statistically significant (β=-0.53; p=0.03), providing support for the reinforcing effect of skills and ethnicity for low-rank groups. These findings suggest that low-rank groups don't simply display co-ethnic solidarity for "taste-based" reasons; instead, an economic logic of "linked fate" seems to be at work.

To further probe the economic underpinnings of co-ethnic support, we restrict our sample to only respondents who received information about the skills-based distributive effects of trade. Thus all respondents start at the same point in understanding the economic effects of trade, allowing

Table 6: Interaction of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment and Skills Treatment, by Social Group

	UC/OBC	SC/ST/Muslim	Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment	-0.09	-0.12	-0.09
	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.09)
Skills Treatment	0.10	0.16	0.10
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x Skills Treatment	0.17	-0.37*	0.17
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.13)
SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			0.17†
			(0.10)
Skills Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			0.06
			(0.14)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			-0.04
			(0.17)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x Skills Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			-0.53*
			(0.25)
Constant (control mean)	2.14	2.26	2.00
N	2,745	1,122	3,867
Controls	Y	Y	Y

– Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Results for control variables provided in Table A.17.

us to study the marginal effect of being informed about a co-ethnic winning, and how that effect varies by the skills profile of low-rank groups. We achieve this by focusing on respondents who received T2, T5 and T6. In Table 7, among low-rank groups, the co-ethnic benefits treatment is significant, precisely estimated, and qualitatively large (β=-0.49; p=0.00); no such effect exists among high-rank groups. When we interact the co-ethnic benefits treatment with a dummy for marginalized groups, we find that co-ethnicity is a strong predictor of preferences only for members of subaltern communities, further bolstering H3a.

Appendix Table A.12 reports the marginal effect of the co-ethnic benefits treatment among low-rank groups who also received the skills treatment. Low-skilled, low-rank individuals respond to information about trade benefiting co-ethnics by supporting trade, but this effect isn't statistically

Table 7: Marginal Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment

	UC/OBC	SC/ST/Muslim	Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment	0.08	-0.49***	0.09
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)
SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			0.23*
			(0.10)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x			-0.57***
SC/ST/Muslim			(0.17)
Constant (control mean)	2.18	2.29	2.15
N	1,339	550	1,889
Controls	Y	Y	Y

– Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Results for control variables provided in Table A.18.

distinguishable from the effect among high-skilled, low-rank individuals. This further supports H3a; both high- and low-skilled respondents support trade when considering its welfare enhancing effects for the group as a whole.

We conclude by considering if skills and ethnicity have a reinforcing effect for low-rank individuals with complementary skills and ethnic profiles, as posited in H3b. Appendix Table A.13 studies the marginal effect of the skills treatment for low-rank respondents who also received the co-ethnic benefits treatment. Interacting the skills treatment with respondents' skill levels, we observe heterogeneity by skills within the low-rank group. In line with H3b, low-skilled respondents are more supportive of trade than their high-skilled counterparts, indicating that skills and ethnicity have an overlapping influence in low-rank groups.

Evidence From Other Multiethnic Systems

In this section, we examine whether our arguments extend beyond the Indian case to other multiethnic developing countries. We begin by comparing trade support by ethnic/racial groups in South Africa and Nigeria. While multiple ethnic cleavages (tribe, religion, race, and language) are politically salient in postcolonial Africa, we focus on racial divisions in South Africa and tribal divisions in Nigeria to illustrate how ethnic solidarity for trade emerges. We follow convention

in categorizing South Africa as a ranked system, where an apartheid regime structured politics for almost half a century (Gisselquist, 2013). Recent scholarship has shown that the effects of apartheid-era policies are still pervasive, as Black (80.9% of the population) and Colored (7.8%) citizens report much lower socioeconomic outcomes than white citizens (8.9%) (Armstrong, Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008; Kaus, 2013).

In comparison, we categorize Nigeria as an unranked ethnic system, with over 100 ethnic groups of which three main tribes—Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa—compete politically. Scholars have argued that British colonial policies largely left in place an unranked system of ethnic stratification, and that ethnic mobilization in the postcolonial context was a strategy to gain access to scarce state resources (Bates, 1974; Blanton, Mason and Athow, 2001). Although some tribes, notably the Yorubas, were relatively more represented in colonial government bureaucracies (an advantage that persists today), Nigeria's main tribes are relatively evenly matched socioeconomically (Horowitz, 1985; Johnson-Kanu, 2021, 17).[31] We conduct a comparative analysis by analyzing a question in the 2016 Afrobarometer data for South Africa and Nigeria (see Appendix E.1 for details). As Figure 2 shows, we find that Non-White South Africans support trade more than whites. These results are significant at conventional thresholds, and robust to the skill levels of respondents. In Nigeria, however, we find no differences in support for trade across the three tribal communities relative to an omitted category comprising all other tribes.

We also study trade preferences in the ranked ethnic system in the Philippines, where colonial-era policies and postindependence politics have led to exclusion and state injustice against the minority Muslim population (Horowitz 1985, 29,McDoom 2019b). Compared to Christians, the Muslim Moros experience labor-market discrimination, specialize in low-skill occupations, register socioeconomic deprivation, and are "increasingly marginalised" (McDoom and Gisselquist 2016, 1538, McDoom 2019a, 871). Using Asian Barometer data, Figure 2 shows that Muslims in the Philippines support trade more than high-rank groups (also see Appendix E.1 and Appendix Table A.21).

