

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

**BRINGING AUTOCRACY HOME?
How Migration to Autocracies
Shapes Migrants' Support
for Democracy**

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Supplementary Material for “Bringing Autocracy Home? How Migration to Autocracies Shapes Migrants’ Support for Democracy”

Note: Some of the material in this appendix is the same as the appendix to Gaikwad, Hanson, and Tóth 2025a and Gaikwad, Hanson, and Tóth 2025b, which examine different outcomes from the same field experiment.

A Additional Information about the Project

A.1 Intervention Location and Study Context

Mizoram is situated in northeastern India, bordering Bangladesh from the east and Myanmar from the west. The state is sparsely populated, with around one million residents. Mizoram has a highly educated population: the literacy rate is 91.33 percent according to the 2011 Census. While most people in Mizoram speak the local language, Mizo, English is also widely spoken and used as the other official language of the state. The vast majority of the state’s population belong to various tribes that are collectively known as Mizos. The majority of Mizos identify as Christians and only a small minority identifies as Hindus or Buddhists. Despite its high human capital, Mizoram lacks employment opportunities. The relative geographic isolation and mountainous topography have constrained industrial growth and produced high unemployment rates. Mizoram’s GDP per capita is around US\$1,600, which puts it at 19th amongst 27 Indian states (Institute for Human Development, 2013).

Why focus on the India - GCC migration corridor? Much of prior research on migration has analyzed population flows from the Global South to the North, but migration across countries in the Global South has increased exponentially in the past twenty years (World Bank, 2023). The Gulf region, meanwhile, is an important destination for migrant workers. Around 60 percent of Asian migrants, for instance, migrate to another Asian country, and only a much smaller subset, 16 and 19 percent migrate to Europe and North America, respectively. Saudi Arabia has the second largest migrant population in the world, the United Arab Emirates the eighth and Kuwait the twentieth. When looking at migration flows between countries, Indian migration to the UAE is second only to the Mexico-US migration corridor. However, migration between India and the Gulf is growing much more rapidly. Migration between India and the UAE registered almost a three-fold increase and migration from India to Saudi Arabia doubled in the past twenty years.

An important difference between South-South migration and South-North migration is that many Western industrialized countries offer a route to citizenship, although they restrict labor migration flows tightly and often privilege educated and skilled migrants in the case of employment-based immigration (Peters, 2017). By contrast, countries in the Global South usually welcome labor migrants of varying skill levels, but make it very difficult for newcomers to obtain citizenship and permanent residency status.

We also note, relevant to Section 2, that migration from democracies to autocracies is relatively common. First, we use data from United Nations (2024) and the Varieties of Democracy Index to classify the world’s top 20 migration corridors by regime types of origin and destination.

Table A1: Top 10 Migration Corridors, by Democracy Scores and Migrant Type

	<i>Destination is...</i>	
	More Democratic	Less Democratic
Primarily	(1) Mexico-USA	(2) Ukraine-Russia
Economic	(5) Russia-Ukraine	(3) India-UAE
Migrants	(6) India-USA	(8) Kazakhstan-Russia
	(10) Bangladesh-India	(9) India-Saudi Arabia
Primarily	(4) Syria-Turkiye	
Refugees	(7) Afghanistan-Iran	

Data from United Nations (2024), comparing Liberal Democracy and Electoral Democracy scores from Varieties of Democracy Index (2024).

A.2 Recruitment Strategy

We identified and recruited a group of prospective candidates interested in migrating to GCC countries for employment, but lacking the know-how and connections to do so. We relied on a variety of different media to advertise the job training and placement opportunity. We posted advertisements in leading Mizo newspapers as well as on local Mizo television networks (specifically, Zonet and LPS). We sent recruitment materials and application forms to regional offices of local skills training organizations and visited job fairs organized by the government. One of the job fairs took place in a suburb of Aizawl, while the other one in a neighboring district’s headquarter. Additionally, we placed banners around Aizawl advertising the program. Finally, we reached out to the largest Mizo community organization, Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP) to advertise on their social media platforms. Advertisement materials were translated to Mizo to reach a wide audience. The advertisement period lasted for two months over the summer of 2018. While we targeted the entire state of Mizoram with our advertising strategy, the majority of applicants came from Aizawl, which was unsurprising given the higher educational attainment and English skills in the capital city.

All our advertising materials asked applicants to be above the age of 18 and have at least Grade 10 standard education. We also required English competency. Once registration for the program took place, our team in Aizawl called back all registered applicants and screened them for their English skills over the phone.

We randomly assigned treatment status using the final list of applicants who passed the English language screening. We matched these applicants into blocked pairs based on age, gender, education level, and English proficiency (judged in the English screening). We then randomized between each pair, assigning one to treatment and the other to control.

