

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

PUBLIC OPINION ON GEOPOLITICS AND TRADE Theory and Evidence

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World Politics

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Public Opinion on Geopolitics and Trade: Theory and Evidence

Supplementary Material

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A Geopolitics and Trade in the United States and India

As mentioned in the main text, political rhetoric and public discourse in both the United States and India suggest that both countries think about trade in the manner outlined by our predictions. Consider each country in turn.

Geopolitics and Trade in the United States

As one of the principal architects of the global system of trade, the U.S. has grappled with decisions over which countries to foster free trade with and which to shut out from its global trading networks. At key moments, such decisions have generated considerable controversy, frequently as a result of the dynamics we identify. For example, arguments about whether trade would strengthen adversaries or promote peace featured centrally in U.S. foreign policy discourse over trade with the Soviet Union and other adversaries during the Cold War, as well as with trade with Germany and Japan after World War II (Carnegie 2015). Consider, for instance, the debate that ensued in 2001 over whether to allow China to join the WTO, which would lead to free trade between the U.S. and China. China is seen as one of the U.S.'s principal adversaries and competitors; in line with our theoretical framework, the terms of the debate regarding trade with China focused squarely around the geopolitical issues that lie at the heart of our theory.

More specifically, in the run-up to China's WTO entry, the U.S. Congress debated whether to grant China permanent MFN status, which would solidify free trade between the two countries. Arguments for and against free trade with China followed the pattern we identify. Critics argued that trade with China would build up China's military might, which could harm the U.S. if a conflict were to break out. For instance, after China's WTO entry, a report by the China Commission—which was set up to monitor China following its WTO entry—concluded, “America's policy of economic engagement with China rests on a belief that...a more prosperous China will be a more peaceful country.” However, the report went on to state, “Many leading experts are convinced that certain aspects of our policy of engagement have been a mistake....and that we are strengthening a country that could challenge us economically, politically and military.” It continued, “China's leaders...often describe the United States as China's long-term competitor for regional and global military and economic influence.” Because of China's adversarial position relative to the U.S., the report flagged that “current U.S. policies and laws fail to adequately monitor the transfers of economic resources and security-related technologies to China” and that trade has led “to China's economic growth and military modernization.” The report recommended that Congress therefore invoke Article XXI of the GATT, which would allow the U.S. to restrict trade with China under the WTO's national security exception, among other similar measures to limit trade.¹

However, those in favor of promoting trade with China thought that doing so would lead to peace. For example, Senator Grassley stated, “I believe we should approve permanent normal trade relations for China...[because] history also shows that free and open trade is one of the most effective ways to keep the peace.” He argued that this was particularly important due to his belief that “many of these disputes and tensions will involve...both China and the United States.”² Similarly, an article from the *Wall Street Journal* that was read into the Congressional Record summarized the Clinton administration's stance on China's WTO entry. It stated that the administration presumed that joining the institution would provide a “peace dividend,” explaining that trade would “empower a bloc of interests favoring outward-oriented growth and the conditions required to secure it, including peace.” Further, “dependent on...Western commerce, China would reconsider military adventurism as too costly and counterproductive.”³ It is striking that the key theoretical tensions that we highlighted in our theoretical framework are precisely the considerations that featured in political debate over the U.S.'s decision to normalize trade with China.

Geopolitics and Trade in India

Similar forms of geopolitical rhetoric have preoccupied public policy debate over trade between India and Pakistan. For example, both nations have long been embroiled in controversies over whether to extend to each other the “Most-Favored Nation” (MFN) trading status and whether to implement preferential trading arrangements—which would allow individuals and firms across the historically adversarial nations to trade directly instead of utilizing indirect paths that carry high transportation costs.⁴ Proponents argue that trade cooperation would lead to peace. A Member of

¹“U.S.-China Security Review Commission Annual Report.” Senate July 17, 2002. 107th Congress, 2nd Session. Issue: Vol. 148, No. 97.

²Grassley, Charles. “Why China Should Join the WTO.” Congressional Record, Volume 146 (2000), Part 2. Senate. Page 1505.

³September 13, 2000. Congressional Record- Senate. Page 17913. “Jiang Muddies the Waters.” September 12, 2000. *Wall Street Journal*.

⁴Without MFN, traders must route their goods through other countries like Dubai, for example.

Parliament argued in 1999, for instance, that “the peace dividend” from a preferential trading arrangement “would accrue to us from improved relations between our two countries” and would lead “to a radical change in our environment leading to the elimination of terrorism altogether.”⁵ In a similar vein, a Commerce Ministry official disclosed that “we have told Pakistan that granting the MFN status to India is not so much about boosting trade, but is an important political symbol that the two countries want to work together and improve trade ties which can help create an environment for...resolving other contentious issues over time.”⁶ Diplomatic observers have also noted that “trade appeared to be the low-hanging fruit for stakeholders on both sides of the border, who hoped that better economic relations would pave the way for political stability and normalized relations between the two countries.”⁷ Similar viewpoints are frequently espoused by officials in Pakistan too, who have argued that “when the two countries trade more with each other, there will be a strong will and compulsion to improve relations” geopolitically.⁸