The results from South Africa and the Philippines suggest that in ranked ethnic systems, similar to the Indian context, an economic logic of "linked fate" makes marginalized ethnic groups more

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[31]To the extent ethnic inequality has emerged among tribal groups in Nigeria, it is attributed to historic variations in sub-national resources and patterns of development, rather than as an outcome of a ranked ethnic system structuring labor markets and inter-group relations (Archibong, 2018). Horowitz (1981) describes competition between ethnic groups in Nigeria as one over territorial redistribution of resources, akin to contests between Bengalis and Urdu speakers in undivided Pakistan, and Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka.

Figure 2: Coefficients of individual-level determinants of trade support in three countries

supportive of trade. However, "taste-based" cultural differences in an unranked system like Nigeria don't lead to the same differences in trade support.

Finally, we examine whether marginalized groups hold distinctive views on trade compared with privileged groups across 28 multi-ethnic developing countries for which individual-level trade support and group-based inequality data were available.[32] We first model trade support at the country-level among marginalized ethnic groups. Next, we regress the coefficient of trade support among marginalized groups on a measure of between group economic inequality in the country using data from Baldwin and Huber (2010). The results show that an increase in group-based inequality is associated with more support for trade among low-rank groups.

Figure 3: Cross-national analysis of trade support among low rank groups

Notes: The figure plots country-level coefficients of low-ranked members' support for trade against between-group inequality in the country. The control variables included education, gender, and age.

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[32]Appendix E.2 gives more details of the surveys in our samples, coding choices for inclusion as marginalized or privileged, the statistical models used, and discusses the substantive interpretation of the results.

Conclusion

Although trade-liberalization is often considered elite-driven and harmful to lower-skilled workers, we show that those workers favor international economic integration when they stand to benefit from trade. Two central findings emerge. First, trade support varies by *ethnic* groups. Access to global markets can disrupt ethnic relations in ethnically ranked societies. Drawing on observational data and an original survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of Indian voters, we show that individuals in privileged ethnic groups lack solidarity with their co-ethnics over their views on trade. In contrast, ethnicity shapes the trade preferences of individuals in discriminated groups. This is striking, as we might expect both the privileged and underprivileged to prioritize ethnic identity, to either uphold or upend the status quo. We argue that these findings emerge because trade liberalization provides fewer discriminatory avenues for advancement for low-rank ethnic groups. Additionally, in developing countries, members of low-rank groups possess skills that benefit from trade, unlike the more variegated profiles of privileged groups. So for low-rank groups, trade policies that benefit co-ethnics are viewed as being coterminous with policies that advance their own economic well-being. Our results hold beyond the Indian context in other ranked ethnic systems around the world.

Second, beyond our findings on ethnicity, our paper also addresses debates on the extent to which *economic* considerations shape individual attitudes on trade policy (cf. Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Rho and Tomz 2017). Because developing countries have an advantage in producing labor-intensive goods, low-skilled individuals are expected to gain from, and support, trade. This is indeed what we find: low-skilled workers are more likely to favor liberalization than high-skilled workers. This result holds whether we analyze skills in terms of education, income, or occupation. It holds at the individual level using observational and experimental data, and at the state-level, where support for free trade is higher in states with more low-skilled workers. Thus, the conclusions of prominent studies that question the HO model by drawing on evidence from advanced industrialized countries might be premature.

Scholars have long documented the phenomenon of "linked fate"—the belief that individual life prospects are inextricably tied to the group as a whole (Dawson, 1995; Gay and Tate, 1998). For scholars of race and politics, linked fate emerges from historical discrimination and segregation in

countries like the United States. Shared experiences of racism and oppression generates loyalty to fellow racial-group members—often contrasted with a rational, individualistic, and economic interest-based approach to political behavior. The concept of linked fate has come to be a stand-in for group-based solidarities (Rogers and Kim, 2021). Our findings contribute to this scholarship—which has primarily focused on US race-relations—by showing that disadvantaged communities in other parts of the world express similar solidarity with their co-ethnics. Critically, we offer an *economic logic* for why linked fate emerges, focusing on the macro context within which ethnic politics unfolds. Marginalized groups develop linked fate because they understand the ethnic basis of discriminatory market structures within ranked ethnic systems in autarky and, in turn, the disproportionate group-related gains from integration into the global economy.

A major claim in the literature is that democratization ought to lead to trade liberalization in developing countries; but as Milner and Kubota (2005, 138) emphasize, India "remains a puzzle; long a democracy, the government has only recently chosen to lower trade barriers." One possible reason for why trade protection persisted for more than forty years after independence is that high-rank groups resisted liberalization. These groups that had historically benefited from skills specialization and caste- and religion-based market discrimination under autarky potentially anticipated that liberalization would upturn the social order and empower low-rank groups. While the politics of liberalization in India has largely been explained as an externally-imposed technocratic endeavor that followed a balance of payment crisis (Alamgir, 2009), our findings are consistent with the claim that liberalization unlocked a set of electoral interests both among India's low-skilled as well as low-ranked groups in support of globalization. Our paper therefore highlights the importance of studying mass politics and the distributive conflicts that emerge from skills, ethnicity, and their intersection in shaping policy debates over globalization.[33]

Scholarship rooted in critical theory and analysis maintains that globalization portends new forms of marginalization for historically disadvantaged groups everywhere (Still, 2015; Mendieta, 2012). Our findings of the opposite empirical pattern in India and elsewhere show that there is in fact broad support for trade among discriminated ethnic groups who view it as a workaround to

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[33]Voter coalitions have increasingly played a bigger role in trade policy contestations in India. Political parties, for example, prominently feature trade policy platforms in their campaign speeches and party manifestos. Some notable examples include the BJP Manifesto 1998, the Communist Party Manifesto 2009 and the Congress Manifesto 2014. The party platforms highlight the role of key political constituencies as decisive stakeholders in the policy-making process over tariffs and foreign direct investment.

domestic barriers that discriminate against them.