A.3 Survey Methodology

Our surveys were administered by a New Delhi-based survey company (CVoter Inc.), that hired twenty local, Mizo-speaking enumerators of both genders to conduct the surveys. This ensured that participants had access to enumerators of the same gender. Both surveys were written in English and then translated and back translated by CVoter’s team into Mizo. We offered subjects the choice of Mizo and English versions of the survey.

The baseline survey was a face-to-face survey that took place in Aizawl. Survey subjects were invited to the research team’s offices in central Aizawl, where they were asked to fill out a survey by enumerators using handheld tablets. In order to facilitate re-contacting, we collected the phone

numbers and addresses of each respondent as well as a back-up family member.

Approximately two and a half years later (January-March 2021), we fielded our endline survey round. The survey was administered as a 30-minute computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI) by CVoter enumerators. To boost participation, we offered phone credits worth a month of free calls, text messages, and 1 GB data to participants for taking the survey. Depending on the telephone operator, this cost around INR 169-199 (USD 2.36-2.78). We used the same protocol for two other surveys. First, in early 2021 we contacted the family member listed by the candidates to investigate the within-family spillover effects of the treatment. Second, in early 2019 we conducted a midline survey with the program participants, but this survey does not play a significant role in this paper.

A.4 Treatment: Job Training and Placement

In this section, we provide further details regarding the treatment component related to the training program geared toward employment opportunities abroad. The training program was designed to equip individuals with the skills required to access employment opportunities overseas and overcome logistical barriers to migration. During the first 2.5 weeks of the program, participants attended classroom training sessions administered by a Bangalore-based training firm, Free Climb. This component of the program included modules on restaurant food service, beverage and counter service, and housekeeping. In the next two weeks, participants conducted on-the-job training in hotels, restaurants, and fast food chains in Aizawl. Overall, this part of the intervention was designed to upgrade candidates' skills, equipping them with basic knowledge required to demonstrate eligibility for hospitality-sector job opportunities in international destinations at the interview stage. Concurrently, instructors also helped participants prepare resumes and practice interview skills. Resume formats and interview preparations were designed with the input of our Mumbai-based recruitment firm to ensure that participants' job application materials were consistent with GCC hiring standards.

In the recruitment stage of the intervention, program participants were invited for interviews with several employers. These interviews were organized by our recruitment partner, Vira International. Every program participant was invited to interview, and most were offered multiple opportunities to do so. The vast majority of those who chose to attend interviews received job offers. Following job offers, Vira and our project manager assisted program participants in obtaining passports and medical certifications. The employers were responsible for providing everything else: work visas, airline tickets, and room and board.

A.5 Ethical Considerations

Researchers have both moral and professional obligations to minimize harm and maximize potential benefits for research participants. This section details the steps we took to protect research participants from potential harm in this project. We organize our discussion following the "Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research" of the American Political Science Association.

Principle 1: Political science researchers should respect autonomy, consider the wellbeing of participants and other people affected by their research, and be open about the ethical issues they face and the decisions they make when conducting their research.

While international employment offers otherwise unattainable economic opportunities for many immigrants, it potentially poses certain costs and risks to their physical or psychological wellbeing. Relocating for work, especially overseas, requires navigating a complex, often uncertain set of costs and benefits. Specifically, in the context of the GCC, there have been documented instances of

migrants facing extortion by recruitment agencies that charge illegal recruitment fees (Sasikumar and Timothy, 2015). Furthermore, Gulf countries have also faced criticism for overlooking employer exploitation, such as the withholding of workers' passports or employers' renegeing on promised salaries (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Reports of labor code violations have been concentrated in the construction sector; domestic household workers have also experienced exploitation (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

This study was conceptualized and embedded within the Research and Empirical Analysis of Labor Migration program (REALM). REALM was founded in order to generate scientific knowledge regarding labor migration as a way to remedy labor recruitment practices in the Persian Gulf that are often private, unsupervised, and opaque, and to help develop and promote fairer migrant labor processes that can lead to better outcomes for migrants and their communities. Within REALM, the goal of our project was to design and evaluate a blueprint for ethical and safe cross-border labor migration, to be used by governments and NGOs in the future. While designing our project, we paid significant consideration to the ethics of the study. We were mindful of the general obligation of researchers "to anticipate and protect participants from trauma stemming from participation in research" (APSA Committee on Human Subjects Research, 2019). We worked closely with our partners to minimize the potential risks and costs that participants might face, to ensure that the benefits of this program flow to participants and their communities, and to protect participants' informed consent (Humphreys, 2015; Teele, 2014).