However, opponents argue that trade would provide military advantages to the other partner, an outcome which they seek to avoid. Indeed, India’s views on free trade with Pakistan has repeatedly taken a negative turn in the aftermath of terrorist attacks tied to Pakistani militants or alleged to be condoned by the Pakistani intelligence agencies. After a recent terrorist attack in which 140 schoolchildren were killed, for example, India curtailed trade with Pakistan because the Indian government was loath to further empower the Pakistani military.⁹ As Zaidi (2004) summarizes pithily, “the constraints to better regional integration and free trade are more political than economic, and there are no real economic arguments for not trading with each other”; but the constant elevation of political tensions between both nations tend to bring efforts at liberalizing their economies “back to square one.” Thus, at least on the surface, the geopolitics and trade tradeoffs that we highlight in our theoretical framework appear endemic—bedeviling global superpowers and regional powers, territorially contiguous and non-contiguous dyads, and richer and poorer nations alike.

B Structural Topic Model Results

We conducted topic modeling for the open ended survey responses using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to analyze the text. We note that there are conflicting views about how effective LDA is to analyze short texts, and thus this is used as a robustness check. We ran the analysis using four topics. We then created word clouds that indicate the probability that a word would appear in a response conditional on the topic. We also removed small and/or inconsequential words using a generic stop word list.

As shown in the word clouds, geopolitical words arise frequently across countries. Words such as “allies,” “peace,” “good relationship,” “friend,” and “enemy” are common across word clouds. Additionally, respondents in our Indian sample frequently refer to terrorism as a reason to justify their opposition to trade. These results lend support for our main results that show the salience of geopolitical concerns for both U.S. and Indian respondents.

⁵Sengupta, Arjun. “A Win-Win Situation: Potential Benefits of Indo-Pak Friendship.” *The Times of India*. September 25, 1999.

⁶Dhoot, Vikas. “Indo-Pak Free Trade Agreement: Govt seeks fresh road map from Pakistan.” *The Economic Times*. May 16, 2013.

⁷Sattar, Huma. “India-Pakistan: The Curious Case of the MFN Status.” *The Diplomat*. February 14, 2015.

⁸Prasad, Rachita. “Traders Hope ‘Yeh Dosti’ will Double Trade across Borders.” *The Economic Times*. May 29, 2014.

⁹Sattar, Huma. “India-Pakistan: The Curious Case of the MFN Status.” *The Diplomat*. February 14, 2015.

Figure S1: India Word Cloud 1



Figure S2: India Word Cloud 1



Figure S3: U.S. Word Cloud 1



Figure S4: U.S. Word Cloud 2



C Balance Tests

Table S1: Summary of Balance Tests

Tests of Covariate Balance (Vignette Experiment) I

	Treatment:					
	Adversary Treatment			Military Treatment		
	Ally	Adversary	Diff. (col. 1-2)	Does Not Benefit	Military Benefits	Diff. (col. 4-5)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Respondent characteristics</i>						
Age	35.72	35.57	0.153 (0.645)	35.46	35.82	-0.360 (0.645)
Education	4.30	4.21	0.094 (0.072)	4.28	4.23	0.057 (0.072)
Religion	4.19	4.32	-0.130 (0.135)	4.18	4.32	-0.140 (0.135)
Race	1.37	1.41	-0.043 (0.060)	1.41	1.37	0.047 (0.060)
Income	4.79	4.71	0.074 (0.131)	4.77	4.73	0.037 (0.131)
<i>N</i>	605	603		605	603	

Notes: Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 report the group means of the covariates under different treatment conditions. Columns 3 and 6 display the results of two-sided t-tests between the treatment conditions, assuming unequal variances.

Tests of Covariate Balance (Vignette Experiment) II

	Treatment:					
	Peace Treatment			Democracy Treatment		
	Does Not Help	Helps Peace	Diff. (col. 1-2)	Not Democracy	Is Democracy	Diff. (col. 4-5)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Respondent characteristics</i>						
Age	35.47	35.82	-0.359 (0.645)	35.42	35.88	-0.459 (0.645)
Education	4.21	4.30	-0.083 (0.072)	4.23	4.28	-0.045 (0.072)
Religion	4.12	4.38	-0.260 (0.135)	4.45	4.05	0.407 (0.134)
Race	1.34	1.44	-0.090 (0.060)	1.37	1.41	-0.037 (0.060)
Income	4.69	4.80	-0.108 (0.131)	4.69	4.81	-0.119 (0.131)
<i>N</i>	606	602		608	600	

Notes: Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 report the group means of the covariates under different treatment conditions. Columns 3 and 6 display the results of two-sided t-tests between the treatment conditions, assuming unequal variances.

