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ARTICLE

Bridging the gulf: How migration fosters tolerance, cosmopolitanism, and support for globalization

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Abstract

Immigration has been shown to drive ethnocentrism and anti-globalization attitudes in native-born populations. Yet understanding how global integration shapes intercultural relations also necessitates clear evidence on how migration affects the attitudes of migrants. We argue that migration can foster tolerance, cosmopolitan identities, and support for international cooperation among migrants who experience sustained contact with other cultural groups. We evaluate this theory with the first randomized controlled trial resulting in overseas migration, which connected individuals in India with job opportunities in the Persian Gulf region's hospitality sector. Two years after the program began, individuals in the treatment group were significantly more accepting of ethnic, cultural, and national out-groups. Migration also bolstered support for international cooperation and cultivated cosmopolitan identities. Qualitative and quantitative evidence links these changes to intercultural contact overseas. By focusing on migrants rather than native-born individuals, our study illustrates how cross-border mobility can facilitate rather than undermine global integration.

The act of migrating overseas potentially transforms how individuals see and relate to the world. For example, the experience of living and working in South Africa was foundational for Mahatma Gandhi, who upon return to India led its struggle for independence, emphasizing the unity of all Indians regardless of caste or creed. Migrants often play pivotal roles in society, culture, and politics, both overseas and in their countries of origin. Yet whether and how migration transforms the attitudes and identities of cross-border migrants, who numbered 272 million in 2019, is not well understood (United Nations, 2020). Policymakers, media, and the public often claim that migrants remain committed to their prior cultures and identities, in turn stoking intercultural conflict and anti-immigrant backlash (Martén et al., 2019; Radziemski, 2021). However, we lack rigorous evidence to adjudicate these assertions because most existing studies focus on how natives—not migrants—respond to migration (Choi et al., 2019; Dancygier & Laitin, 2014; Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Investigating how cross-border mobility impacts migrants themselves is necessary for understanding the drivers of migrant integration, immigration policy, and globalization more broadly.

How does migration shape the social attitudes, worldviews, and identities of people who cross national borders? Scholars raise concerns that competition between natives and migrants gives rise to intercultural conflict and a retreat into parochialism (Adida, 2014a; Careja & Emmenegger, 2012; Dancygier, 2010). Migrants who confront ethnically, religiously, and culturally distinct host societies—especially ones in which they encounter discrimination—may grow less tolerant of out-groups and reject more inclusive identities (Fouka, 2020). This mirrors effects often doc-

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umented among native-born individuals; migration has been shown to drive anti-immigrant prejudice and a broader backlash to globalization among natives (Adida et al., 2014; Choi et al., 2019; Enos, 2014).

We instead argue that moving to a new country can foster intercultural tolerance, cosmopolitanism, and support for globalization for migrants. The day-to-day experience of migration often involves living and working around people from different national, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Such intercultural contact—particularly when migrants do not perceive discrimination—dispels negative beliefs of other nationalities and cultures, leading migrants to become more tolerant (Clingingsmith et al., 2009; Mousa, 2020; Paluck & Green, 2009; Scacco & Warren, 2018). We contend that out-group contact also allows migrants to see commonalities with individuals from other cultural groups. As a result, it encourages them to conceptualize themselves as "citizens of the world" rather than members of national, regional, or ethnic communities—what political theorists refer to as cosmopolitanism.[1]

Increasing tolerance and cosmopolitanism, in turn, influence how migrants develop policy preferences regarding globalization. Out-group hostility and ethnocentrism are driving forces behind isolationist preferences toward international trade, immigration, and security cooperation (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Kinder & Kam, 2011; Mansfield & Mutz, 2009). We, therefore, argue that regular contact with diverse international communities should lead migrants to become more supportive of policies promoting global integration. In short, our focus on migrants instead of the native-born leads us to contend that cross-border mobility can reinforce, rather than undermine, international inclusion and cooperation.

Evaluating whether and how migration shifts norms and beliefs among migrants is fraught with methodological challenges because individuals self-select into the migration process (Bazzi et al., 2021; Beam et al., 2016). People who decide to leave their home countries and embark on overseas migration are almost certainly systematically different from those who do not; for example, they likely *already* hold open-minded views toward outsiders. As such, it is difficult to ascertain whether migration and contact with host societies cause meaningful changes in migrants' attitudes.

Overcoming these methodological concerns, we bring to bear clear, causal evidence on the impact of cross-border migration on intergroup attitudes, identities, and policy preferences from the first randomized controlled trial to have resulted in international migration (Beam et al., 2016). Our study connected individuals from Mizoram, India, who sought overseas employment with hospitality sector jobs in the Persian Gulf. The experiment had potent first-stage effects, driving a more than sevenfold increase in international migration (from 3% in the control group to 23% in the treatment group). The experiment therefore provides a valuable, causally identified setting to evaluate the impact of migration on migrants' attitudes and worldviews.

The results show that the treatment had substantial impacts on migrants' attitudes and identities. Two years after the program began, individuals in the treatment group reported markedly more accepting views of a wide variety of religious, ethnic, and national out-groups. Overall, our index of intergroup tolerance was .37 standard deviations higher in the treatment group than in the control group. These changes in intergroup tolerance accompanied pronounced shifts in individuals' group affiliations and identities. Treatment group individuals were nearly twice as likely to identify primarily as "citizens of the world" rather than as members of their national or regional communities. Lastly, moving overseas increased individuals' support for globalization: subjects in the treatment group were more supportive of international trade and security cooperation. Our index of international cooperation increased .23 standard deviations in the treatment group.

Qualitative and quantitative evidence from preregistered tests links these changes to cross-border migration and multicultural contact rather than alternative mechanisms. First, migrants in the study lived and worked alongside people from a wide variety of religious, ethnic, and national backgrounds. In the endline survey, our index of intergroup contact was .49 standard deviations higher in the treatment group than in the control group and these effects were concentrated among members of the treatment group who migrated. In extensive qualitative interviews, migrants reported that these experiences were meaningful and transformed their beliefs and identities. Second, the treatment had very large effects among the subsets who were *most likely to migrate*. The effects, in other words, appear to be driven by migration rather than the act of merely being selected for the intervention. This validates the exclusion restriction behind estimates of the conditional average causal effects (CACE), which are much larger than the intention-to-treat (ITT) effects described above. Third, we find no major effects among household members of migrants, who benefited economically from increased remittances. This is consistent with the argument that migration and contact—as opposed to economic empowerment—alters individuals' social consciousness and identities.

[1] This term dates back to c.400 BCE. When asked where he came from, Diogenes the Cynic replied, "I am a citizen of the world [*kosmopolitēs*]" (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 157).

Taken together, our results provide compelling evidence that migration in the global economy can facilitate new forms of contact that spark tolerance, cosmopolitanism, and internationalism. This is in contrast to the large body of work that focuses on *native-born* attitudes and finds that immigration precipitates out-group animosity, interethnic strife, and nationalism (cf. Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Our results on changes in migrants' consciousness suggest that the composite effects of migration are more nuanced and that for migrants the effects can be the opposite. These findings help advance the immigration literature by pointing to conditions such as sustained contact as opposed to mere exposure that may moderate the impact of immigration flows on natives' attitudes.