We situated the study in Mizoram because of the demand for international employment opportunities, both from individuals and from the state government, in this region. The Government of Mizoram's earlier attempts at training and recruitment had drawn large numbers of youth looking for lucrative international work, given the scarcity of employment opportunities within Mizoram. The Government's Mizoram Youth Commission (MYC), the Chief Minister of Mizoram, and several leading Mizo community organizations sought to create recruitment opportunities for Mizo workers in GCC countries, and called upon researchers to assist in scientifically evaluating processes of skills training and overseas placement that were already underway. By helping connect government and community organizations with reputable partners both inside and outside of India, the program enabled local stakeholders to better screen potential employers, protect citizens during their employment tenures abroad, and facilitate migrant integration. Although we (and the government) could not possibly facilitate supervised employment opportunities for *all* individuals seeking employment abroad, our goal was to help the government and NGOs build an ethical template for future skills development and employment placement programs in the region.

Principle 2: Political science researchers have an individual responsibility to consider the ethics of their research-related activities and cannot outsource ethical reflection to review boards, other institutional bodies, or regulatory agencies. This research project has received IRB approval from Columbia University, Dartmouth College, the US Naval War College, and Stanford University. The project proposal was also reviewed by the grant selection committee of REALM and an advisory committee of five social science faculty unaffiliated with the research team. Apart from the formal IRB reviews, we strove to ensure that our involvement minimized risk to participants and that the benefits of the program flowed directly to participants (Teel, 2014; Humphreys, 2015). In particular, we worked closely with New York University–Abu Dhabi Office for Compliance & Risk Management to select an employment sector (hospitality) that is relatively reputable compared to sectors where labor violations had previously been reported (e.g. construction), and to choose a recruitment partner with a long and tested history for fair recruitment practices in the hospitality sector in the Persian Gulf.

Principle 4: When designing and conducting research, political scientists should be aware of power differentials between researcher and researched, and the ways in which such power differentials can affect the voluntariness of consent and the evaluation of risk and benefit. Given the economic opportunities presented by our program and the potential power imbalances between the research team and the individuals in our study, we took two major steps to protect the sanctity of the informed consent process. First, we decided that PIs would not interact directly with any of the research subjects. We made this decision so as to not put pressure on potential research participants to take part in the program. The main point of contact for subjects was our project manager in Aizawl, who was of a similar age and background as the subjects. Most of these interactions happened in person or by phone/WhatsApp, in the Mizo language. Similarly, all surveys and interviews were also conducted by Mizos, by either our project manager or local enumerators hired by the survey firm.

Second, the recruitment for the program and the three survey waves created distinct decision points for individuals in which they were informed that they could withdraw from the study without any negative impact. In addition to the formal consent processes, we specifically trained our project manager to be honest and clear about the potential costs and benefits in any informal interactions with the participants. Our recruitment partner also conducted extensive information sessions with subjects, in which they were provided information about various aspects related to the risks and benefits of working abroad and in the Persian Gulf in particular.

Principle 5: Political science researchers should generally seek informed consent from individuals who are directly engaged by the research process, especially if research involves more than minimal risk of harm or if it is plausible to expect that engaged individuals would withhold consent if consent were sought. As noted above, subjects were required to provide informed consent prior to participating in the study and had the right to withdraw from the project at any point. Additionally, participants had distinct decision points (from participating in surveys and attending the training program, to sitting for placement interviews and deciding to accept employment contracts) where they were able to reaffirm or withdraw consent.

Principle 7: Political science researchers should consider the harms associated with their research. In addition to efforts described above, we worked closely with New York University–Abu Dhabi Office for Compliance & Risk Management to carefully vet project partners and employers. We scrutinized our recruitment partner closely and worked alongside them to screen and assess specific employers that entered the placement program for fair recruitment practices, working conditions, and migrant worker treatment. Employers agreed to charge no recruitment fees, sponsor and guide prospective employees through the work visa authorization process for the receiving country, cover expenses for round-trip flights, visas, and other immigration costs, help recruited workers relocate and find housing abroad, provide competitive salaries and benefits, and enter into labor contracts that permitted workers to switch employers or leave their jobs at any time. All labor contracts were registered with governmental agencies in both home and host countries. To minimize participants’ financial obligations, training (including tuition, course materials, and on-the-job training) was provided free of charge. While not all participants may eventually obtain employment in the GCC, their training was deemed broadly useful for jobs in the hospitality sector.