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Appendix

"Attitudes toward Globalization in Ranked Ethnic Societies"

Table of Contents

A   Observational Individual-Level Analysis

A.1   Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Observational Sample

Variable	Mean
Age	40.15 years
Education	2.3 – Below High School Diploma
HH Monthly Income	3.48 – Rs.2001 - Rs.3000
Wealth	42 – Wealth Index
Gender	47%
Upper Caste	22%
Other Backward Classes	30%
Scheduled Caste	14%
Scheduled Tribe	13%
Muslim	11%
Others	11%
NES 1999	13%
NES 2004	37 %
NES 2009	50 %
N	69,665

A.2 Main Manuscript Table 1 with Control Variables

Table A.2: Individual-Level Relationship Between Opposition to Trade and Measures of Low Rank
Groups and Skills

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) Low Educ	(7) High Educ	(8) SC/ST/Muslim
SC/ST/Muslim	-0.064***			-0.048**	-0.059***	-0.042*	-0.057†	
	(0.015)			(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.029)	
Education		0.121***		0.113***				0.068*
		(0.019)		(0.019)				(0.034)
Income			0.089***		0.081***			
			(0.016)		(0.016)			
Female	-0.096***	-0.078***	-0.071***	-0.079***	-0.070***	-0.103***	-0.033	-0.073**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.023)
Age	-0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
NE	0.201***	0.185***	0.227***	0.194***	0.240***	0.145*	0.327**	0.347***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.102)	(0.078)
N	69609	69665	60562	69609	60506	46599	23010	27254

– Models are estimated using ordered logit, state and year fixed effects with robust standard errors.
– Dependent variable is a three-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 2
– Standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

A.3   Modeling "No Opinion"

Table A.3: Individual-Level Relationship Between Opposition to Trade and Measures of Low Rank Groups and Skill

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) Low Educ	(7) High Educ	(8) SC/ST/Muslim
DV="No Opinion/Don't know"								
SC/ST/Muslim	0.368***			0.204***	0.281***	0.200***	0.285***	
	(0.021)			(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.049)	
Education		-1.328***		-1.294***				-1.253***
		(0.025)		(0.026)				(0.043)
Income			-0.647***		-0.613***			
			(0.023)		(0.023)			
Female	0.782***	0.617***	0.746***	0.621***	0.746***	0.620***	0.577***	0.530***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.032)
Age	0.017***	0.008***	0.016***	0.008***	0.016***	0.009***	0.002	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
NE	-0.471***	-0.369***	-0.441***	-0.439***	-0.537***	-0.600***	0.306†	-0.299**
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.087)	(0.166)	(0.106)
DV="Oppose Trade"								
SC/ST/Muslim	-0.046*			-0.042*	-0.051*	-0.031	-0.051	
	(0.020)			(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.034)	
Education		0.024		0.018				-0.012
		(0.020)		(0.020)				(0.035)
Income			0.057**		0.051*			
			(0.021)		(0.021)			
Female	-0.041*	-0.038*	-0.028	-0.039*	-0.028	-0.059*	-0.003	-0.046
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Age	0.001*	0.002*	0.001*	0.002*	0.001*	0.002†	0.002	0.002†
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
NE	0.333***	0.329***	0.388***	0.333***	0.396***	0.309***	0.391**	0.588***
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.091)	(0.123)	(0.109)
N	69609	69665	60562	69609	60506	46599	23010	27254

– Models are estimated using multinomial logit, state and year fixed effects with robust standard errors.
– Dependent variable is a three-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 2
– Standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

A.4   Expanded Ethnic Category

Table A.4: OLOGIT- Individual-Level Relationship Between Opposition to Trade and Measures of Ethnicity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
				Low Educ	High Educ
Backward Caste	-0.032	-0.010	-0.007	0.001	-0.020
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.035)
Scheduled Caste	-0.100***	-0.071**	-0.084**	-0.060*	-0.084†
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.045)
Scheduled Tribe	-0.042	-0.008	-0.016	-0.023	0.075
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.054)
Muslim	-0.116***	-0.090**	-0.102***	-0.042	-0.171***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.049)
Others	-0.054	-0.038	-0.049	-0.023	-0.054
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.053)
Education		0.113***			
		(0.019)			
Income			0.084***		
			(0.016)		
Female	-0.097***	-0.079***	-0.070***	-0.103***	-0.034
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Age	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
NE	0.189***	0.183***	0.229***	0.140*	0.305**
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.069)	(0.103)
N	69609	69609	60506	46599	23010

– Models are estimated using ordered logit, state and year fixed effects with robust standard errors.
– Dependent variable is a three-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 2
– Standard errors in parentheses: † $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$, *** $p<.001$.