This study provides the first set of field experimental evidence on how cross-border mobility reshapes the identities and attitudes of migrants, illustrating how globalization holds the potential of altering intergroup relations for migrants and their communities.

MIGRATION'S IMPACT ON MIGRANT ATTITUDES AND IDENTITIES

Here, we build on prior work and develop a theoretical framework to explain whether the experience of migration can sow greater intercultural tolerance, instill cosmopolitan identities, and reduce backlash to globalization.

Effects of migration on native-born and migrant attitudes

With few exceptions, existing research on migration and political preferences focuses on the attitudes of native-born individuals in high-income countries and finds that migration stokes intolerance. Natives living in high-migration areas are much more likely to hold anti-migrant attitudes (Dancygier & Laitin, 2014; Enos, 2014; Fetzer, 2000). Rising intolerance against immigrants has also contributed to an increase in the vote share of right-wing nationalist political parties in Western Europe and the United States (Barone et al., 2016; Caselli et al., 2020; Dustmann et al., 2019; Vertier et al., 2018). Similar trends have also been documented in lower income regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Adida, 2014a; Gaikwad & Nellis, 2017). Overall, the prevailing scholarly view is that immigration causes an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes among native-born populations. Intolerance toward immigrants has in turn been linked to opposition toward globalization and international cooperation. Individuals with less tolerant attitudes toward out-groups are also less supportive of global economic integration: free trade, permissive migration policy, and open foreign investment (Cavaille & Marshall, 2019; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Mansfield & Mutz, 2009; Rankin, 2001). Likewise, hostile attitudes toward cultural out-groups are correlated with opposition to international engagement and more hawkish foreign policy views (Berinsky, 2009; Kertzer, 2018; Kinder & Kam, 2011).

Migration may drive intolerance toward out-groups for both *economic* and *cultural* reasons. On the economic front, native-born individuals view migrants as competition for scarce jobs and resources (Mayda et al., 2022; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). Furthermore, natives express concern that migrants and refugees can strain public services and increase tax burdens (Alesina et al., 2023). Others have emphasized the cultural threat that many native-born individuals perceive when immigrants have different backgrounds, in turn driving anti-migrant attitudes and political action (Adida et al., 2014; Alesina & Tabellini, 2020; Gaikwad & Nellis, 2021; McLaren & Johnson, 2007). In contrast, when migrants are seen as adopting the host society's values and civic norms, they are less likely to face intolerance (Choi et al., 2019). Although these mechanisms have primarily been studied in relation to native-born attitudes, they plausibly also play a role in influencing migrant viewpoints.

Far less research investigates whether and how migration alters migrants' attitudes (Willekens et al., 2016). This is an important omission for both scholarship and policy. First, the sheer number of migrants in the world today makes the study of migrant perspectives an important goal in and of itself. Second, migrants often transmit norms that they adopt in host countries to families and friends at home (Barsbai et al., 2017; Beine et al., 2013; Spilimbergo, 2009) or return to their home countries and become key figures in politics and policymaking (Dancygier & Saunders, 2006; Kapur, 2014). Third, migrants' behavior and attitudes play an important role in shaping natives' experiences and, in turn, host society politics (Choi et al., 2019). The lack of evidence on these issues also poses a problem for policymakers, who often express concerns that migrants maintain distinct ethnic identities and struggle to integrate into host societies.

It matters a great deal, then, how migrants respond to experiences of living overseas. Do migrants become more open-minded about foreign cultures, interacting positively with native-born individuals? Do they return home with more cosmopolitan beliefs and policy preferences? Or do they "cluster in ethnic communities" (Careja & Emmenegger, 2012, p. 880), invest in in-group identities, and stoke nationalism in their home communities?

Migration's impact on migrants: A theoretical framework

In this section, we articulate when and how intercultural contact between migrants and other communities in host societies leads migrants to adopt more tolerant attitudes and cosmopolitan identities, in turn increasing their support for international cooperation.

Tolerance. We argue that for migrants a primary aspect of the experience of migration is intercultural contact. We expect that migrants' intercultural experience is quantitatively and qualitatively different from natives'. By dint of their minority status, migrants typically live and work around people from a range of new cultures, in contrast to native-born individuals who may encounter migrants only occasionally and tangentially. Even primarily immigrant enclaves often have a great deal of national, ethnolinguistic, and religious diversity. On a routine basis, then, migrants are more likely than natives to experience out-group contact with neighbors, co-workers, employers, and customers, among a host of other affiliates.

Intergroup contact is not only more prevalent for migrants but also varies in its nature compared to natives' encounters. Natives often come into contact with other groups as a consequence of immigration, demographic change, or refugee resettlement and as such they lack a choice in interacting with out-groups. Possibly because of the absence of choice involved, these interactions are prone to being devoid of meaningful contact and are likely to be of fleeting duration. In fact, when natives do engage in meaningful contact with (as opposed to have mere exposure to) other groups, they are more likely to report favorable experiences; such positive experiences have been shown to minimize backlash against immigrants (Steinmayr, 2021). Compared to natives, migrants possess much greater autonomy in exposing themselves to intercultural experiences. Studies suggest that having agency in an experience can contribute to a more positive perception of that experience (Bandura, 1982). Therefore, migrants' decisions to reside and work in foreign countries, coupled with their minority status in host societies, are likely to facilitate more frequent, positive, and enduring contact with other groups.

A long line of scholarly work, beginning with Allport (1954), argues that such sustained intergroup contact decreases prejudice by correcting false assumptions about other cultures. This "contact hypothesis" has been supported by hundreds of experimental and observational studies in a variety of contexts (Mousa, 2020; Paluck et al., 2019; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Scacco & Warren, 2018). Allport (1954) argues that contact is especially beneficial for reducing prejudice when different groups interact cooperatively on an equal footing, pursue a common goal, and have interactions that are sanctioned by institutions. However, studies conducted on interactions in naturalistic settings suggest that even those interactions that do not meet all of Allport's criteria or those that involve some negative experiences can boost tolerance (Barnhardt, 2009; Mousa, 2020). Furthermore, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) in their meta-analysis find that tolerance may be contagious: following intercultural contact, attitudes can improve even toward those groups that one does not interact with. This implies that contact is likely to generate tolerance in a variety of contexts.

Extending these insights to the case of international migrants, we argue that migration provides migrants more opportunities for favorable intercultural contact than native-born individuals. Although evidence indicates that even short-term overseas pilgrimages involving unstructured interactions between pilgrims from different ethnic and national groups can improve tolerance (Clingingsmith et al., 2009), longer-term migrants should have more opportunities to develop contact with other groups, leading to greater tolerance.