Cognizant of potential power differentials between employees and employers, we strove to empower participants by informing them of their rights and resources in destination countries. The GCC states have passed several decrees in recent years that require employers to cover recruitment expenses (including visas and costs of travel), provide competitive salaries and benefits, and furnish

housing and health fees for foreign workers. New reforms allow workers to leave their jobs at any time (subject to contractual obligations) and make it easier for workers to switch employers. Under the new policies in the U.A.E., for instance, prospective migrants sign a standard employment offer in their home country that is registered at the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation (MoHRE) before a work permit is issued. Once the worker arrives in the country, the agreement becomes registered as the contract and no changes are allowed unless the employer extends further benefits to the worker. Our project provided subjects with detailed information regarding the locations and helpline numbers of MoHRE offices. Additionally, the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India has established Indian Workers Resource Centres in GCC countries that provide helplines and conduct awareness classes and counseling programs on legal, financial, and social issues.

Principle 8: Political science researchers should anticipate and protect individual participants from trauma stemming from participation in research. In addition to the efforts described under Principles 1 and 7, we took two additional steps. First, in order to assist with integration and reintegration, our project provided participants with access to comprehensive information regarding legal and counseling services both in the GCC states and in Mizoram. They were made aware of the option of availing counseling services free of cost (with the cost of these services covered by the project).

Our project manager also checked in with participants regularly through the process of migration and integration. After the endline survey, we also conducted long-form, semi-structured interviews with individual subjects who had migrated abroad in order to better understand the migration experience and to provide access to counselling, if needed. Within these interviews, we specifically asked respondents if they had experienced any discrimination in the workplace and none of the respondents indicated any such experience.

Principle 9: Political science researchers should generally keep the identities of research participants confidential; when circumstances require, researchers should adopt the higher standard of ensuring anonymity. We took steps to keep our participants' identities confidential in this project. Enumerators collected the names and contact information of respondents, but that information was immediately encrypted and uploaded to a secure central server. Only the project investigators and the survey team's project manager were able to access the file linking the encrypted identifying information to the anonymous numerical ID associated with each respondent.

Principle 10: Political science researchers conducting studies on political processes should consider the broader social impacts of the research process as well as the impact on the experience of individuals directly engaged by the research. In general, political science researchers should not compromise the integrity of political processes for research purposes without the consent of individuals that are directly engaged by the research process. Besides the research subjects, one other group of individuals directly impacted by our study was the subjects' family members. Therefore, it was important that families were aware of the process, costs, and benefits of the program. During the registration process, the project manager encouraged subjects to take information home to their families and discuss the opportunity before signing up. We also held public information sessions open to the community, particularly to interested individuals and their families. At these sessions, the project manager, the head of our local NGO training partner, and one of our co-PIs answered any questions,

attempting to be as honest as possible about the purpose, costs, and benefits of the program. Additionally, our study was conducted in conjunction with the Government of Mizoram’s Mizoram Youth Commission, with the permission of the Chief Minister of Mizoram, and prominent local community organizations such as the MZP. Receiving government and community buy-in for the study helped ensure that the broader social impacts of the research were understood by relevant stakeholders apart from the research subjects themselves.

Principle 11: Political science researchers should be aware of relevant laws and regulations governing their research related activities. A principal reason for working with partners was to ensure that our project followed relevant laws and regulations, both in Mizoram and in the Gulf Region. In Mizoram, we partnered with a state government office (Mizoram Youth Commission) and a local non-governmental organization (SJnDI), who helped us navigate local laws and regulations. In the Gulf Region, our recruitment partner assisted our research subjects in navigating immigration laws and provided legal recourse for any workplace issues.

Principle 12: The responsibility to promote ethical research goes beyond the individual researcher or research team. Throughout the project, we workshopped the research design and solicited feedback on research ethics with numerous scholars of migration and experimental research.

B Balance and Attrition

B.1 Balance Table

The following regressions attempt to predict treatment status by pre-treatment covariates, among each of the three sample stages (the job candidates both pre-treatment and post-treatment, and the household members post-treatment). The covariates include both demographic characteristics and pre-treatment measures of key outcome variables. We find little evidence of significant differences between treatment and control group in any of the three survey stages, even after attrition. In fact, the treatment groups were remarkably balanced. Just one of the ten pre-treatment covariates predicted treatment status, and only on the endline survey. This 2/33 is in line with the expected false-positive rate of .05, and any pre-treatment imbalances should be accounted for in the statistical analysis in Section 5 anyway. Overall, the omnibus F-test (p-values at the bottom) shows that even the combination of all ten variables provides no predictive value on treatment group on any of the three surveys.