Table A.5: MLOGIT- Individual-Level Relationship Between Opposition to Trade and Exapnded Measures of Ethnicity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
					Low Educ	High Educ
DV=1 or "No Opinion/Don?t know"						
Backward caste	0.428***	0.202***	0.340***	0.177***	0.167**	0.219***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.061)	(0.037)
Scheduled Caste	0.607***	0.319***	0.455***	0.224***	0.404***	0.316***
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.076)	(0.042)
Scheduled Tribe	0.922***	0.583***	0.738***	0.441***	0.701***	0.584***
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.094)	(0.048)
Muslim	0.377***	0.116**	0.311***	0.160***	0.134†	0.142**
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.081)	(0.047)
Others	0.349***	0.192***	0.293***	0.197***	0.256**	0.170**
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.089)	(0.062)
Education		-1.260***				
		(0.026)				
Income				-0.569***		
				(0.023)		
Wealth					-0.017***	
					(0.000)	
Female	0.784***	0.626***	0.748***	0.782***	0.583***	0.625***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.045)	(0.024)
Age	0.017***	0.009***	0.016***	0.015***	0.003†	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
NE	-0.543***	-0.508***	-0.595***	-0.608***	0.226	-0.669***
	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.168)	(0.088)
DV=2 or Oppose Trade						
Backward Caste	-0.002	0.002	0.012	-0.003	-0.014	0.021
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Scheduled Caste	-0.073*	-0.069*	-0.083*	-0.074*	-0.073	-0.050
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.053)	(0.043)
Scheduled Tribe	0.050	0.056	0.060	0.050	0.131*	0.041
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.066)	(0.050)
Muslim	-0.106**	-0.099**	-0.100**	-0.104**	-0.185***	-0.037
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.056)	(0.049)
Others	-0.032	-0.030	-0.034	-0.033	-0.040	-0.024
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.062)
Education		0.020				
		(0.021)				
Income				0.057**		
				(0.021)		
Wealth					0.000	
					(0.000)	
Female	-0.042*	-0.039*	-0.029	-0.042*	-0.004	-0.059*
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.025)
Age	0.001*	0.002*	0.001*	0.001*	0.002	0.002†
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
NE	0.310***	0.312***	0.374***	0.310***	0.363**	0.294**
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.124)	(0.091)
N	69609	69609	60506	69602	23010	46599

– Models are estimated using multinomial logit, state and year fixed effects with robust standard errors.
– Dependent variable is a three-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 2
– Standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

A.5 Main Manuscript Table 1 using expanded education and income measures and alternate measures of skill

Table A.6: Individual-Level Relationship Between Opposition to Trade and Measures of Low rank Groups and Skill

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
SC/ST/Muslim					-0.040**	-0.051**	-0.046**	-0.057***
					(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education Full	0.033***				0.031***			
	(0.004)				(0.004)			
Income Full		0.030***				0.028***		
		(0.004)				(0.004)		
Wealth			0.001***				0.001***	
			(0.000)				(0.000)	
Occupation				0.044**				0.038*
				(0.016)				(0.017)
Age	0.001*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	-0.064***	-0.066***	-0.093***	-0.085***	-0.065***	-0.066***	-0.093***	-0.086***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
North-East	0.170**	0.232***	0.196***	0.150**	0.177**	0.242***	0.203***	0.168**
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.058)
N	69353	59877	69658	66729	69297	59821	69602	66684

– Models are estimated using ordered logit, state and year fixed effects with robust standard errors.
– Dependent variable is a three-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 2
– Standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

B Observational State-level Analysis

We buttress the individual-level findings by examining state-level support for trade liberalization. We do this because in India's federal system, states retain jurisdiction over many economic policy levers such as tariffs, subsidies, FDI inducements, special economic zones, amongst other business-related policies. India's states also vary markedly in their ethnic composition. We create state-level averages of public opposition to trade liberalization using the same NES data discussed above. To construct state-level measures of ethnic and economic determinants, we use nationally-representative data from three rounds of the Government of India's NSSO "Employment and Unemployment" surveys. The surveys were conducted the years before the parliamentary elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009, yielding over 100,0000 respondents each. The NSSO collects data on each respondent's state of residence, caste, religion, wages, and primary occupation as categorized by India's National Industrial Classification (NIC) codes. We categorized respondents into high- and low-skilled industries according to their NIC codes.[34]

We created the following state-level measures for the ethnicity and skills variables:

- ELF: This measure calculates the ethnolinguistic fractionalization score using the ethnic groups defined for the variable *Ranked Ethnicity* in each state.

- Percent SC/ ST/Muslim: This variable measures the percentage of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Muslims in the state.

- Percent High-Skill: This variable (which we term, *Percent High-Skill*) captures the percentage of a state's workforce that is employed in high-skilled industries.

- Percent Agriculture: This variable captures the percentage of the workforce reporting to be employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing, and related activities.[35]

Appendix Table A.7 shows that a greater proportion of SC/ST/Muslims in a state is associated with lower levels of trade opposition. We also find a robust and positive relationship between the percent of high-skilled workers in a state and opposition to trade. These results corroborate our individual-level analyses. In column 1 of table 6 we regress state-level measure of trade support on ELF while controlling for state-level Percent Skilled Workforce, GDP, Gini, and year fixed effects. We should expect a robust relationship between ELF and the opposition to trade if we believe the mechanism through which ethnic politics operates is the numerical competition between groups in the state. We find no significant relationship between ELF and trade support. In column 2 we investigate the relationship between the percentage of SC/ST/Muslim in the state to probe whether trade opposition is contingent on specific types of discriminated ethnic groups. We find that greater proportion of SC/ST/Muslims in a state is associated with lower levels of opposition to trade in the state and the coefficient on this variable is significant, similar to the individual-level findings. In Columns 1 and 2 we find a robust and positive relationship between the percent of high-skilled workers in a state and opposition to trade. In column 3 we substitute the Percent High Skill with another measure of state-level economic variation – Percent Agriculture – which is a proxy for low skilled labor. The coefficient on the Percent SC/ST/Muslim remains negative and significant in this model. Taken together these provide further corroborating evidence to the claims that ethnic groups that have historically been marginalized are more supportive of trade, a finding similar to the individual-level analysis presented earlier.

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[34]Low-skilled industries included agriculture, forestry, and fishing, as well as low-skilled manufacturing. High-skilled industries included chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and automobiles. Our results are robust to different classifications of respondents into high- and low-skilled industries. Because the NIC codes differed across the NSSO rounds, we created manual concordances to standardize the classification systems across all rounds.

[35]We restricted the analysis to NIC codes 01—05.