D Vignette Experiment OLS Results

Table S2: OLS Estimate of the Effect of Ally / Adversary Treatment

	Binary Outcome 1	Binary Outcome 2	Ordered Outcome 3	Ordered Outcome 4
Adversary Treatment	- 0.189*** (0.028)	- 0.189*** (0.028)	- 0.510*** (0.070)	- 0.515*** (0.069)
Constant (Control Mean)	0.582	0.449	2.147	1.866
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.036	0.075	0.042	0.086
N	1,208	1,208	1,208	1,208

Notes: Pre-treatment controls include gender, age, education, religion, race, and income. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S3: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Military, Peace, and Democracy Treatments

	Effect in Full Sample 1	Effect For Adversaries 2	Effect For Allies 3
Military Treatment	-0.109*** (0.029)	-0.183*** (0.039)	-0.039 (0.040)
Constant	0.542	0.484	0.601
R-Squared	0.012	0.035	0.002
Peace Treatment	0.313*** (0.027)	0.331*** (0.037)	0.298*** (0.038)
Constant	0.332	0.227	0.435
R-Squared	0.098	0.115	0.091
Democracy Treatment	0.078*** (0.029)	0.056 (0.040)	0.098** (0.040)
Constant	0.449	0.365	0.533
R-Squared	0.006	0.003	0.010
N	1,208	603	605

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S4: Two-way Interaction between Adversary and Military Treatments

	No Controls 1	With Controls 2
Adversary X Military	-0.144** 0.056	-0.143*** 0.055
Adversary Treatment	-0.118*** 0.040	-0.118*** 0.039
Military Treatment	-0.039 0.040	-0.033 0.039
Constant	0.601	0.466
R-Squared	0.053	0.091
N	1,208	1,208
Controls	No	Yes

Notes: Pre-treatment controls include gender, age, education, religion, race, and income.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S5: Two-way Interaction between Adversary and Peace Treatments

	No Controls 1	With Controls 2
Adversary X Peace	0.033 0.054	0.031 0.052
Adversary Treatment	-0.208*** 0.037	-0.207*** 0.037
Peace Treatment	0.298*** 0.038	0.297*** 0.037
Constant	0.435	0.358
R-Squared	0.135	0.172
N	1,208	1,208
Controls	No	Yes

Notes: Pre-treatment controls include gender, age, education, religion, race, and income.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S6: Three-way Interaction between Adversary, Peace, and Military Treatments

	No Controls 1	With Controls 2
Adversary X Peace X Military	-0.087 (0.106)	-0.114 (0.105)
Adversary X Peace	0.074 (0.077)	0.086 (0.075)
Adversary X Military	-0.100 (0.074)	-0.085 (0.073)
Peace X Military	0.057 (0.077)	0.088 (0.075)
Adversary Treatment	-0.158*** (0.056)	-0.164*** (0.054)
Military Treatment	-0.063 (0.057)	-0.072 (0.055)
Peace Treatment	0.268*** (0.054)	0.252*** (0.053)
Constant	0.467	0.397
R-Squared	0.152	0.188
N	1,208	1,208
Controls	No	Yes

Notes: Pre-treatment controls include gender, age, education, religion, race, and income.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

E Additional Description of the Conjoint Experiment

Figure S5

America is considering increasing trade with other countries in the world. We are interested in what you think about this topic. We will now give you information about two countries that are America's potential future trading partners. If you had to choose one country with which America should increase trade, which country would you choose? You may like both or not like either one. In any case, choose the one you prefer the most.

Attributes	Country A	Country B
Country government type	Democracy	Not a democracy
Country alliance with America	Ally of America	Adversary of America
Country current military size	A little smaller than the American military	Much Smaller than the American military
Trade will increase the size of the military of the other country by	A little	A lot
Trade will change the likelihood the other country engages in conflict with the US by	Likelihood stays the same	Likelihood decreases a little
Impact of trade on the US economy	Neither helps nor hurts	Hurts a little

Which country should America increase trade with?

Country A

Country B

On a scale of 1 to 10, how much would you support or oppose increasing trade with Country A and Country B:

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Country A	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Country B	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Table S7: Treatments in Conjoint Experiment

Attributes	Values
Country government type	Democracy Not a democracy
Country current military size	Much smaller than the American military A little smaller than the American military
Country alliance with America	Ally of America Adversary of America
Trade will increase the size of the military of the other country by	No change in size A little A lot
Trade will change the likelihood the other country engages in conflict with the US by	Likelihood stays the same Likelihood decreases a little Likelihood decreases a lot
Impact of trade on the US economy	Helps a little Neither helps nor hurts Hurts a little

Table S8: Conjoint Experiment: Effect of Trade Partner's Attributes on Support for Free Trade

	Treatment Effect in Full Sample
<i>Other Country's Government Type</i>	
Baseline: Not a democracy	
Democracy	0.128*** (0.009)
<i>Other Country's Alliance with America</i>	
Baseline: Ally	
Adversary	-0.274*** (0.013)
<i>Current Military Size of Other Country</i>	
Baseline: A little smaller than the American military	
Much Smaller	0.027*** (0.008)
<i>Increase in Size of Other Country's Military</i>	
Baseline: No change in size	
A little	-0.038*** (0.011)
A lot	-0.168*** (0.011)
<i>Change in Likelihood of Conflict</i>	
Baseline: Likelihood stays the same	
Decreases a little	0.081*** (0.012)
Decreases a lot	0.184*** (0.013)
<i>Impact of Trade on U.S. Economy</i>	
Baseline: Helps a little	
Neither helps nor hurts	-0.107*** (0.011)
Hurts a little	-0.270*** (0.011)
Constant	0.757*** (0.014)
R-Squared	0.131
N	12,080