Table B1: Treatment-Control Balance at Survey Stages

	<i>Dependent variable: Treatment</i>		
	Baseline	Endline	Household
Age	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.010)
Male	-0.018 (0.053)	-0.073 (0.067)	-0.062 (0.060)
Education	0.019 (0.032)	0.055 (0.041)	0.008 (0.036)
Employed	-0.021 (0.076)	-0.050 (0.102)	-0.055 (0.091)
Scheduled Tribe	-0.057 (0.122)	-0.100 (0.166)	-0.063 (0.133)
Married	0.104 (0.202)	0.225 (0.318)	0.118 (0.267)
English Ability	0.003 (0.025)	0.003 (0.032)	0.001 (0.029)
Income	0.0003 (0.014)	0.014 (0.018)	0.011 (0.016)
Inst Trust	0.030 (0.026)	0.011 (0.033)	0.006 (0.031)
Democracy	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.019 (0.034)	-0.011 (0.031)
Participation	0.055** (0.024)	0.062** (0.030)	0.041 (0.027)
Observations	388	247	302
F-Stat P-Value (Par)	.669	.614	.911
F-Stat P-Value (RI)	.376	.458	.819

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.2 Tests for Attrition Bias

First, we tested whether attrition was greatly affected by treatment assignment itself – i.e. whether the differences in response rates between the treatment and control groups are larger than what might be expected based purely on chance. There is no significant evidence that treatment is affecting response rate in the main survey, but there is evidence that the treatment may have decreased response rates in the household survey.

Table B2: Response Rates: Treatment vs. Control Group

	<i>Endline</i>	<i>Household</i>
Response Rate: Treatment Group	65.8 %	70.4%
Response Rate: Control Group	60.7 %	84.2%
Difference in Response Rate	5.1 %	13.8%
P-Value: Two-Sample T-Test	.296	.001
P-Value: RI-based Test	.268	.002

We also tested whether response rates for the endline and household surveys were affected by any pre-treatment covariates. For each survey, we ran three regressions predicting survey response based on pre-treatment covariates. Here, again, there is no evidence that attrition in the endline survey was systematic.

Table B3: Predictors of Attrition

	<i>Dependent variable: Response</i>			
	Endline		Household	
Age	0.001 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.009)	0.010 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)
Education	0.018 (0.031)	0.011 (0.031)	0.023 (0.026)	0.021 (0.027)
Scheduled Tribe	0.123 (0.116)	0.100 (0.116)	-0.057 (0.100)	-0.056 (0.101)
Employed	-0.098 (0.072)	-0.074 (0.072)	-0.128** (0.062)	-0.121* (0.063)
Married	-0.137 (0.190)	-0.066 (0.191)	-0.191 (0.163)	-0.159 (0.166)
Male	-0.031 (0.050)	-0.033 (0.050)	-0.019 (0.043)	-0.017 (0.043)
English Ability	0.043* (0.024)	0.039 (0.024)	0.031 (0.021)	0.027 (0.021)
Income		0.014 (0.014)		0.014 (0.012)
Inst Trust		0.069*** (0.025)		0.017 (0.022)
Democracy		0.040 (0.025)		0.011 (0.022)
Participation		0.022 (0.022)		-0.013 (0.019)
Observations	389	388	389	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C Key Outcome Questions

Table C1: Questions: Institutional Trust

Question	Options
I am going to name several different governments. On a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 is “not at all,” and 4 is “completely,” could you please tell me how much you TRUST each government?	Not at all Somewhat Mostly Completely
- National Government of India	
- State government of Mizoram	
- Local government in your town or village	

<p>On a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 is “not at all” and 4 is “completely,” could you tell me how much you think each government is capable of solving problems in Mizoram?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Government of India - State government of Mizoram - Local government in your town or village 	<p>Not at all Somewhat Mostly Completely</p>
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Table C2: Questions: Support for Democracy

Question	Options
<p>Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Even if you agree with both statements, please select the one that you agree with most. Please choose statement 1 or statement 2.</p> <p>Statement 1: In India, it is more important to have a government that can get more things done, even if citizens have no influence over what it does.</p> <p>Statement 2: In India, it is more important for citizens to have influence over what the government does, even if that means it does not get as much done.</p>	<p>Agree more with Statement 1 Agree more with Statement 2</p>
<p>Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Even if you agree with both statements, please select the one that you agree with most. Please choose statement 1 or statement 2.</p> <p>Statement 1: An authoritarian government that resolves social and economic problems but does not allow citizens to participate is better than a democracy that allows citizens to participate but doesn’t resolve problems.</p> <p>Statement 2: A democracy that allows citizens to participate but does not resolve social and economic problems is better than an authoritarian government that resolves problems but does not allow citizens to participate.</p>	<p>Agree more with Statement 1 Agree more with Statement 2</p>
<p>If you had to choose between democracy and economic development in Mizoram, which would you say is more important?</p>	<p>Economic development is definitely more important Economic development is somewhat more important Democracy is somewhat more important Democracy is definitely more important</p>