Table A.7: State-Level OLS regressions of Opposiion to Trade on Measures of Ethnicity

	(1)	(2)	(3)
ELF	0.014	-0.092	-0.128
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.085)
Percent SC/ST/Muslim		-0.198*	-0.214**
		(0.081)	(0.078)
Percent High Skill	+0.504*	+0.393*	
	(0.194)	(0.196)	
Percent Agriculture			-0.298*
			(0.140)
State GDP	-0.000	-0.000	+0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
State Gini Index	0.648*	0.746*	0.747*
	(0.318)	(0.326)	(0.320)
North-East Dummy	-0.018	+0.028	+0.055
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Adj. R-squared	0.072	0.103	0.100
N	68	68	68

–All models include year fixed effects with robust standard errors.

–Dependent variable is average trade opposition in state-year.

–Standard errors in parentheses. † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

C   Research Ethics

This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of [University Name and Protocol Number Redacted].

Voluntary informed consent was obtained by all human subjects. In our original survey, which was conducted via telephone, informed consent was obtained verbally and was built into the survey flow. Subjects were free to decline participation in the survey at any point during the study.

Prior to providing consent, subjects were informed about the goals of the research, foreseeable risks and benefits associated with the research, the scholarly nature of the research, compensation, the voluntary nature of the study, and relevant contact information. No deception was used in the surveys.

Survey respondents were not compensated monetarily for participating in the study; respondents were sampled at random from the general population and asked if they were interested in participating in a survey. We worked with a survey company (CVoter News Pvt. Ltd.) that does polling, market, and academic research and does not compensate survey takers.

Finally, in order to ascertain the appropriateness of the study with respect to local laws, cultural, social and political contexts, our research design and study was reviewed by a country expert not affiliated with the research project and experienced and knowledgeable about the local laws, regulations and customs.

D   Experimental Results

D.1   Survey Methodology

Our survey was implemented using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) that was able to draw on the population-wide database of all mobile phone and landline connections in the country. An automated predictive dialer randomly selected phone numbers to dial from all Indian telecom circles and digital exchanges. Given that the teledensity rate and, in particular, mobile phone usage is extremely high in India, we were able to access the vast majority of demographic groups through this mode of contact. There are several advantages to our mode of interviewing. Telephone surveys help mitigate privacy and social-desirability concerns that typically arise in the context of face-to-face surveys conducted in group settings in India (for example, if men insist on supervising interviews of women in the household), increasing in turn the truthfulness of elicited responses. Whereas certain types of individuals are extremely difficult to sample through Face-to-Face interviewing (such as, for example, employed workers in time intensive jobs) or internet-based interviewing (for instance, illiterate individuals), it is relatively easier to schedule and conduct telephone interviews with a broad range of citizens, boosting the representativeness of the sample. Additionally, we were able to record and supervise in real time the interviews, eliminating enumerator errors and enhancing the quality of responses. The survey was conducted by the firm CVoter News Pvt. Ltd.

In order to obtain a geographically and socio-economically representative sample, we over-sampled members of low-frequency type demographic groups. Note, also, that incoming calls are free for telephone users; respondents therefore did not have to bear any financial costs for the interviews, which meant that members of particular groups (such as the poor, for example) were no less likely to drop out of our sample frame than others. Additionally, public opinion interviews are exempted from the "Do Not Call" registry maintained by the Indian government for citizens who wish to avoid marketing and sales calls.

Our sample included the entire geography of India, and excluded only a few of the remote north-eastern states and union territories.

D.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.8: Descriptive Statistics of Experimental Sample

| Variable	Mean
Age	35 years
Gender	56%
Upper Caste	35%
Other Backward Classes	29%
Scheduled Caste	12%
Scheduled Tribe	3%
Muslim	14%
Christian	3%
Sikh	2%
Others (Buddhist, Jain, etc.)	2%
No Formal Education (Cannot Read/Write)	4%
No Formal Education (Can Read/Write)	24%
Primary School	16%
Secondary School	20%
Senior Secondary School	27%
Graduate School	9%
Diploma/Vocational Course	<1%
HH Monthly Income (< Rs. 1,000)	3%
HH Monthly Income (Rs. 1,001 - 5,000)	18%
HH Monthly Income (Rs. 5,001 - 10,000)	25%
HH Monthly Income (Rs. 10,001 - 20,000)	21%
HH Monthly Income (Rs. 20,001 - 30,000)	12%
HH Monthly Income (Rs. 30,001 - 40,000)	6%
HH Monthly Income (> Rs. 40,000)	12%
N	4,217

D.3 Geographic Distribution of Sample

Figure A.1: This map shows the geocoded locations from where respondents were sampled. Colors represent states and regions sampled in the country.

D.4 Treatment Examples

T3 presented to a respondent from West Bengal could look as follows: "We want to hear your views on trade between India and other countries. Suppose trade will increase the wages of **workers like an upper caste named Sudeb Banerjee**. But trade will lower the wages of **other workers**."

T6 for a respondent from Haryana state could be: "Suppose trade will increase the wages of **some workers who are low-skilled and have not passed high school**. But trade will lower the wages of **workers like an OBC named Dinesh Kumar Yadav who are high-skilled and have passed high school**."