This same logic, notably, suggests that the effects of migration could vary depending on its type and context. Certain categories of migrants are more likely to engage in interethnic contact that meets Allport's conditions. For example, given that labor migrants often live and work alongside individuals from different cultures and backgrounds, they should have built-in opportunities for sustained, cooperative, peer-to-peer contact. Refugees or family-based migrants, by contrast, may have less opportunity for tolerance-boosting contact with host societies. Therefore, our conjecture here is that, consistent with the arguments of Allport and subsequent scholars, those migrants who have meaningful and positive contact with other migrants and natives should develop greater tolerance for members of other ethnic, religious, and national groups. Empirically, our study focuses on migrants who meet these criteria; we further discuss the applicability of our argument to other types of migrants and contexts in the section on external validity and in Online Appendix G (p. 20).

Identity. We theorize that intercultural contact experienced by migrants alters their group identities. Individuals have a palette of ethnic, religious, local, and national affiliations, some of which may be more socially and politically salient than others. We build on a long tradition in political theory that has argued that besides local and national identities, individuals may also identify as members of a larger global, or cosmopolitan community. The Stoics coined the term "kosmou polites" or citizens of the world, "arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities—the local community of our birth and the community of human argument and aspiration that 'is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of

our nation by the sun' (Seneca, *De Otio*)" (Nussbaum, 1994, pp. 157–158).

How might the experience of migrating abroad affect individuals' group identification? Social identity theory proposes that individuals develop their identities through continuous comparisons with members of different groups (Tajfel, 1978). In moving across borders, migrants come into contact with a wide range of out-groups. According to Appiah (2007), daily conversations and observations help individuals recognize similarities across cultures, contextualize differences, and understand other perspectives; even if individuals ultimately disagree on values or traditions, engaging in intercultural exchange helps foster cosmopolitan identities. Migrants, in fact, often come to adopt the social and political norms of their host countries and "remit" those back to their home countries (Barsbai et al., 2017; Beine et al., 2013; Levitt, 1998; Spilimbergo, 2009). The adoption of new norms in itself indicates that migrants shift with which groups and traditions they identify. Therefore, we predict that the experience of moving overseas should make world citizenship a more salient identity for migrants.

An important caveat to this claim is that the experience of systemic discrimination in host societies may have the opposite effect. Discriminatory institutions and treatment may reify migrants' differences from others and undermine shared identity (Fouka, 2020). Anderson (1983) found that discriminatory treatment by metropolitan elites helped solidify national identities in many colonies. Similarly, if migrants perceive significant discrimination, they may be more likely to invest in their local, ethnic, and national identities.

Support for globalization. Prior work illustrates how immigration decreases support for globalization. In contrast, we argue that migrants should become more supportive of international economic and security cooperation because of the two processes laid out above. First, increasing tolerance leads migrants to become more open to international cooperation. As noted earlier, the literature links intercultural tolerance to globalization support (e.g., Mansfield & Mutz, 2009). Second, cosmopolitan identification should make migrants more supportive of the policies that support those identities. Solidarity and identification with a group have been shown to bolster support for policies that maintain the community (Herrmann, 2017; Singh, 2015). As migrants become more tolerant and cosmopolitan, therefore, they should favor greater global integration. This shift in attitudes is important because migrant communities often play significant roles in politics regardless of whether they remain in host countries or return to their countries of origin. For example, Careja and Emmenegger (2012) show that migrants within the European Union were more supportive of supranational institutions and more likely to advocate for their views once they returned home.

We have thus far highlighted the role of intercultural contact in driving tolerance, cosmopolitanism, and support for globalization. However, as suggested by the literature on immigration and tolerance, the economic benefits that migrants may reap from moving overseas also provide an alternative mechanism for these same outcomes. Work in political economy shows that wealthier individuals tend to hold more tolerant attitudes and favor greater international cooperation more. For example, negative economic shocks have been consistently associated with greater likelihood of voting for nativist candidates and more protectionist policy positions (Ballard-Rosa et al., 2021). Because migration often improves the economic lives of both migrants and their families, it is possible that migration also improves intergroup attitudes through its effect on economic outcomes (Gibson & McKenzie, 2014; Mobarak et al., 2020). Whether attitudinal shifts are driven by intercultural contact or economic gain, or whether migrants even shift their views in the first place, are open empirical questions to which we now direct our attention.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To test the effect of migration on tolerance, identity, and support for globalization, we conducted a randomized controlled trial connecting individuals in Mizoram, India, seeking overseas jobs with lucrative employment opportunities in the hospitality industry in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region.[2]

Setting

We study hospitality-sector labor migration from Mizoram, a state in Northeast India, to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other GCC states. We chose Mizoram as our study location because international outmigration is rare and local economic opportunities are scarce in this region.

The majority of Mizoram's population are Mizos, a historically marginalized indigenous Scheduled Tribe community concentrated in Mizoram. Mizos encounter few economic opportunities in other parts of India, facing discrimination as conspicuous racial and religious minorities (McDuie-Ra, 2012). Mizos are viewed as racially Southeast Asian (rather than South Asian), and the vast majority are Christians (rather than Hindus or Muslims). This demographic and economic isolation was cemented in the 1980s when a long-running Mizo separatist movement disarmed in exchange for statehood and strict controls on inter-

[2] This research design also forms the basis of the design in Gaikwad et al. (2022, 2023).

TABLE 1 Demographic characteristics of subjects.

	Baseline respondents	Endline respondents
N	389	248
Mean age (baseline)	22.9	22.9
Percentage of male	56	54
Percentage of completed Grade 12	72	75
Percentage of employed	14	12
Percentage of married	2	1
Percentage of scheduled tribe	95	96

Note: Baseline characteristics for respondents in each survey.

nal migration. For additional information on our study setting, see Online Appendix A.1, p. 2.

The migrants in our study joined a large and growing labor migration corridor between India and GCC countries. India is the world's largest source of emigrants (16.6 million per year), who are primarily labor migrants in other Asian countries (United Nations and Social Affairs, 2017). Many Indians work in GCC countries, with the India–UAE corridor representing the world's second largest migration corridor (United Nations and Social Affairs, 2016). In the GCC countries, there is a substantial demand for foreign workers in service sectors, and workers from South Asia often enjoy advantages due to their high literacy and English-language skills. Labor migrants typically return home after employment stints abroad, as few GCC states have pathways to citizenship for foreign workers and their families.

In the Gulf region, labor migrants are exposed to a remarkably diverse community; this is especially true for Mizos, who hail from a religiously and ethnically homogeneous territory. Foreign workers constitute the majority of the populations in the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar. Indian labor migrants typically live and work alongside others from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, as well as from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Those working in restaurants and hotels serve a range of customers from all over the world. We provide more detail on these interactions in the Mechanisms section.