Table C3: Questions: Political Participation

Question	Options
<p>Vote Intention:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How likely do you think it is that you would vote in the next Indian national elections? - How likely do you think it is that you would vote in the next Mizoram state assembly elections? - How likely do you think it is that you would vote in the next local body elections? 	<p>Very likely Somewhat likely Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely</p>

Past Voting:	Yes
- Did you vote in the most recent (2019) Indian parliamentary elections?	No
- Did you vote in the most recent (2018) state assembly elections?	
- Did you vote in the most recent local body elections?	
Political Participation: Here is a list of things that people sometimes do as citizens. Please tell me if you have personally done each of these things during the past two years.	Yes
	No
- Attended a campaign rally?	
- Attended a meeting with a candidate or campaign staff?	
- Attended a village council meeting?	
- Attended a different type of community meeting (e.g., union or NGO)?	
- Try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or political party?	
- Work for a candidate or party?	
- Given money to a political party or to a political cause?	
- Voted in an internal political party election or a local election?	
- Speak at a community council meeting?	

D Main Results

Table D1: Full Results: Views of Democracy

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			2SLS		<i>N</i>
	<i>C</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>P(RI)</i>	<i>ATE</i>	<i>P(RI)</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>CACE</i>	<i>P</i>	
Index: Democracy	0	-.102	.418	-.099	.427	.451	-.500	.463	248
vs. Efficiency	1.45	1.49	.521	+.04	.474	.492	+.21	.489	247
vs. Solving Problems	1.50	1.37	.038	-.13	.038	.041	-.64	.066	247
vs. Econ. Growth	1.73	1.71	.894	+.01	.958	.957	+.03	.957	247

Table D2: Full Results: Institutional Trust

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			2SLS		<i>N</i>
	<i>C</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>P(RI)</i>	<i>ATE</i>	<i>P(RI)</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>CACE</i>	<i>P</i>	
Index: Govt Trust	0	.258	.044	+.256	.046	.048	+1.258	.069	240
Trust: National	3.07	3.17	.239	+.10	.247	.234	+.50	.259	229
Trust: State	2.91	3.09	.037	+.19	.031	.042	+.92	.066	224
Trust: Local	3.39	3.58	.092	+.18	.116	.149	+.94	.181	217
Capable: National	3.11	3.19	.410	+.08	.411	.389	+.41	.393	234
Capable: State	2.96	3.20	.014	+.24	.014	.014	+1.21	.027	222
Capable: Local	3.48	3.49	.924	+.01	.951	.954	+.04	.954	214

Table D3: Full Results: Political Participation


	Diff-in-Means			OLS			2SLS		N
	C	T	P(RI)	ATE	P(RI)	P	CACE	P	
Index: Voting Intention	0	-.133	.310	-.146	.267	.291	-.730	.280	248
Next National	3.40	3.33	.452	-.07	.401	.421	-.34	.409	248
Next State	3.44	3.36	.341	-.09	.312	.322	-.42	.314	248
Next Local	3.37	3.28	.299	-.10	.237	.259	-.51	.253	248
Index: Voting	0	-.162	.191	-.175	.160	.176	-.880	.168	248
Voted: 2019 National	.79	.68	.060	-.11	.055	.057	-.54	.051	247
Voted: 2018 State	.73	.67	.307	-.07	.230	.263	-.33	.279	248
Voted: Local	.49	.49	.966	-.00	.966	.975	-.01	.975	248
Index: Participation	0	.465	.007	+.290	.050	.076	+1.493	.104	248
Attended Rally	.05	.09	.194	+.04	.224	.244	+.20	.268	248
Met w/ Campaign	.03	.11	.010	+.07	.010	.033	+.35	.058	248
Attended Village Council	.04	.06	.537	+.02	.484	.448	+.11	.457	248
Attended NGO Meeting	.26	.36	.094	+.08	.159	.171	+.43	.198	248
Argued about Politics	.03	.14	.002	+.08	.017	.024	+.41	.038	248
Worked for Candidate	.03	.09	.051	+.06	.050	.065	+.29	.075	248
Donated to Campaign	.03	.03	.792	-.00	.763	.854	-.02	.854	247
Spoke at Village Council	.08	.12	.214	+.05	.165	.163	+.28	.199	248

Table D4: Full Results: Migration

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			N
	C	T	P(RI)	ATE	P(RI)	P(OLS)	
Moved Overseas	.03	.23	.000	+.20	.000	.000	248
Training Program	.43	.58	.011	+.14	.009	.012	245
Job Offer	.08	.34	.000	+.25	.000	.000	231
Moved in India	.32	.13	.000	-.19	.000	.000	247

E Mechanism and Household Tests

Figure E1: Comparing Midline vs. Endline Effects



The pre-analysis plan for our midline survey combined all participation outcomes above into a single index, which showed a significant positive treatment effect at midline.