D.5 Balance Tests

Table A.9: Tests of Covariate Balance (Vignette Experiment)

	Treatment:					
	Skills Treatment:			Co-ethnicity Treatment:		
	No	Yes	Diff (col 1-2)	No	Yes	Diff (col 4-5)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Respondent Characteristics						
Age	34.67	35.17	-0.497 (0.375)	35.07	34.60	0.470 (0.396)
Gender	1.46	1.45	0.013 (0.026)	1.46	1.42	0.036** (0.016)
Education	3.72	3.76	-0.044 (0.083)	3.76	3.77	-0.011 (0.052)
Income	3.74	3.82	-0.084 (0.094)	3.79	3.79	-0.001 (0.058)
State	16.22	16.29	-0.067 (0.452)	16.66	16.95	-0.292 (0.277)
Ethnic Group	3.96	3.91	0.051 (0.118)	3.93	3.97	-0.046 (0.071)
N	722	699		2,777	1,397	

Notes: Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 report the group means of the covariates under different treatment conditions. Columns 3 and 6 display the results of two-sided t-tests between the treatment conditions, assuming unequal variances.

D.6 Additional Results

Table A.10: Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment on Opposition to Trade

	UC/OBC	SC/ST/Muslim	Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Co-ethnic Benefits Control			
Non-Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment	0.33***	0.23†	0.33***
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment	0.16*	-0.19	0.16*
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.08)
SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			0.25*
			(0.10)
SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			-0.10
x Non-Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment			(0.14)
x Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment			-0.35*
			(0.14)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	0.07	0.11	0.08
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.05)
Constant (control mean)	2.03	2.24	2.02
N	2,745	1,122	3,867

–Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

In this Table we compare respondents in the control condition to respondents who received information about a co-ethnic benefiting as well as those who received information about a non-co-ethnic benefiting. The results further elucidate the mechanisms in our theoretical argument. Among marginalized groups, a non-co-ethnic benefiting from trade generates opposition to trade, whereas a co-ethnic benefiting from trade is associated with an uptick in support. But respondents belonging to privileged groups treat both non-co-ethnics and co-ethnics similarly, evidencing protectionist sentiments when both types of workers are predicted to benefit from trade. Our primary interest lies in Column 3, which shows that the effect of the co-ethnic benefits treatment relative to the control is significantly different for marginalized groups as compared to privileged groups.

Table A.11: Effect of Skills Treatment on Opposition to Trade, by Social Group and Income

	UC/OBC High-Skill	UC/OBC Low-Skill	UC/OBC	SC/ST/Muslim High-Skill	SC/ST/Muslim Low-Skill	SC/ST/Muslim
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Skills Treatment	0.51***	0.13	0.13	0.45	0.02	0.02
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.27)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Respondent Skill			-0.17			-0.11
			(0.15)			(0.28)
Skill Treatment x			0.38*			0.43
Respondent Skill			(0.18)			(0.32)
Age	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	0.13	0.20*	0.17*	0.10	0.12	0.12
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Constant (control mean)	1.78	1.94	1.94	1.90	1.99	1.99
N	697	1,120	1,817	205	535	740

–Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

This Table focuses on the skills treatment. Previously, we had documented how the skills treatment had a strong effect among high-skilled respondents but not among low-skilled respondents. We now show that the effect of the skills treatment is concentrated among high-skilled UC/OBC respondents, and that the treatment effect is significantly different across high- and low-skilled respondents in these groups. By contrast, the skills treatment does not have an effect among either high- or low-skilled SC/ST/Muslim respondents (Columns 4–6).

Table A.12: Marginal Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment, Conditional on Receiving Skills Treatment

	High Skill	Low Skill	Interaction with High-Skill Dummy
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment	-0.42	-0.50**	-0.50**
	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.17)
High-Skill Dummy			0.29
			(0.18)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x			0.08
High-Skill Dummy			(0.31)
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	-0.06	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.14)
Constant (control mean)	2.55	2.15	2.18
N	163	387	550

– Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

In this table we study the marginal effect of receiving a co-ethnic benefit treatment amongst low-ranked respondents who have also received the skills treatment (sub-setting our sample to T2, T5, and T6). Column 2 shows that low-skill respondents who receive co-ethnic cues become more favorable to trade. Column 3, which interacts the co-ethnic treatment with respondents' skill level, shows that the coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically significant, indicating that low-skill respondents are not statistically different than high-skill respondents in their response to co-ethnic cues. We interpret this as evidence of H3a where both both high and low skill respondents support trade when told about its welfare enhancing effect for the group as a whole.

Table A.13: Marginal Effect of Skills Treatment, Conditional on Receiving the Co-Ethnic Benefits Treatment

	High-Skill	Low-Skill	Interaction with High-Skill Dummy
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Skills Treatment	0.33	-0.25†	-0.25†
	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Respondent Skills			-0.24
			(0.18)
Skills Treatment x			0.57*
Respondent Skills			(0.26)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Gender	0.16	0.03	0.07
	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Constant (control mean)	2.03	2.14	2.37
N	213	516	729
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001			

In this table we study the marginal effect of receiving a skills treatment amongst low-ranked respondents who have also received the co-ethnic benefits treatment (sub-setting our sample to T3, T4, T5, and T6). Column 1 shows no statistically significant effect of the skills treatment on the high-skilled. Column 2 shows that low-skill respondents who receive skills cues become more favorable to trade. Column 3, which interacts the skills treatment with respondents' skill level, shows that the coefficient on the interaction term is significant, indicating that there is heterogeneity within the low-ranked group by skills. We interpret this as evidence of H3b where low-skill respondents are more supportive of trade than their high-skills counterparts due to the overlapping influence of both skills and ethnicity for members of this group.

D.7 Results for the Main Manuscript Tables in the Experimental Section with Control Variable

Table A.14: Effect of Skills Treatment on Opposition to Trade

	High-Skilled	Low-Skilled	Interaction with Respondent Skill
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Skills Treatment	0.33***	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Respondent Skill			-0.13†
			(0.07)
Skill Treatment x			0.34***
Respondent Skill			(0.10)
Age	-0.00	-0.00†	-0.00†
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	0.02	0.09	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Constant (control mean)	2.13	2.24	2.25
N	1,493	2,681	4,174

– Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Replication, with results of control variables, of Table 3.