Sample

In July–August 2018, we collaborated with the Government of Mizoram's Mizoram Youth Commission (MYC) and a local NGO (MZP) to recruit prospective applicants interested in overseas employment from Mizoram's capital, Aizawl, and surrounding areas (see Online Appendix A.2, p. 3). With the help of our recruitment partner, Vira International, a Mumbai-based recruitment firm, we selected candidates who met basic requirements for hospitality sector jobs in GCC countries: English language skills and educational attainment.[3] After selection, subjects were surveyed at baseline by Delhi-based CVoter, Inc., to record basic demographics and pretreatment outcome measures (see Online Appendix A.3, p. 3, for methodology).

Table 1 shows the baseline characteristics of our sample. The final 392 candidates were primarily young, educated, and unemployed. The average age in our sample was 23, with over 70% of participants having completed higher secondary (Grade 12), and more than 85% being unemployed at the start of the program. These characteristics are common among many South Asian migrant communities in the Gulf. South Asian migrants, especially those in the service sector, are generally more educated than nonmigrants and often come from underrepresented ethno-religious groups.[4] Half of this pool was randomly selected to attend the training and recruitment module ($T = 196$, $C = 196$). Before assigning subjects to experimental groups, we used a matching algorithm to generate blocked pairs to ensure balance along key covariates that might predict cultural attitudes, specifically gender, education, and English proficiency.

Treatment

Our treatment involved a two-part program to facilitate migration to GCC countries for hospitality sector employment. First, selected individuals received a fully funded, 5-week hospitality training program in October–November 2018. The training was designed and administered by a Bangalore-based job-training firm (Free Climb, Inc.) in collaboration with a local NGO (SJnDI) and the MYC. The program offered both classroom and basic practical training for service jobs

[3] A large proportion of candidates had these skills with English being the medium of instruction, aside from Mizo, in Mizoram schools.

[4] Our sample is similar in these respects to migrants in the nationally representative Indian Human Development Survey and in the Kerala Migration Study, which tracks migrants from the Indian state with the highest overseas out-migration rate, Kerala (see Online Appendix G, p. 20).

in restaurants and hotels in the Gulf, primarily to help candidates interview and demonstrate eligibility for overseas hospitality jobs (see Online Appendix A.4, p. 4, for details). Foreign employers provide in-depth job-specific training to hired employees.

In the program's second phase, candidates in the treatment group were invited for interviews with vetted potential Gulf employers in the hospitality sector. Employers included hotels such as Mandarin Oriental as well as food-and-beverage outlets such as Pizza Hut and Costa Coffee. Employers conducted several rounds of interviews with candidates, both remote and in-person in March–July 2019. Every individual in the treatment group was eligible to interview, typically multiple times, and employers offered jobs to suitable matches. Employers paid and applied for visas on behalf of job candidates, and our recruitment partner and local project manager assisted candidates in obtaining necessary paperwork for emigration.

The study by necessity bundled both elements of the treatment: the training program and recruitment opportunities for overseas placement. However, treatment effects on tolerance, internationalism, and group identification likely stem from working overseas. Many individuals in both groups had previously enrolled in hospitality job training programs and generally reported that the experience was similar. Moreover, more than 40% of the control group enrolled in an alternate program administered by our local training partners. Additionally, contact between subjects and the training instructors was relatively shallow and short. In Online Appendix F (p. 18), we find no evidence that attending a job training program, controlling for moving overseas, was associated with any significant shifts in our main outcomes in either the treatment or control groups. By contrast, placement opportunities with foreign employers are few and far between; at baseline, just 10% of respondents reported having any friends or extended family members overseas.

Ethical considerations

We carefully considered the ethics of this study, which was approved by IRB committees at Columbia University, Stanford University, Dartmouth College, and the U.S. Naval War College. The study was embedded within the Research & Empirical Analysis of Labor Migration Program (REALM), a research program aiming to improve knowledge about labor migration to the Gulf to promote fairer labor mobility and better outcomes for migrants and stakeholders. International employment offers otherwise unattainable economic opportunities and has the potential to increase intergroup tolerance. However, it also poses risks to migrants' physical and psychological well-being with reported cases of exploitation of immigrant workers in GCC countries (Sasikumar & Timothy, 2015). Hence, we aimed to evaluate a blueprint for ethical cross-border labor migration to be used by governments and NGOs in the future.

We situated the study in Mizoram due to the existing local demand for international employment opportunities. The Mizoram government and local NGOs were interested in creating overseas job opportunities for educated but unemployed youth and called upon academic researchers to assist in the scientific evaluation of the skills training and overseas recruitment programs that were already underway. We worked closely with these partners to minimize the potential risks that participants might face, to ensure that the benefits of the program flowed to participants, and to protect participants' informed consent (Humphreys, 2015; Teele, 2014).

Numerous steps were taken to protect program participants. These included vetting project partners, selecting the hospitality sector due to its relatively reputable labor practices, screening specific employers for fair recruitment and labor practices, connecting prospective migrants with governmental agencies safeguarding migrants' rights, registering employment contracts with regulatory groups, and offering subjects extensive information on risks, rights, and resources. The program aimed to improve the recruitment and migration experience for prospective migrants relative to those who migrated on their own accord. An extended discussion of ethical considerations and a cost-benefit analysis of the intervention are provided in Online Appendix A.5 (p. 5) and Online Appendix A.6 (p. 10), respectively.

Outcomes and estimation

Our main outcomes come from the endline survey that was conducted in January–March 2021, approximately 2 years after the treatment group began to move overseas. Of the 392 pretreatment subjects, 248 responded to the endline survey (63%). In a host of statistical tests, we find no evidence that attrition altered the sample or resulted in bias (see Online Appendix B, p. 11). First, multi-sample *t*-tests show that treatment subjects were not significantly more likely to respond than control subjects. Second, using omnibus *F*-tests we do not find that pretreatment covariates (or interactions between covariates and the treatment) predict patterns in attrition. Third, omnibus *F*-tests find no significant imbalances between the treatment and control groups, either among all subjects or among endline respondents. This indicates that coefficient estimates comparing differences between treatment and control respondents are likely to be valid esti-

mates of the treatment effect among respondents and possibly among nonrespondents as well.

We evaluated five major tolerance and identity-related outcomes, driven by our theory. All hypotheses and procedures were preregistered in the Experiments in Governance and Politics (EGAP)/Open Science Foundation registry. For each outcome, we asked 1–6 survey questions. For multi-question outcomes, we combined various responses with a *z*-score index of the main outcome in order to reduce the number of comparisons (and therefore the chance of false positives) and to reduce noise.[5] Wording and response choices for questions are listed in Online Appendix C (p. 14). We configured all outcome variables such that the hypothesized direction of the effect is positive and that all indices are in units of standard deviations of the dependent variable.

The main results show the OLS-estimated average treatment effect (ATE) for each hypothesis, controlling for the baseline measure of each variable (or the nearest proxy). Following our pre-analysis plan, in addition to these ITT effects, we also include the CACE of migration on the main outcomes. As preregistered, we provide both parametric *p*-values and the nearly identical *p*-values from randomization inference in Online Appendix D. We use one-tailed *p*-values reflecting the preregistered effect direction.