Table E1: Results: Political Interest

	Diff-in-Means				OLS			<i>N</i>
	<i>C</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>P(RI)</i>	<i>ATE</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>P(RI)</i>	<i>P(OLS)</i>	
Index: Political Interest	0	.304	.029	+.303	.134	.027	.025	248
National	1.53	1.71	.015	+.17	.07	.016	.014	248
State	1.66	1.84	.020	+.18	.07	.015	.014	248
Local	1.66	1.74	.231	+.09	.07	.240	.233	248

Table E2: Experiences of Migrants

Endline Survey (Migrants):	
In general, how happy were you with the experience of living and working abroad?	
Very happy	8
Mostly happy	4
Somewhat happy	15
Mostly unhappy	1
Very unhappy	0
Endline Survey (Migrants):	
While you have been living abroad, how much discrimination did you face based on your ethnicity, race or religion?	
Little or no discrimination	12
Not much discrimination	13
Some discrimination	3
A lot of discrimination	0
Midline survey (All Respondents):	
In which of these places will Mizos face less employment discrimination?	
Gulf Region	55%
Mainland India	8%
Don't Know / Can't Say	37%

Table E3: Effects of Job Training Attendance on Key Outcomes, Within Control Group

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Democracy	Trust	Voting	Vote Intention	Participation
Attendance	-0.273 (0.189)	0.151 (0.188)	0.425** (0.188)	-0.070 (0.184)	0.052 (0.181)
Age	-0.038 (0.032)	0.049 (0.031)	0.0002 (0.032)	0.066** (0.031)	-0.012 (0.031)
Male	0.128 (0.190)	0.184 (0.194)	0.246 (0.195)	0.391** (0.191)	0.259 (0.196)
Employed	-0.119 (0.282)	0.329 (0.288)	0.098 (0.286)	-0.219 (0.280)	0.139 (0.275)
Married	0.330 (1.113)	-2.198* (1.127)	1.058 (1.128)	0.431 (1.106)	-0.138 (1.083)
Education	-0.148 (0.118)	0.039 (0.115)	0.044 (0.116)	0.158 (0.114)	0.248** (0.111)
Scheduled Tribe	-1.078* (0.572)	-0.653 (0.510)	-0.068 (0.513)	0.046 (0.502)	0.164 (0.491)
Baseline Outcome	0.235** (0.099)	0.009 (0.100)	0.132 (0.107)	0.029 (0.105)	0.301*** (0.109)
Observations	113	118	118	118	118

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E4: Effects of Job Training Attendance on Key Outcomes, Within Treatment Group

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Democracy	Trust	Voting	Vote Intention	Participation
Attendance	-0.074 (0.199)	-0.426** (0.201)	0.014 (0.213)	-0.245 (0.184)	0.426 (0.275)
Migration	0.025 (0.232)	0.439* (0.239)	-0.906*** (0.254)	-0.699*** (0.219)	-0.362 (0.331)
Age	-0.067** (0.033)	-0.034 (0.034)	0.034 (0.037)	0.016 (0.032)	-0.107** (0.048)
Male	-0.007 (0.186)	0.331* (0.191)	0.293 (0.203)	0.327* (0.175)	0.481* (0.261)
Employed	0.174 (0.297)	-0.111 (0.309)	0.097 (0.330)	0.044 (0.284)	0.073 (0.423)
Married	-0.120 (0.758)	-0.863 (0.780)	0.368 (0.828)	1.245* (0.714)	0.448 (1.083)
Education	0.061 (0.119)	-0.105 (0.124)	0.088 (0.131)	0.123 (0.113)	0.570*** (0.168)
Scheduled Tribe	-0.997** (0.447)	-0.509 (0.458)	0.126 (0.496)	-0.144 (0.428)	0.086 (0.629)
Baseline Outcome	0.079 (0.096)	0.026 (0.102)	0.027 (0.149)	0.157 (0.128)	0.782*** (0.103)
Observations	124	127	127	127	126

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F External Validity

F.1 Generalizability of Sample (X-Validity)

“X-validity” concerns relate to the idea that the composition of subjects in experimental samples often varies from those in target populations (Egami and Hartman, 2022). The subjects in our study were relatively young and educated, and largely hailed from minority backgrounds. How might the findings from this sample generalize to other population groups? It is plausible, for example, that minorities’ prior engagement with democratic institutions might moderate the effect of overseas migration on contact and tolerance. Education and age might similarly moderate the effect of migration on attitudinal change.