Table A.15: Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment on Opposition to Trade

	UC/OBC	SC/ST/MUSLIM	Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment	-0.01	-0.30**	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			0.20**
			(0.07)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x			-0.29*
SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			(0.12)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	0.67	0.11	0.08
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.05)
Constant (control mean)	2.19	2.34	2.18
N	2,745	1,122	3,867

– Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Replication, with results of control variables, of Table 4.

Table A.16: Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment on Opposition to Trade, by Social Group and Income

	UC/OBC High-Skill	UC/OBC Low-Skill	UC/OBC	SC/ST/Muslim High-Skill	SC/ST/Muslim Low-Skill	SC/ST/Muslim
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment	-0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.31†	-0.30*	-0.30*
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Respondent Skill			0.08			0.09
			(0.08)			(0.13)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x			-0.06			-0.01
Respondent Skill			(0.14)			(0.22)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Gender	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.11	0.11
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Constant (control mean)	2.20	2.19	2.17	2.33	2.34	2.32
N	1,056	1,689	2,745	317	805	1,122

– Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Replication, with results of control variables, of Table 5.

Table A.17: Interaction of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment and Skills Treatment, by Social Group

	UC/OBC	SC/ST/Muslim	Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment	-0.09	-0.12	-0.09
	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.09)
Skills Treatment	0.10	0.16	0.10
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x	0.17	-0.37†	0.17
Skills Treatment	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.13)
SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			0.17†
			(0.10)
Skills Treatment x			0.06
SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			(0.14)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x			-0.04
SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			(0.17)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x			-0.53*
Skills Treatment x			(0.25)
SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	0.07	0.11	(0.08)
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.05)
Constant (control mean)	2.14	2.26	2.00
N	2,745	1,122	3,867

–Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Results for control variables provided in Table 6.

Table A.18: Marginal Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment

	UC/OBC	SC/ST/Muslim	Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment	0.08	-0.49***	0.09
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)
SC/ST/Muslim Dummy			0.23*
			(0.10)
Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x			-0.57***
SC/ST/Muslim			(0.17)
Age	-0.01	0.01	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Gender	0.19*	-0.28	0.13†
	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.08)
Constant (control mean)	2.18	2.29	2.15
N	1,339	550	1,889

– Robust standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

– Results for control variables provided in Table 7.

E External Validity

E.1 Measuring Trade Policy Preference in Nigeria, South Africa and Philippines

Like for India, our primary dependent variable aims at capturing individuals' attitudes toward trade policy. Respondents in the Philippines were asked to give their opinion to the statement: "*We should protect our farmers and workers by limiting the import of foreign goods.*" As they explicitly relate to trade in terms accessible to all respondents while not mentioning particular countries, such a question closely resembles the one used for India.

In Nigeria and South Africa, subjects were asked to choose which of these two statements they most agree with: "*1. People living in Nigeria/Southern Africa should be able to move freely across international borders in order to trade or work in other countries*" or "*2. Because foreign migrants take away jobs, and foreign traders sell their goods at very cheap prices, governments should protect their own citizens and limit the cross-border movement of people and goods.*" While the Afrobarometer assertions conflate immigration and trade issues, they are beneficial in our context to the extent that they capture broad preferences toward globalization and the main issues surrounding free trade in plain terms, and do so without naming specific countries. Additionally, under certain assumptions, factor proportion models offer similar predictions for trade and immigration preferences in this context (see Dolan and Milner 2023 for an extended discussion).

In the Philippines subjects were given five choices: strongly agree, agree, no opinion, disagree, and strongly disagree. In Nigeria and South Africa, respondents were given the possibility to strongly agree or agree with one of the two statements below, but also to choose neither of them. Converting this choice into a five-point scale by associating the first statement to support for free trade, and the second to opposition to such policies is thus quite straightforward. We re-scale the variables to hold a five-point value between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating greater support for trade liberalization. In line with the Indian case, we keep "Don't know" and "No opinion" respondents and assign them a median score.

In order to test the effects of respondents' ethnic or racial background on their attitude toward trade while accounting for skill effects, these categories were operationalized like in the Indian case. In Nigeria, we created three categorical variables— *Yoruba*, *Igbo* and *Hausa*—that each take the value of 1 if respondent identifies as a member of one of those groups, and zero otherwise. These three group comprise approximately 64% of the population of Nigeria (Johnson-Kanu, 2021; Horowitz, 1985; Blanton, Mason and Athow, 2001; Posner, 2004; Bates, 1974).

In South Africa, a *non-White* categorical variable takes a value of 1 if a respondent identifies as a member of a group most exposed to labor market discrimination, and 0 if the respondent identifies as White. In South Africa, it covers Black and Indian respondents (Gisselquist, 2013; Armstrong, Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008; Kaus, 2013).

In the Philippines, a similar categorical variable is used to differentiate between ethnic Christian and Muslim communities who have historically been exposed to discrimination (Horowitz 1985, 29; McDoom 2019*a*, 1538; McDoom and Gisselquist 2016, 871; McDoom 2019*b*). Muslims are coded as 1 and others, mainly Christians, are coded as 0.

As in the case of India, the following specifications control for education using a dummy variable *Education* measuring whether a respondent completed high school or not. Skills are also accounted for using a self-reported measure of individual income/standards of living, with a dummy variable *Income* classifying whether an individual is above or below the average income in the sample.