We also took a number of steps, registered in our pre-analysis plan, to disentangle the possible mechanisms by which our treatment affects tolerance, identity, and globalization attitudes (see the Mechanisms section). First, we examined both quantitative and qualitative evidence of intercultural contact and its role in changing attitudes. Second, we compare the treatment effects within demographic subgroups where migration was likely and unlikely to test whether migration itself was critical to treatment effects. Third, we conducted a survey of participants' family members (one per candidate, most of whom were parents and siblings), helping us separate the role of economic gain from intercultural contact.

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

In this section, we examine whether migrants became more tolerant of cultural out-groups, more likely to identify as world citizens, and more supportive of international cooperation 2 years after our program began. Before examining the main results, however, we note that the program succeeded in helping treatment individuals move overseas (Figure 1). While just 3% of the control group left India over the two-plus years of the program, 23% of the treatment group moved abroad, taking jobs in Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Most of these migrants were still living abroad at the time of the endline survey. Some in the control group, however, also had opportunities to encounter life and people outside of Mizoram. About 30% of the control group, and about 15% of the treatment group, moved elsewhere in India, mostly to work in large cities like Kolkata, Mumbai, and Delhi, and states like Goa.



FIGURE 1 Migration over time, treatment versus control. The percentage of subjects living overseas at different times. Black: treatment group. Gray: control group.

Intergroup tolerance

First, we find that the treatment significantly bolstered individuals' tolerance for those from different ethnic, religious, and national backgrounds, as Figure 2 demonstrates. On average, the treatment group scored more than a third of a standard deviation higher on our intergroup tolerance index compared to the control group.

Individuals in the treatment group were 25% more likely to say that it was acceptable to marry a non-Mizo (65% vs 52%) than those in the control group. Furthermore, they were significantly more likely to have positive impressions of various ethnic and national out-groups, such as Europeans, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, and Middle Easterners, on a feeling thermometer. These effect sizes range from .1 to .2 points on a 5-point scale, or about .2–.4 standard deviations. Given that the majority of respondents held a neutral view of most groups, these effects are quite large—particularly because less than a quarter of the treatment group migrated overseas. In the Mechanisms section, we demonstrate that these effects are primarily driven by the relatively small number of individuals who migrated abroad. This would imply that the effect of migration on tolerance is much larger; on views of various groups, we find a CACE of .5–1 scale points, greater than one standard deviation.

[5] As specified in the pre-analysis plan, we also provide a Benjamini–Hochberg false discovery rate analysis (Online Appendix E, p. 18) to account for multiple hypotheses. Even by the conservative statistical standards, our central findings are validated.



FIGURE 2 Treatment effects on intergroup tolerance. Top: treatment and control group means, rescaled 0–100. The first item is yes/no. Subsequent items measured 0 (very negative) to 100 (very positive). Middle: Coefficient plot of OLS treatment effects, scaled in standard deviations of outcome variable, controlling for baseline measures of outcome. Bottom: Coefficient plot of 2SLS results, scaled in standard deviations of outcome. Ninety percent confidence intervals are shown, which translates to $p < .05$ on these one-directional tests.



FIGURE 3 Treatment effects on identity. Outcomes are measured in percentage points. Top: Stacked bar graph of subjects' primary identity. Middle: Coefficient plot of OLS treatment effects, controlling for baseline measures of outcome. Bottom: Coefficient plot of 2SLS effects. Ninety percent confidence intervals are shown, which translates to $p < .05$ on these one-directional tests.

These effects contribute to scholarly debates on the nature of prejudice and the role of contact in diminishing it (Allport, 1954; Blumer, 1958). Scholars have hypothesized that contact is unlikely to lead to tolerance unless it is cooperative, on equal footing, and endorsed by authorities. In the Gulf hospitality sector, migrant workers often work and live alongside other South and Southeast Asians but are more likely to interact with Middle Easterners and Europeans as servers or employees in hierarchical settings. It does not appear, however, that the treatment effects documented in Figure 2 diverge according to the nature of contact. For example, the treatment group's most improved views were of Middle Easterners, even though migrant workers are excluded from government benefits in the Gulf, depend on Gulf employers to sponsor visas and have no avenue for citizenship in their host nations. This held despite the fact that both the treatment and control groups already held impressions of Middle Easterners that were more positive than negative (unlike their impressions of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis). These results suggest that contact itself is the important element, not the nature of the contact.

Cosmopolitan group identification

Second, we study whether migration shifted migrants' primary sociopolitical identities. Scholars have shown that natives often become more ethnocentric when exposed to migration, but little evidence exists on whether migration changes migrants' identities in a similar way. In the endline survey, we asked study subjects about the group with which they most closely identify. Our prediction was that as migrants encounter out-groups and start to see themselves as more similar to these groups, they will increasingly identify as members of a global community ("citizens of the world") rather than as members of local or national groups.

Figure 3 graphs the results of this exercise, depicting changes in group identification across the treatment and control groups. We find that members of the treatment group were significantly more likely than members of the control group to adopt a cosmopolitan identity (23% vs. 14%). Assuming that this difference is driven by migration, this implies a CACE of nearly 50 percentage points among those who migrated. Moreover, we do not find that migrants' identification with national or ethnic categories became stronger, a topic to which we return later. Overall, this finding lends credence to the claim that contact with other groups in the wake of migration shifts core ways in which



FIGURE 4 Treatment effects on support for international cooperation. Top: Coefficient plot of OLS treatment effects, scaled in standard deviations of outcome variable, controlling for baseline measures of outcome. Bottom: Coefficient plots of 2SLS coefficients, scaled in standard deviations of outcome. Ninety percent confidence intervals are shown, which translates to $p < .05$ on these one-directional tests. (See Online Appendix for component results).

individuals construct their identities to reflect global aspirations and affiliations.

Attitudes toward international cooperation

Third, along with increased tolerance and cosmopolitanism, we test whether migrants became significantly more supportive of global economic integration, security cooperation, and international migration, and more interested in foreign affairs. Recall, in line with prior work on immigration, we theorized that more tolerant cultural attitudes should lead to improved support for international cooperation. To test this conjecture, we created three indices: the first captured individuals' support for international economic integration and security cooperation, the second measured individuals' support for migration, and the third tracked interest in foreign affairs/international relations.

Figure 4 summarizes our findings and shows modest positive effects on support for international cooperation. On average, those in the treatment group were .23 standard deviations more supportive of international economic and political cooperation. They were more likely to agree with the statement that trade improves lives (4.27 vs. 4.04 on a 1–5 scale) and that peace with Pakistan is important (3.98 vs. 3.87). We observed suggestive but not statistically significant effects on support for more open migration regimes: respondents in the treatment group were slightly more likely to agree that migration improves lives (3.47 vs. 3.39) and to support Bangladeshi migration into India (2.77 vs. 2.66). Notably, the latter question is a hard test of migration support, given that anti-Bangladeshi sentiment is salient and entrenched in Mizoram. Lastly, those in the treatment group expressed somewhat (about .21 standard deviations) greater interest in foreign politics and international affairs (statistically significant at the .10 level). As with tolerance and identity, estimates of the CACE of migration on these outcomes are much larger (.6–1.2 standard deviations).