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

F Construction of Variables and Results of Sub-Group Analyses

- Hawks versus Doves: We followed Herrmann and Keller (2004, 565) to construct this variable.¹⁰ Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: (a) The best way to ensure world peace is through military strength; (b) It is fine for our country to use force when dealing with international problems; (c) Rather than simply reacting to our enemies, it's better for us to strike first; (d) Generally, the more influence our nation has on other nations, the better off they are. Respondents scoring above the average level of agreement were classified as hawks.
- Liberals versus Conservatives: This variable was constructed based on a five-point scale set of responses, ranging from "very conservative" to "very liberal."
- Republicans versus Democrats: This variable was constructed based on a five-point scale set of responses, ranging from "strong Republican" to "strong Democrat."
- Ethnocentrism: We followed Mansfield and Mutz (2009, 439) to construct this measure.¹¹ Respondents were asked to rate four groups (Physicians, Blacks, Whites, and Hispanic-Americans) on seven-point scale measures for "Hard Working–Lazy," "Efficient–Wasteful," and "Trustworthy–Untrustworthy." We then defined ethnocentrism as the difference between the mean attributed to the in-group and the average of the means attributed to the two other racial out-groups.
- Nationalism: Following Mansfield and Mutz (2009, 439), this variable was constructed as an average response on a five-point scale to the following three statements: "In the United States, our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others"; "I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world"; and, "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans."
- Isolationism: This variable was constructed as an average response on a five-point scale to the following two statements Mansfield and Mutz (2009, 439): "The U.S. needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world"; and "The U.S. government should just try to take care of the wellbeing of Americans and not get involved with other nations."
- Internationalism: Following Herrmann and Keller (2004, 565), we asked individuals if they agreed or disagreed with the following two statements: "America needs to cooperate more with the United Nations in settling international disputes"; and "It is essential for the United State to work with other nations to solve problems such as over-population, hunger and pollution."
- Interest in foreign affairs: This variable was coded based on responses to the question, "How interested are you in information about what's going on in foreign affairs?" Responses ranged from "very interested" to "not interested at all."

¹⁰Herrmann, Richard and Jonathan Keller. 2004. "Beliefs, Values, and Strategic Choice: U.S. Leaders' Decisions to Engage, Contain, and Use Force in an Era of Globalization." *Journal of Politics* 66(2):557-580.

¹¹Mansfield, Edward D and Diana C Mutz. 2009. "Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety." *International Organization* 63(03):425-457.

Figure S6




Figure S7




Figure S8




Figure S9




Figure S10




Figure S11




Figure S12




Figure S13




Table S9: Effect of Trade Partner's Attributes on Support for Free Trade

	Effect Among Doves	Effect Among Hawks
<i>Other Country's Government Type</i>		
Baseline: Not a democracy		
Democracy	0.118*** (0.013)	0.137*** (0.012)
<i>Other Country's Alliance with America</i>		
Baseline: Ally		
Adversary	-0.230*** (0.018)	-0.312*** (0.017)
<i>Current Military Size of Other Country</i>		
Baseline: A little smaller than the American military		
Much Smaller	0.023* (0.012)	0.029** (0.012)
<i>Increase in Size of Other Country's Military</i>		
Baseline: No change in size		
A little	-0.022 (0.016)	-0.052*** (0.015)
A lot	-0.172*** (0.016)	-0.165*** (0.016)
<i>Change in Likelihood of Conflict</i>		
Baseline: Likelihood stays the same		
Decreases a little	0.083*** (0.018)	0.079*** (0.016)
Decreases a lot	0.205*** (0.019)	0.164*** (0.017)
<i>Impact of Trade on U.S. Economy</i>		
Baseline: Helps a little		
Neither helps nor hurts	-0.133*** (0.016)	-0.083*** (0.014)
Hurts a little	-0.296*** (0.017)	-0.247*** (0.015)
Constant	0.740*** (0.021)	0.772*** (0.018)
R-Squared	0.133	0.135
N	5,650	6,430

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. To construct a measure of relative hawkishness, we asked respondents to what extent they agreed or disagreed with four statements: "the best way to ensure world peace is through military strength"; "it is fine for our country to use force when dealing with international problems"; "rather than simply reacting to our enemies, it's better for us to strike first"; "generally, the more influence our nation has on other nations, the better off they are." Based on respondents' agreement with these sentences, we created a five-point index and classified those above the mean level of agreement as hawks and those below the mean level of agreement as doves.

Table S10: Effect of Trade Partner's Attributes on Support for Free Trade

	Effect Among Liberals	Effect Among Conservatives
<i>Other Country's Government Type</i>		
Baseline: Not a democracy		
Democracy	0.130*** (0.013)	0.124*** (0.013)
<i>Other Country's Alliance with America</i>		
Baseline: Ally		
Adversary	-0.236*** (0.018)	-0.314*** (0.017)
<i>Current Military Size of Other Country</i>		
Baseline: A little smaller than the American military		
Much Smaller	0.017 (0.011)	0.038*** (0.013)
<i>Increase in Size of Other Country's Military</i>		
Baseline: No change in size		
A little	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.067*** (0.015)
A lot	-0.152*** (0.016)	-0.186*** (0.016)
<i>Change in Likelihood of Conflict</i>		
Baseline: Likelihood stays the same		
Decreases a little	0.091*** (0.017)	0.071*** (0.017)
Decreases a lot	0.202*** (0.018)	0.163*** (0.018)
<i>Impact of Trade on U.S. Economy</i>		
Baseline: Helps a little		
Neither helps nor hurts	-0.126*** (0.016)	-0.086*** (0.015)
Hurts a little	-0.300*** (0.015)	-0.239*** (0.016)
Constant	0.725*** (0.020)	0.791*** (0.019)
R-Squared	0.132	0.137
N	6,200	5,790