Table A.19: Individual-Level Relationship Between Support for Trade and Measures of Ethnicity in Nigeria (Afro-Barometer)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) High Educ	(7) Low Educ
Yoruba	-0.108			-0.129	-0.151	-0.016	-0.607
	(0.195)			(0.194)	(0.195)	(0.212)	(0.431)
Igbo	0.044			0.038	-0.008	0.136	-0.316
	(0.232)			(0.233)	(0.234)	(0.285)	(0.430)
Hausa	0.263			0.271	0.259	0.259	0.031
	(0.191)			(0.190)	(0.191)	(0.243)	(0.336)
Education		-0.077		-0.063			
		(0.089)		(0.089)			
Income			-0.066		-0.063		
			(0.090)		(0.090)		
Gender	-0.103	-0.109	-0.109	-0.111	-0.114	-0.118	-0.105
	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.102)	(0.136)
Age	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)
N	2250	2247	2197	2247	2197	1420	827

- Models are estimated using ordered logit, region fixed effects with robust standard errors.

- Models control for age and gender of respondent.

- Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.20: Individual-Level Relationship Between Support for Trade and Measures of Ethnicity in South Africa (Afro-Barometer)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) High Educ	(7) Low Educ
Non-White	0.245**			0.283**	0.267**	0.264*	0.898***
	(0.123)			(0.128)	(0.123)	(0.143)	(0.340)
Education		0.065		0.094			
		(0.082)		(0.093)			
Income			0.096		0.075		
			(0.086)		(0.093)		
Gender	-0.017	-0.046	-0.047	-0.015	-0.016	-0.046	-0.047
	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.108)	(0.131)
Age	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.004	0.001	0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
N	1916	2232	2220	1915	1903	1124	791

- Models are estimated using ordered logit, regional fixed effects with robust standard errors.
- Standard errors in parentheses.
- Whites are reference category. Non Whites include Indian and Black respondents.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.21: Individual-Level Relationship Between Support for Trade and Measures of Ethnicity in the Philippines (Asian-Barometer)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) High Educ	(7) Low Educ
Muslim	0.844***			0.816***	0.810***	0.919**	0.915***
	(0.245)			(0.248)	(0.242)	(0.394)	(0.340)
Education		-0.219*		-0.187			
		(0.116)		(0.118)			
Income			-0.324**		-0.293**		
			(0.131)		(0.134)		
Gender	-0.044	-0.031	-0.040	-0.034	-0.043	0.162	-0.298*
	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.149)	(0.180)
Age	-0.002	-0.005	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002	-0.005	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)
N	1200	1200	1185	1200	1185	718	482

- Models are estimated using ordered logit, region fixed effects with robust standard errors.
- Models control for age and gender of respondent.
- Standard errors in parentheses. Roman Catholic are reference category.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E.2 Cross-National Analysis

We further demonstrate the external validity of our theory in other ethnically divided developing countries. We first model trade support amongst ethnic groups in each country. Next, the country-level coefficients of free trade support amongst low rank groups are regressed on a country-level measure of between group inequality (BGI). The data for BGI came from Baldwin and Huber (2010), and the trade support data was taken from surveys conducted closest to the time period for which the BGI measures were available leading to the inclusion of 28 countries from Afrobarometer Round 6, Asian Barometer Wave 4, ISSP 2003 and 2013, and Latino Barometer 2007. We retained every ethnic group in a country with more than 40 respondents. We used the following rules to classify the base category (privileged group).

1. In historically ranked societies (Horowitz, 1985), we used the high rank group as base category

2. In a country where there is a substantial white population, we used white as the base category

3. Where there is no white population or an obviously ranked system, we used the largest ethnic group as the base category.

The results are shown in Figure A.2. In Figure (a), we run the tests with similar covariates used in Subsection E.1, such as education, gender, and age.[36] The positive and significant relationship suggests that as BGI rises, people from low-ranked groups are more likely to be supportive of free trade than those from high-ranked groups. The slope is 0.09 meaning that a one unit increase in the BGI index is associated with a rise of 0.09 odds ratio in the effects of ethnicity. In other words, low-ranked group members on average will increase trade support by around 15 percent in places with a level of BGI at 1, while people from low-ranked groups will be about 27 percent more supportive of trade in countries with a BGI index equalling to 2.[37] The effect of low-ranked membership, though varies across countries, is comparable in magnitude to other important determinants of trade preferences. For example, Table A.2 shows that people with higher education tend to be about 10 percent less supportive of free trade than their less educated peers. Scholarship on the relationship between gender and trade attitudes consistently finds that women are around 10 percent less likely than men to support free trade (Guisinger 2016, Mansfield, Mutz and Silver 2015, 309). In Figure (b), we conduct the tests without covariates, and the relationship remains positive, and the magnitude of the effects is largely unchanged. These results confirm that the effect of low-ranked membership changes along with the level of local inter-group inequality. Consistent with previous findings, the differential in trade support across groups with various ranks is more salient in a hierarchical society than the difference in a more equal environment.

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[36]We do not include individual incomes, because not all surveys have asked related questions.

[37]The first effect is calculated by the following equation: $exp(0.056 + 0.09) - 1 \approx 15\%$. The second one is based: $exp(0.056 + 0.09 \times 2) - 1 \approx 27\%$.

Figure A.2: Relationship between the Effect of Low-Ranked Membership on Trade Support and National Between-Group Inequality

(a) Relationship with Controls   (b) Relationship without Controls

Notes: These figures show how the effects of being low-ranked members on trade support vary across countries with different levels of between-group inequality. We exclude respondents who refused or were unable to provide group identities. To reduce biases, we also only include medium to large groups with the number of observations greater than 40. The control variables are similar to what we have used in Subsection E.1, including education, gender, and age. We do not include income as such information is not available for all surveys.

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