Importantly, we did not observe any treatment effects on these outcomes in our midline survey after the training program but before migration began. This survey was intended to test economic outcomes outside the scope of this paper, particularly migrants' anticipated economic gains from migration. Although the treatment group believed migration would provide large benefits (which it eventually did), they were no more likely to express pro-migration or pro-globalization attitudes. The lack of a treatment effect at this stage implies that anticipated economic gains alone do not shift globalization attitudes. Rather, it appears that the treatment group needed to encounter novel cultures, institutions, and interpersonal interactions in their destination countries before they altered their perspectives on foreign policies.

In contrast to policy issues related to international cooperation and integration, we did not observe any effects of migration on issues related to domestic cooperation. Scholars and commentators often express concerns that migrants may become more nationalist (toward their origin country) or regionalist. However, we did not detect any significant effects on our measures of nationalism (refer to Table A.13 in the Online Appendix). Although individuals in the treatment group were more likely to express a tolerant view of Mainland Indians, they were no more inclined to identify as Indian over Mizo or to support national integration or internal migration.

Given that much of the literature has linked increased national or ethnic identification among immigrants to experiences of discrimination in host societies (Adida et al., 2014; Fouka, 2020), it is plausible that the lack of changes in identification that we observe in this area is a consequence of migrants in our study experiencing little ethnic or national discrimination while living abroad. Indeed, our qualitative investigation in the following section suggests that migrants faced very little discrimination overseas. Rather than seeking refuge in local or national identities, then, migrants began to embrace a more cosmopolitan identity.

MECHANISMS: INTERCULTURAL CONTACT

In this section, we explore the causal mechanisms behind the increased tolerance, cosmopolitanism, and



FIGURE 5 Treatment effects on intercultural contact. Top: Treatment and control group means (percentage of respondents who reported engaging in each behavior at least once a week). Bottom: Coefficient plot of OLS treatment effects, scaled in standard deviations of outcome variable, controlling for baseline measures of outcome. Ninety percent confidence intervals are shown, which translates to $p < .05$ on these one-directional tests.

support for international cooperation observed in individuals who received opportunities to move overseas. We present several forms of evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, all preregistered in our pre-analysis plan. This evidence supports the main argument: individuals who moved overseas had the opportunity to live and work alongside people from different cultures, exposing them to new ways of life and increasing their tolerance toward these groups.

Furthermore, we evaluate whether economic resources, which is an alternative mechanism commonly found in the migration literature, can better explain our results. However, we find that this is not the case.

Evidence of intergroup contact

First, we find very strong quantitative and qualitative evidence of intercultural contact itself: migrants in our study worked and lived alongside individuals from a diverse range of backgrounds in the Gulf. Figure 5 compares the treatment and control groups on six measures of intercultural contact. Overall, individuals in the treatment group were almost half a standard deviation more likely to have interacted with people from different ethnic, religious, and national backgrounds (see Online Appendix D, p. 16, for full quantitative results). The treatment group was significantly more likely to have worked regularly with individuals with different cultural profiles. Gulf employers recruit service workers from all over South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. These interactions did not end at work, however: migrant workers in the Gulf typically live in employer-provided or employer-paid housing with other migrant workers of diverse backgrounds. As a result, individuals in the treatment group were far more likely to regularly eat meals and spend time with individuals from different faiths, ethnicities, and nationalities.

Turning to our qualitative evidence, interviewees who lived in the Gulf highlighted that one of the defining features of their experience was living with and working alongside individuals from a wide variety of national backgrounds: Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bhutan, and other parts of India.[6] In particular, many interviewees reported making friends with migrant workers from the Philippines. Several described realizing that they were very similar to Filipinos—like Mizos, Filipinos are typically Christian and phenotypically Southeast Asian.[7] These were not superficial relationships; when asked to describe their friendships, the vast majority of the interviewees used the word "close." One respondent offered a typical response when asked about his interactions with coworkers.

> I hang out with people from the Philippines the most … Initially I was not very close with [my coworkers from the Philippines] but as I get to know them more and spend more time with them, I feel comfortable and I was close to them more than the other employees who were Indian. … There were new comers from Arabia and Africa who joined after us, I am also close to these people and we are still in contact.[8]

Another respondent shared that "[she has] made a best friend who is from Bhutan and [their] friendship is very good and strong,"[9] while another describing a friend from the Philippines as "like an elder sister to [her]."[10] Participants who migrated abroad forged strong relationships with those they lived and worked alongside. These experiences allowed migrants to

[6] Respondents #26, 44, 59, 144, 156, 179, 228, 239, 295, 335, 360.
[7] Respondents #156, 239, 59.
[8] Respondent #156.
[9] Respondent #360.
[10] Respondent #144.



FIGURE 6 Word cloud analysis of subjects' interactions and relationships. Word cloud analysis from responses to question about who interviewees spent time with and the nature of their relationships. The size of words in the word cloud represents the frequency of usage.

reevaluate which groups they felt similar to on a variety of characteristics.

Even more superficial interactions and experiences with Gulf society, though, left an impression. One respondent told us that diversity was one of the most exciting aspects of living abroad: "The fact that I am in a country I never thought I will get the chance to visit is memorable and meeting people from different cultures and religions is also memorable."[11] Interactions with customers—locals (Qataris, Emiratis, etc.) and tourists (Europeans and Americans)—were more superficial but generally positive. One subject shared, "I always had a pleasant interaction with our customers… most of the time they are always nice and polite," while another reported "I think I had a pleasant experience … mostly tourists from Europe and America were nice."[12]

The control group, by contrast, reported far less contact with individuals from other national, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. This is illustrated in Figure 6, which charts the word clouds of terms used by the treatment and control groups when responding to the question: "Who are the people you interact with regularly? How would you describe your relationship with them?" While many in the treatment group reflected on relationships with "workers" and "roommates" who tended to be "Filipino," "Indian," and "Nepali" (alongside stressing concepts related to "teamwork," "manager," and "contact"), most of the control group respondents discussed their relationships with their "family," "friends," and "neighbours" that were perpetuated "nearby" in the "locality." These results are notable given that many individuals in the control group moved elsewhere in India for work. Even control group individuals that moved elsewhere in India generally reported keeping to other Mizos—living with Mizo friends and family and finding work through Mizo community connections.

A key factor that helps explain why the migrants in our study responded positively to the diversity in the Gulf was that in general they were pleasantly surprised by the lack of prejudice. This was summarized by one of the respondents: "here the local people are not racist towards any group of people and also because so many of us here are from different countries, we are more accepting."[13] Others concurred by stating that "because in Dubai we are a mix of people from different countries and people are exposed to that difference in culture so no one is racist here…."[14] The vast majority reported that they expected they would face more prejudice in Mainland India than they faced in the Gulf.