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S11: Effect of Trade Partner's Attributes on Support for Free Trade

	Effect Among Democrats	Effect Among Republicans
<i>Other Country's Government Type</i>		
Baseline: Not a democracy		
Democracy	0.130*** (0.014)	0.125*** (0.012)
<i>Other Country's Alliance with America</i>		
Baseline: Ally		
Adversary	-0.238*** (0.020)	-0.304*** (0.016)
<i>Current Military Size of Other Country</i>		
Baseline: A little smaller than the American military		
Much Smaller	0.014 (0.012)	0.037*** (0.012)
<i>Increase in Size of Other Country's Military</i>		
Baseline: No change in size		
A little	0.002 (0.016)	-0.071*** (0.015)
A lot	-0.157*** (0.017)	-0.178*** (0.015)
<i>Change in Likelihood of Conflict</i>		
Baseline: Likelihood stays the same		
Decreases a little	0.083*** (0.019)	0.079*** (0.016)
Decreases a lot	0.201*** (0.019)	0.170*** (0.017)
<i>Impact of Trade on U.S. Economy</i>		
Baseline: Helps a little		
Neither helps nor hurts	-0.118*** (0.016)	-0.097*** (0.014)
Hurts a little	-0.276*** (0.017)	-0.264*** (0.015)
Constant	0.717*** (0.021)	0.790*** (0.018)
R-Squared	0.128	0.138
N	5,460	6,620

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure S14





Figure S15



G Details on the India Survey Replication

While our survey was run in the United States, the question remains whether the factors we identify are salient elsewhere, particularly in developing countries. This concern is important given that scholars have argued that particular findings in the trade, conflict, and peace literature hold better among advanced industrialized economies than among developing countries (Hegre 2000). To examine this question, we focus on India, where geopolitical considerations have routinely been invoked by political elites when discussing foreign economic policy, as explained previously. As the world’s largest democracy, and as one of the most economically and geopolitically significant developing countries in the world, India shares several similarities and differences with the U.S., making it an important crucible for tests of our theory. We thus replicated our vignette experiment on a sample of Indian respondents recruited from the MTurk platform in April 2016.

By design, we only allowed respondents who were geographically located in India to participate in the survey. We also asked respondents if they were located in India and terminated the survey if they responded in the negative. Although the representativeness of the Indian MTurk sample has not been explored in detail, several prominent political science articles have drawn on this sample for the purposes of survey research.¹² We note that this sample is more likely to be male, higher educated, English-speaking, urban, and geographically concentrated; consequently, we include pre-treatment demographic covariates in all of our specifications. Our primary goal here was not to make population-wide inferences about the validity of our results. Instead, we wished to investigate whether the theoretically-specified geopolitical triggers of mass preferences that appeared to evoke strong responses in our American sample operated similarly among Indian respondents.

Our experimental design was identical to the U.S. vignette experiment, save for some minor context-specific variations. In particular, because the words “ally” and “adversary” would not have been familiar to many Indian respondents, we added synonyms and used the phrases “ally or partner” and “adversary or opponent” in place of the original words. The precise wording of the vignette appeared as follows: “An article in a major national newspaper recently stated that India is considering enacting a free trade agreement with another country. Trade will strengthen the Indian economy, although some Indians will lose their jobs as a result of free trade. The other country in the free trade agreement [*is / is not*] a democracy and has a large military. Importantly, the other country is an [*ally or partner / adversary or opponent*] of India, meaning that it is considered to be [*friendly with / hostile to*] India. In addition, the article makes two key predictions about how trade with India will impact the other country. First, trade [*will / will not*] benefit the other country’s military. Second, trade [*will / will not*] help ensure peace by reducing the possibility of a conflict between the other country and India.” Respondents were asked: “Given the facts described in the article, do you support increasing trade with this country?”

Table S12: Replication of Vignette Experiment Among Indian Respondents

	Ally/Adversary Treatment 1	Military Size Treatment 2	Peace Treatment 3	Democracy Treatment 4
Treatment Effect	-0.188*** (0.043)	-0.097** (0.044)	0.226*** (0.043)	0.027 (0.044)
Constant	1.019	0.916	0.835	0.861
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.050	0.023	0.068	0.014
N	480	480	480	480

Notes: Pre-treatment controls include gender, age, education, religion, caste, and income. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. All significance levels reported using two-tailed tests.

¹²Charnysh, Volha, Christopher Lucas and Prerna Singh. 2015. “The Ties That Bind: National Identity Saliency and Pro-Social Behavior Toward the Ethnic Other.” *Comparative Political Studies* 48:267-300.