We investigated X-validity concerns empirically by testing for heterogeneous effects within the sample to assess potential effects outside of the sample. First, looking at pairwise interactions, we found just three significant interactions (out of 50 possible interactions) between treatment effects and demographic and socio-economic characteristics of respondents: age, gender, tribe, religion, education level, employment status, and baseline income (see Table F1). By definition, we should expect 2-3 results significant at the $p < .05$ level simply by chance. Therefore, there is no significant evidence that members of underrepresented or politically connected groups were more (or less) affected by the treatment than others.


Table F1: Pairwise Heterogeneous Effects

	Trust	Democracy	Voting	Intention	Participation
Age	-0.41	-1.50	0.56	-0.87	0.01
Gender	-0.98	0.87	-0.01	-0.11	0.72
Education	0.23	-0.43	0.92	-0.61	0.04
Employed	1.08	-0.81	-0.15	0.62	0.21
Scheduled Tribe	0.22	0.31	-0.12	-0.47	0.42
Christian	1.67	-1.99	-0.71	-0.91	0.48
Voting	0.49	-1.96	-0.52	0.55	0.80
Trust in Govt	-1.13	-0.06	-0.12	-0.10	-0.11
Participation	-0.45	-0.11	-0.45	0.53	2.51
Support for Democracy	-0.47	0.25	0.35	-0.88	-1.09

Trust: Index of trust in government. Democracy: Index of support for democracy. Voting: Index of past voting. Intention: Index of voting intention. Participation: Index of non-voting participation. T-Statistics of pairwise interaction effects between treatment and pre-treatment covariate of interest for each outcome variable.

Second, we used machine-learning estimators to investigate heterogeneity agnostically, following Devaux and Egami (2022), which proposes estimating individual-level treatment effects for all individuals in the sample based on estimates of the heterogeneous effects of the treatment using all pre-treatment covariates. The results, presented in Appendix Figure F1, generally show very little systematic heterogeneity in the treatment effects—particularly with effects on tolerance—which suggests that the treatment would not have different effects for individuals with different socio-economic profiles.

Figure F1: Estimated Treatment Effects for Each Subject



Predicted treatment effects for each individual in our sample, estimated using *exr* package (CRAN). Machine-learning algorithm estimates heterogeneity of treatment effect using all pre-treatment covariates, then predicts treatment effect for each unit.

F.2 Generalizability of Setting (C-Validity)

Table F2: Key Contextual Factors, Predicted Effects, and Suggested Designs

Context	Hypothesized Effect on Tolerance	Suggested Study Sites and/or Research Designs
Migration to lower-income autocracies	Stronger positive effect on support for democracy because economic comparisons are less flattering to autocracy	Research Design: Compare migrants from the same locations to higher and lower-income autocracies. For example, migration from India to the Gulf vs. Thailand.
Migration from weaker-institutionalized democracies	Weaker positive effect on support for democracy because political comparisons are more flattering to autocracy.	Research Design: Compare migrants from better and worse-institutionalized democracies to an autocracy. For example, migrants from India vs. Philippines to the Gulf Region.
Migration to autocracies with greater repression of dissent	Stronger positive effect on support for democracy because political comparisons are less flattering to autocracy.	Research Design: Compare migrants from the same locations to more and less repressive autocracies. For example, migration from India to the UAE vs. Saudi Arabia.
Migration in lower-wage or more exploitative sectors	Stronger positive effects on support for democracy because both political and economic comparisons are less flattering to autocracy.	Research Design: Compare migrants from higher and lower-wage sectors – for example, Indian workers in hospitality vs. construction industry in Gulf Region.
Longer-term migration, or migration pathway to citizenship	Weaker positive effects on support for democracy because migrants become more invested in host country (autocratic) politics.	Research Design in autocracies: Comparing migrants with and without citizenship in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which both now offer citizenship to some categories of high-skilled migrants.
Nativism or prejudice in host society	Stronger positive effect on support for democracy because political comparisons are less flattering to autocracy.	Research Design: Comparing migrants from a democracy to an autocracy before vs. after a key nativist political event.
Majority ethnic group migrants	Stronger positive effect on support for democracy because members of a majority ethnic group face less discrimination in the home country and enjoy higher benefits from democracy	Research design: Comparing majority and minority ethnic group migrants who move from a democracy to an autocracy.

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