Several interviewees went out of their way to express that these diverse experiences had changed their views of other cultures. One respondent explained to us how she had changed:

> I was actually a bit scared because I used to wonder if it is safe to say that I am a Christian because most of them are Muslims, but it is totally opposite of that, no one is bothered that I'm a Christian so no one here is really bothered about religion. And the fact that there is no alcohol and drugs makes it very safe to live.[15]

Together, migrants' reflections on forging new relationships with people from abroad and developing an appreciation for diversity illuminate why our experimental results uncovered such strong positive shifts in migrants' levels of tolerance for out-groups and why migrants started viewing themselves as members of a global community, rather than members of narrower ethnic or national groups.

Effects of selection versus migration

Second, we find that the changes in tolerance, cosmopolitanism, and internationalism were registered primarily among those who migrated overseas and not among others in the treatment group. This bolsters the argument that it was the experience of moving overseas that shifted attitudes and identities and not, for example, the experience of participating in a job training program conducted by non-Mizos.

The most basic evidence of these differences is visible merely by comparing the changes over time among migrants and others in the study. Individuals who

[11] Respondent #261.
[12] Respondents #239, 144.
[13] Respondent #59.
[14] Respondent #261.
[15] Respondent #40.

TABLE 2 Main effects: Likely migrants versus likely nonmigrants.

	Effect size		
	Likely migrant	**Likely nonmigrant**	**Difference**
Moved abroad	0.59**	0.06†	$p < 0.01$
	(0.07)	(0.04)	
Intergroup contact	1.36**	0.18	$p < 0.01$
	(0.29)	(0.18)	
Intergroup tolerance	0.87**	0.16	$p < 0.05$
	(0.24)	(0.15)	
Identify as world citizen	0.03	0.13*	$p > 0.10$
	(0.09)	(0.06)	
Support for international cooperation	0.25	0.21†	$p > 0.10$
	(0.25)	(0.15)	
Support for international migration	0.36†	0.03	$p > 0.10$
	(0.24)	(0.15)	
Interest in international politics	0.50*	0.09	$p > 0.10$
	(0.26)	(0.16)	
N	68	180	

Note: Estimated effect of treatment within each subgroup, based on OLS regression of treatment on the main outcome. Each row is a separate model. Standard errors are included in parentheses.
†$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

moved overseas saw a significant increase in measures of tolerance, while those who migrated within India and those who remained in Mizoram saw no significant change (see Online Appendix F, p. 18).

A more principled version of this analysis, however, is to compare treatment and control individuals within demographic subgroups who were likely to emigrate and subgroups who were unlikely to do so. To identify those likely (and unlikely) to migrate if selected, we conducted an analysis in two steps using a machine-learning algorithm called Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART), included in the pre-analysis plan. First, we used BART to identify which pretreatment characteristics (from the baseline survey) best predicted an individual's decision to migrate among the treatment group. Second, we used this model to identify the individuals in both the treatment and control groups who most resembled the migrants in the treatment group. For example, men in our sample were far more likely to migrate, so they were more likely to show up as "likely migrants." This resulted in two subgroups based on pretreatment covariates: "likely migrants," of whom 59% migrated if selected for the program, and "likely nonmigrants," of whom just 6% migrated if selected. The lists of likely movers and likely nonmovers were created before the endline survey, and the code was preregistered. We then compare the difference between treatment and control individuals within each subgroup, which estimates the effect of being selected *alone* (among likely nonmigrants) and the effect of being selected *and moving* (among likely migrants).

The most important takeaway from these comparisons (Table 2) is that most of the main effects are much larger among those who were likely to migrate if selected than among those who were not likely to do so. The index of intergroup tolerance, for example, moved nearly a full standard deviation for the likely migrants, five times as much as it moved for the likely nonmigrants. The effects on support for migration and interest in international politics are also much larger among likely migrants. The evidence is less clear on whether migrants identify as world citizens or support international cooperation—neither of these results show a statistically significant difference between the effects among likely movers and among likely nonmovers, possibly due to limited statistical power. Overall, these results are consistent with the increase in tolerance being driven by the experience of migrating overseas and experiencing other cultures, not by attending the job training program or by being selected for the program.

Effects of contact versus economic gain

Third, we test whether an alternative explanation—the role of economic gains—better explains our results than our proposed mechanism of contact. Many studies have shown that individuals with higher incomes and more wealth—particularly those who stand to benefit from globalization—are more tolerant toward out-groups and more supportive of international cooperation. At the endline survey, those who were still working overseas were earning 40,100 INR (540 USD) per month on average, and the treatment group overall was earning more than double the wages as those in the control group (10,400 INR vs. 4800 INR). The jobs offered by our program, therefore, may have

TABLE 3 Full results: household members.

	Group means		OLS	
	C	T	ATE (SE)	*N*
Tolerance index	—	**−0.01**	**−0.02 (0.11)**	304
OK to marry Non-Mizo?	0.36	0.33	−0.02 (0.06)	293
View of Bangladeshis	2.30	2.31	0.01 (0.11)	302
View of Pakistanis	2.25	2.27	0.02 (0.10)	297
View of Middle Easterners	2.80	2.96	0.17* (0.09)	295
View of Europeans	3.95	3.77	−0.18 (0.11)	302
Support for migration	—	**−0.13**	**−0.13 (0.11)**	**304**
Migration improves lives	3.59	3.51	−0.08 (0.13)	304
Support migration into India	1.33	1.23	−0.10 (0.09)	302

Note: Each row represents the treatment effects on a single outcome based on an OLS model. Bolded rows are standardized indices of components below.
$^{\dagger}p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$.

made individuals in the treatment group more tolerant merely through economic channels.

We use two separate strategies to estimate this effect. First, we use Acharya et al. (2016)'s methodology to estimate the direct effects of the treatment, holding constant the gains in wages from the program (see Online Appendix F, p. 18). The main effects, particularly the effect on intercultural tolerance, remain essentially the same.

Second, we measure the treatment effects on migrants' household members. If economic gains drive tolerance, we expect that migrants' immediate family members, who also benefited economically from the program, should also shift their views. On average, migrants in our study reported sending 14,000 INR (200 USD) per month—nearly half their wages—to their families in the form of remittances, significantly boosting family incomes in the treatment group (Gaikwad et al., 2022). Due to concerns over the length of the household member survey, we only included questions on the two outcomes we believed most likely to move: intercultural tolerance and support for migration.[16]

Table 3 shows the comparisons between the parents/siblings of treatment and control individuals in indices of intercultural tolerance and support for migration. Even in the control group, migrants' family members were far less tolerant toward cultural outsiders and far less positive on migration. More importantly, the treatment had no significant effects on tolerance and support for migration.[17] The economic benefits of migration, in other words, had no apparent effect on the attitudes of migrants' family members absent the intercultural contact that migrants themselves experienced. This suggests that contact with out-groups is a more likely mechanism for understanding the changes in migrants' tolerance, identity, and support for international cooperation than economic resources. It also suggests that migrants' contact with outside groups did not spill over (at least in a positive direction) onto their family members, as we might expect based on prior findings on the "social remittances" that emigrants bring back to their communities (Beine et al., 2013; Levitt, 1998).