H External Validity

Surveys capture attitudes at a specific moment in time and in a specific location. The question remains whether the trends identified in our experiments have been salient in other time periods and countries. In the main text, we pointed to suggestive evidence from the Cold War and from the post-WWII settings, which appear to indicate that our results are broadly generalizable. We now use historical survey and case study evidence from the India-Pakistan, Taiwan-China, and South Korea-North Korea cases to investigate these claims more deeply.

Using nationally-representative survey data from the Pew Research Center, we find strong and significant evidence that the more Indian respondents view Pakistan as an adversary, the less likely they are to want to trade with Pakistan. We also find that Indian citizens who value peace between Pakistan and India are more likely to support trade liberalization (see Tables S13 and S14). Similarly, using data from the 2015 Taiwan National Security Survey, we show that Taiwanese citizens who perceive China to be a greater adversary are less willing to trade with China. We also observe a qualitatively meaningful relationship between the desire to trade and the desire for peace (see Tables S15 and S16).

We note that these results should be interpreted with caution, as the data are observational. We thus cannot fully rule out potential alternative explanations. For example, in the China case, it is possible that Taiwanese preferences for economic cooperation with the mainland stem primarily from changing identities (Lin 2016). However, the results do suggest that citizens routinely think about trade in line with the predictions of our theory, at least when particular geopolitical rivals are concerned. We view them as compelling when taken with the battery of other tests we have conducted.

The India-Pakistan Case

We look at public opinion data from a survey administered by Pew Research Center in India between December 7, 2013 – January 12, 2014. We begin by probing whether respondents with more negative opinions of Pakistan—that is, those who view Pakistan as more of an adversary—are less supportive of trade with Pakistan (see Table S13). To do so, our outcome variable is measured using responses to the following question: “Do you think that an increase in trade and business ties between India and Pakistan would be a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or a very bad thing for our country?” Respondents could answer on a sliding scale from 1–4 from “very good” to “very bad.” Our key independent variable is whether respondents viewed Pakistan in an adversarial manner, which is measured in two ways. First respondents are asked “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Pakistan?” Again, responses are measured on a sliding scale from 1–4, increasing in unfavorability. Our second measure asks respondents “How serious of a threat is Pakistan to our country? Is it a very serious threat, a somewhat serious threat, a minor threat, or not a threat at all?” This is scaled from 1–4 from “very serious threat” to “no threat at all.”

We first look at the correlation in a basic regression, and then add demographic characteristics. These include an indicator for whether the respondent is male, age, religiosity, an indicator for whether the respondent is employed, income, and an indicator for whether the respondent lives in an urban area. As shown, we find strong and significant evidence that the more respondents view Pakistan as an adversary, the less likely they are to want to trade with Pakistan. Additionally, this effect dwarfs the effects of the other variables we include, as none of our control variables are statistically significant.

We next examine whether respondents that value peace between Pakistan and India are more likely to support trade liberalization (see Table S14). We use two measures of how much citizens desire peace. First, we examine responses to the question: “How important is it that relations improve between Pakistan and India?” This was answered on a scale from 1-4, from “very important” to “not at all important.” Second, we look at answers to the question, “Would you favor or oppose further talks between India and Pakistan to try to reduce tensions between the two countries?” This is coded as an indicator of whether respondents oppose talks. Here, we find that respondents that are more averse to peace between Pakistan and India are also less likely to support trade between the two countries. Again, our key independent variables represent the only significant findings; none of our control variables reach statistical significance. We emphasize, however, that the data remain observational in nature and thus the results, while suggestive, could be driven by other factors.

Table S13: India: Effect of Viewing Pakistan as Less Adversarial on Willingness to Trade

	Measure 1		Measure 2	
	No Controls	Adding Control Variables	No Controls	Adding Control Variables
Favorable View of Pakistan	0.099*** (0.023)	0.099*** (0.023)	0.097*** (0.027)	0.093*** (0.027)
R-Squared	0.008	0.009	0.005	0.006
N	2220	2220	2220	2220

Notes: Control variables and constant not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S14: India: Effect of Desire for Peace on Willingness to Trade

	Measure 1		Measure 2	
	No Controls	Adding Control Variables	No Controls	Adding Control Variables
Desire for Peace	0.232*** (0.018)	0.234*** (0.018)	0.191*** (0.025)	0.194*** (0.025)
R-Squared	0.070	0.071	0.025	0.026
N	2220	2220	2220	2220

Notes: Control variables and constant not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The China-Taiwan Case

The relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan has been the primary security concern for both sides since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Mainland China claims sovereignty over the island of Taiwan, whereas Taiwan views the Mainland as an adversary that poses military threats and stymies its role and activities in the international community. While both sides have an interest in maintaining the status quo (i.e. China does not actively seek unification and Taiwan does not unilaterally declare independence), their relations are characterized by mistrust and potential volatility.