REPRESENTATIVENESS AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY

Our study focuses on a specific sample and migration corridor. How generalizable are the results to other migrants in the global economy? We probe this question from three angles.

First, we study the representativeness of our sample and context to international migrants. In Online Appendix G (p. 20), we benchmark our experimental sample against two large-scale data sources on overseas migrants from India, the world's largest source of migrants: the Kerala Migration Study and the Indian Human Development Survey. These comparisons underscore key ways in which the characteristics of our sample and context are surprisingly common. Like our subjects, emigrants from South Asia are disproportionately highly educated, young, and belong to underrepresented minority groups. As in our study, other Indian migrants mostly live abroad for 1–5 year stints and are far more likely to move to Gulf autocracies than to Western democracies. Likewise, data from the World Values Survey (WVS, Round 7) show that the plurality of emigrants from Asia, like those in our study, reside in autocracies rather than democracies.

Second, in Online Appendix G.2 (p. 22), we consider how likely the results from our sample are to generalize to migrants with different demographic profiles—what Egami and Hartman (2023) term "X-validity" concerns. In particular, would the same effects hold true for individuals from non-marginalized groups? Heterogeneous effects within our sample provide suggestive evidence that the effects may generalize outside the sample. Looking at pairwise interactions, we found no significant interactions between treatment effects and markers of marginalization: age, gender,

[16] Unlike the main survey, this household survey did show differential attrition across survey groups, but there was little evidence that this created any demographic imbalance (see Online Appendix B, p. 11).

[17] We find separate null effects among both parents and siblings.

education, baseline income, religion, and tribal identity (Online Appendix Table A.19). Additionally, we used machine-learning estimators to investigate treatment effect heterogeneity agnostically based on all pretreatment covariates, following Devaux and Egami (2022). The results, presented in Online Appendix Figure A.5, generally show very little systematic heterogeneity in the treatment effects—particularly on tolerance—which suggests that the treatment would have similar effects for individuals with different demographic profiles.

Third, we consider how likely the results from our context are to generalize to other migrant contexts. Such "C-validity" concerns are very difficult to address empirically with only one experimental site (Egami & Hartman, 2023). Our study was the first field experiment of its kind: resources, capabilities, and policy constraints precluded replication in alternate sites. In Online Appendix G.3 (p. 24), we identify a set of key contextual factors that may moderate the effects of overseas migration on migrants' tolerance, offer theoretical predictions, and suggest future research designs to evaluate the effects of migration in these other contexts (Online Appendix Table A.20). For example, we conjecture that migration to democracies should have a stronger positive effect on tolerance than migration to autocracies because migrants likely encounter and adapt to liberal norms of inclusion. We also present observational data from the WVS showing that immigrants around the world, as in our case, display higher levels of tolerance and trust than native-born citizens (Online Appendix Figure A.6) and that immigrants in democracies are more tolerant and trusting than those in autocracies (Online Appendix Figure A.7). This suggests that the argument presented in this paper travels beyond the India–GCC migration context. More broadly, we hypothesize that migration reduces prejudice when, as in our context, it involves significant intercultural contact.

CONCLUSION

In contrast with prior work that links immigration to rising intolerance and isolationism, we argue that migration can engender tolerance, inclusive identities, and support for globalization among migrants. We evaluate this theory by conducting the first field experiment to result in international migration, overcoming the empirical challenges in studying migration's impact. Using both qualitative and quantitative evidence, we find that migration bolsters tolerance and openness among migrants, and that these effects are driven by intercultural contact with people of other national, ethnic, and religious groups. These results build on a large literature on the impact of migration on natives' tolerance. Additionally, we also extend prior work on the impact of migration on migrants that has mostly focused on migrants' earnings (Gibson & McKenzie, 2014; Mobarak et al., 2020). Our findings on the impact of migration on social and political attitudes are significant because previous research demonstrates that changes in migrants' attitudes can matter for sending country politics (Barsbai et al., 2017; Beine et al., 2013; Spilimbergo, 2009).

Our results demonstrate that intercultural contact can have nuanced effects on migrants and natives. Our findings are in contrast with a large literature suggesting that immigration often engenders conflict between natives and immigrants. However, many studies in this vein do not measure levels of contact between natives and migrants and do not distinguish between exposure and contact. Those studies that do, in general, align with our findings. Enos (2014), for example, finds that the impact of exposure to immigrants reduces natives' tolerance, but repeated exposure diminishes these effects. Similarly, Steinmayr (2021) finds that while exposure alone negatively affects natives' attitudes toward refugees, meaningful contact improves them. Our study adds to this literature by highlighting the role that sustained contact can play in building tolerance not only for natives but also for migrants.

Furthermore, our study shows that contact has far-reaching effects on tolerance. Allport (1954) argues that contact only sows tolerance when it takes place among peers in a cooperative task sanctioned by institutions. Yet the migrants in our study adopted more tolerant attitudes even toward groups who were more likely to be their employers and customers, such as Middle Easterners and Europeans. This suggests that contact between migrants and others, even in hierarchical settings, may have positive effects (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). For policymakers, this means that efforts to integrate migrants into host communities, both economically and socially, may encourage greater tolerance and integration.

In contrast to prior work that focuses either on migrants' retreat into their ethnic identities or on diaspora politics, we argue and provide evidence that migrants can come to see themselves as belonging to a more inclusive global community following migration. We link these changes to sustained contact with out-groups that helped migrants recognize cultural similarities with others. Importantly, migrants in our study did not perceive discrimination along ethnic and racial lines, which in other contexts have driven migrants to invest in their ethnic identities (Abdelgadir & Fouka, 2020; Fouka, 2020); such discrimination is more likely to take place in competitive settings featuring a few polarized groups (Dustmann et al., 2019). By contrast, in our study migrants reported facing very little discrimination because they lived in multicul-

tural, labor-scarce settings (Adida, 2014b; Bai et al., 2020). Migration context, therefore, likely matters for whether migrants adopt inclusive identities or remain resistant to integration. Our paper provides directions for future research on investigating how different contexts may shape migrants' attitudes.

Scholarly and policy discussions typically claim that globalization undermines itself: that migration and other cross-border economic flows create a backlash that limits further integration.

These analyses often focus on a perceived cultural threat among individuals in the Global North. We instead focus on a group at the center of cross-border economic exchange: migrants themselves. Our study illustrates the cultural processes by which global integration can build support for further globalization among this group. This demonstrates that support for international integration extends far beyond educated elites in the Global North, who are conventionally seen as the base for internationalist policies. Migrants' impact, moreover, may weigh quite heavily on the aggregate effects of migration. Overseas migrants number in the hundreds of millions worldwide, affecting the politics of host societies, and many more have returned to influence their home countries' politics and societies. Our study shows how migrants—as agents bridging the gulf between different cultures—serve key roles in the architecture supporting globalization.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

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