However, mainland China and Taiwan began to negotiate trade agreements after the pro-unification Kuomintang (KMT) took back both the legislature and presidency in Taiwan in 2008 from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). By offering favorable trade terms to Taiwan that are conducive to its economic recovery, China seeks the normalization of relations with the island, which could help to promote peace.¹³ Yet in Taiwan, opinions on free trade with Mainland China are divided along partisan lines, and public sentiments toward this issue are highly influenced by the approval (or the lack thereof) of the incumbent party. For example, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), signed in 2010, caused contentious debate in Taiwan. The KMT and supporters of the ECFA emphasized its economic benefits such as boosting domestic economic growth, safeguarding Taiwan's competitiveness in the mainland market,¹⁴ and the increased likelihood of peaceful relations with Mainland China.¹⁵ The DPP and opponents of the ECFA, on the other hand, claimed that it would be both economically disadvantageous and politically dangerous. They feared that economic integration via trade would increase Taiwan's economic dependence on the Mainland, strengthening Mainland China. Negotiation of subsequent trade agreements between the two sides has thus proven to be politically challenging.¹⁶

To test whether this elite rhetoric matches the views of the public, we use data from the 2015 Taiwan National Security Survey, which was conducted by the Election Study Center of the National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan. The dependent variable we employ is a question that asks, "Some people in our society assert that Taiwan should strengthen its economic and trade ties with the Mainland, and others believe we should lessen such ties. Which opinion do you agree more with?" Answers range from on a scale from 0-2 from "lessen ties" to "strengthen ties."

We examine several independent variables. We first look at perceptions of mainland China as an adversary, captured by the question "On a scale of 0-10 how much do you give the Mainland Chinese government?" Higher values

¹³March 5, 2009. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. "Premier Wen Calls for Peaceful Development in Cross-Strait Relations." (http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/speech/speech/201101/t20110123_723974.htm, last accessed on April 30, 2016.)

¹⁴April 22, 2009. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan). "President Mao's Remarks at the Videoconference with the Center for Strategic and International Studies." (<http://english.president.gov.tw>, last accessed on April 30, 2016.)

¹⁵Huang, Jie. 2012. "TPP versus ECFA: Similarities, Differences, and China's Strategies." *China Review* pp. 85-109.

¹⁶Romberg, Alan D. 2014. "Sunshine heats up Taiwan politics, affects PRC tactics." *China Leadership Monitor* 44(2).

indicate a less adversarial view of the mainland. An alternative question capturing the same concept reads “On a scale of 0-10, where 0 indicates cross-strait relations as extremely hostile and 10 as extremely peaceful, how would you rate current cross-strait relations?” Again, a higher number signals a more friendly view of mainland China. We run a simple regression, both examining the correlation without any control variables and then controlling for several demographic variables including whether the respondent is a member of the KMT political party, whether the respondent identifies as Taiwanese, level of education, age, and gender. The results indicate that, in line with the predictions of our theory, people who perceive mainland China to be a greater adversary are less willing to trade with China. This result is highly significant and remains so regardless of the way the question is asked, and whether control variables are included.

Second, we analyze whether people prefer to seek a military build-up or peace. To get at this, we look at the following question: “Facing military threat from the Mainland, do you think Taiwan should strengthen its military power, or adopt moderate policies to avoid agitation?” Answers to this question range on a scale from 0-2 from “strengthen the military” to “adopt moderate policies.” We also capture this question in a different way using the question: “Facing military threat from the Mainland, do you think Taiwan should strengthen its military power, or adopt moderate policies to avoid agitation?” This is again coded on a scale from 0-2 where higher values indicate a greater desire for peace. We find a strong correlation between the desire to trade and the desire for peace, which is statistically significant in all specifications.

Table S15: Effect of Viewing China as Less Adversarial on Willingness to Trade

	Measure 1		Measure 2	
	No Controls	Adding Control Variables	No Controls	Adding Control Variables
Favorable View of Mainland China	0.201*** (0.031)	0.157*** (0.014)	0.121*** (0.019)	0.083*** (0.018)
R-Squared	0.220	0.271	0.047	0.183
N	816	806	828	819

Notes: Control variables and constant not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table S16: Effect of Desire for Peace on Willingness to Trade

	Measure 1		Measure 2	
	No Controls	Adding Control Variables	No Controls	Adding Control Variables
Desire for Peace	0.162*** (0.024)	0.112*** (0.023)	0.233*** (0.037)	0.184*** (0.036)
R-Squared	0.054	0.185	0.047	0.182
N	801	791	816	809

Notes: Control variables and constant not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The North Korea-South Korea Case

Similar dynamics played out in South Korea when debating whether to increase trade with its primary adversary, North Korea. In particular, the leftist party in South Korea favored increasing trade with North Korea in order to increase the prospects for peace between the two countries. Thus, when it assumed power, the party supported the building of the Kaesung Industry Complex in North Korea which was designed to increase trade between the two nations. This factory was an element of the so-called “Sunshine Policy” which advocated opening to North Korea in order to foster peace. Indeed, according to a South Korean government report, “The sunshine policy can be seen as a proactive policy to induce incremental and voluntary changes in North Korea for peace” (Kwon 2014, 2). Rice and fertilizer were provided, and South Korean businesses were allowed to operate in North Korea.

However, opponents of the industrial complex and of the sunshine policy more broadly argued that liberalizing trade relations with North Korea would strengthen the state and allow it to divert resources toward its military – specifically to its nuclear weapons program. Thus, “whenever North Korea raised the level of security threat with its missile or took war-provoking postures, the Sunshine Policy was brought to the discussion table....The hardliners

in the South criticize the Sunshine Policy as having done nothing but help the North to develop a nuclear weapons program” (Kwon 2014, 2).

I Generalizability

We find additional evidence of the generalizability of our effects when we examine the results of our first survey. To start, we find strong evidence that voters typically know which countries are the friends and which countries are the enemies of their respective homelands. American citizens display remarkable consistency and accuracy in their responses to questions probing the identities of the United States’ allies and adversaries. Without any priming, respondents consistently listed countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany as America’s top allies, while marking out China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as America’s most important adversaries. That voters are able to chalk out allies and adversaries suggests that they likely have preferences over economic statecraft with specific partner nations.

More specifically, respondents were asked whether they supported trade with other countries and why. We found that they tend to explain their answers in geopolitical terms, particularly regarding peace and security externalities. For example, U.S. respondents who do not want to trade with North Korea (“the regime is run by a despot, trade will only make him stronger”; “North Korea is a very adamant and known enemy of the United States. They hate our way of living and I don’t want to help their economy in any way. I am frankly scared of that country and their power and intentions”; “This is a bad country . The leader is crazy. It may help the country if we traded. I would not support helping the country of North Korea at all”) and China (“Increasing foreign trade would give them more economic prosperity”) cite security externalities, and they do want to trade with allies (e.g. Britain) for these reasons (“Great Britain is our ally, we should do what we can to help them. We need strong relations in Europe to help keep enemies at bay. The stronger their economy is the more able they will be to help us in situations when it becomes necessary to do so.”) Further, people do want to trade with adversaries when they believe it will lead to peace (“We should nurture peace. Trade makes allies.”) Similar results obtain in India regarding China (“Trade will cause a good relationship between the two countries. But China will try to strengthen its military”) and other partners.

J Question Wording for Post-Treatment Survey Questions

Hawks versus Doves:

To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements:

- a. The best way to ensure world peace is through military strength.
- b. It is fine for our country to use force when dealing with international problems.
- c. Rather than simply reacting to our enemies, it’s better for us to strike first.
- d. Generally, the more influence our nation has on other nations, the better off they are.

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

Isolationism:

To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements:

- a. The U.S. needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.
- b. The U.S. government should just try to take care of the wellbeing of Americans and not get involved with other nations.

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

Internationalism:

To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements:

- a. America needs to cooperate more with the United Nations in settling international disputes.
- b. It is essential for the United State to work with other nations to solve problems such as over-population, hunger and pollution

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

Liberals versus Conservatives:

Below is a scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from “extremely conservative” to “extremely liberal.” Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- Very Conservative
- Somewhat conservative
- Moderate
- Somewhat liberal
- Very Liberal

Republicans versus Democrats:

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a:

- Strong Republican
- Moderate Republican
- Independent
- Moderate Democrat
- Strong Democrat

Interest in foreign affairs:

How interested are you in information about what’s going on in foreign affairs?

- Very interested
- Moderately interested
- Slightly interested
- Not interested at all

Job security:

How secure do you feel in your job at the moment?

- Very secure
- Somewhat secure
- Neither secure nor insecure
- Somewhat insecure
- Very insecure

Nationalism:

To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements:

- a. In the United States, our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.
- b. I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world.
- c. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Ethnocentrism:

Next are some questions about various groups in our society. Below are seven-point scales on which you can rate characteristics of people in different groups.

Where would you rate people in the following groups in general on this scale?

- a. Physicians
- b. Blacks
- c. Whites
- d. Hispanic-Americans

Hard Working (1) – Lazy (7)

Where would you rate people in the following groups in general on this scale?

- a. Physicians
- b. Blacks
- c. Whites
- d. Hispanic-Americans

Efficient (1) – Wasteful (7)

Where would you rate people in the following groups in general on this scale?

- a. Physicians
- b. Blacks
- c. Whites
- d. Hispanic-Americans

Trustworthy (1) – Untrustworthy (7)

Demographic Covariates

Gender:

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

Age:

What year were you born (YYYY)?

Education:

What best describes your highest level of education?

- Did not graduate from high school
- Completed high school or GED
- Some college, but no degree (yet)
- Two-year college degree / AA / AS
- Four-year college degree / BA / BS
- Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.)

Religion:

What is your religion?

- Protestant
- Catholic
- Jewish
- Muslim
- Mormon
- Not religious
- Other

Race/Ethnicity:

What is your race/ethnicity?

- White
- Black or African American
- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- Other / Hispanic

Income:

What is your household's approximate annual income from all sources before taxes?

- Under \$10,000
- \$10,000-\$24,999
- \$25,000-\$34,999
- \$35,000-\$49,999
- \$50,000-\$64,999
- \$65,000-\$84,999
- \$85,000-\$99,999
- \$100,000-\$149,999
- \$150,000-\$174,999
- \$175,000-\$199,999
- \$200,000-\$249,999
- \$250,000 and above

Occupation:

What is your occupation?

Occupation category:

Please classify your occupation into one of the following categories:

- Management, business, and financial occupations
- Professional and related occupations
- Service occupations
- Sales and related occupations
- Office and administrative support occupations
- Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations
- Construction and extraction occupations
- Installation, maintenance and repair occupations
- Production occupations
- Transportation and material moving occupations
- Other:
- Unemployed

Marital status:

What is your marital status?

- Married, living with spouse
- Separated
- Divorced
- Widowed
- Single, never married

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