

Attitudes toward Globalization in Ranked Ethnic Societies

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Abstract

Canonical scholarship has focused on the economic basis of individual support for trade. Separately, studies of developing country politics have specified ethnicity as a crucial driver of political behavior. We develop a novel argument to demonstrate how ethnic identity structures support for global economic integration. In ranked ethnic systems, marginalized ethnic groups are excluded from domestic labor markets and compartmentalized into lower-skill occupations. International trade disrupts this status quo by offering marginalized groups less discriminatory avenues for economic advancement. We present a wealth of observational and experimental evidence from India to show that individuals in disadvantaged communities are significantly more likely to support trade liberalization than members of dominant ethnic groups. Experimental tests reveal that ethnic considerations reinforce the effects of material self-interest for members of marginalized communities. Our findings point to ethnicity as a key determinant of economic policy preferences regarding globalization in culturally segmented societies.

Keywords: *trade, globalization, identity, ranked ethnicities, public opinion*

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Introduction

How does identity shape trade preferences? A rich body of scholarship argues that voters' *economic* interests determine their attitudes toward globalization because trade creates winners and losers among different sectors and factors of production (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Naoi and Kume, 2011; Ardanaz, Murillo and Pinto, 2013). Given these findings, it is not clear if *non-economic* identities—like religion, race or caste—should matter for trade support. In some societies, however, ethnicity is the relevant system that organizes economic relations, skills acquisition, and market access.¹ Just as trade shifts resources between economic classes, it also holds redistributive implications for members of different ethnic groups (Guisinger, 2013, 2017). If trade policies disproportionately benefit only some ethnic communities, then groups that stand to gain relatively more from trade liberalization will support trade more.

We argue that ethnic identity is a salient determinant of trade preferences in “ranked ethnic systems”: societies where ethnicity and economic class overlap (Horowitz, 1985). Why? First, in ranked systems, low-rank groups face systematic barriers to entry into lucrative employment. Because trade provides opportunities for occupational mobility in less discriminatory environments, trade liberalization is viewed as improving the material prospects of both high- and low-skilled individuals within this ethnic group. Consequently, we expect greater support for trade among discriminated communities (Osgood and Peters, 2017). Second, group-based occupational specialization is a characteristic feature of ranked ethnic systems (Hechter, 1978). If most members of an ethnic group also hold the relevant type of skill that benefits from trade (such as low-skilled workers in developing countries), then the overlap of ethnicity and skills reinforces trade preferences, leading members of this group to support trade more than they would if only skills or ethnic considerations were at play.²

We study public opinion on trade in India—the world's largest democracy, a complex multiethnic country, and a crucial case for studying how voters in developing countries formulate preferences

¹Following convention, we define ethnic identity as membership into a descent-based group, or more subjectively as “self-identification around a characteristic that is difficult or impossible to change, such as language, race, or location” (Birnie, 2006, 66). This departs from studies of other noneconomic factors, such as nationalism and partisan ideology (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Mutz and Kim, 2017).

²In ranked ethnic systems, low-rank groups are segmented into low-skill occupations. Individuals in privileged groups typically have more heterogeneous skills and don't face barriers within domestic markets, so their fortunes are not anticipated to rise and fall with the fortunes of their co-ethnics, so far as trade is concerned.

over international economic exchange. India’s ethnic communities can be viewed as dominant or marginalized regarding their access to socioeconomic resources. Historically, the Hindu caste system has been organized according to ascriptive occupational groups. Castes like Upper Castes (UC) and Backward Classes (OBC) are concentrated in higher-skill, landowning, artisanal, or labor-based occupations, with privileged access to employment opportunities in domestic markets. Lower-ranked Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) have faced severe social and economic discrimination and have been segregated into menial jobs. Outside of the Hindu caste system, religious minorities, most notably Muslims, face systematic economic and social discrimination (Sachar, 2006).

To study the determinants of support for international trade, we use data from three rounds of National Election Studies (NES) conducted after India’s national elections in 1999, 2004, and 2009. We find that low-skilled respondents support trade more than high-skilled respondents. This aligns with theories of comparative advantage that predict a country’s abundant factor of production gains from international trade and thus supports it (Rogowski, 1989). Next, we find that respondents in discriminated ethnic groups—SC, ST, and Muslim—support trade more than those in privileged groups (UC and OBC). Importantly, the effect of ethnicity on trade remains robust among both high- and low-skilled SC, ST, and Muslim respondents. Because India’s states vary markedly in levels of development and ethnic structures, we study state-level support for trade as a function of state-level determinants (Thachil and Herring, 2008; Singh, 2016). Using fine-grained occupational and ethnicity data, we find that states with higher percentages of low-skilled workers and of SC, ST, and Muslims evince greater support for trade openness.

To probe the mechanisms at work in our argument—that marginalized and discriminated ethnic groups will support trade more due to the group-based distributive consequences of liberalization—we employ an original survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of over 4,200 respondents. When we give respondents information about ethnic winners and losers from trade, it’s the SC, ST, and Muslim respondents (not members of high-rank ethnic groups) who display sensitivity to co-ethnic gains and losses. Furthermore, our results show that both high- and low-skilled SC/ST/Muslims are sensitive to the co-ethnic treatments, and strongly support policies that benefit their co-ethnics. We find no such comparable effect among high- or low-skilled high-rank groups.

Next, we examine how much the economic and skills profiles of voters of any ethnic identity shape support for trade. Our findings demonstrate that when respondents receive information about the economic winners and losers of trade, high-skilled respondents develop more protectionist viewpoints. This resonates with studies showing that high-skilled workers in developing countries oppose trade liberalization when their wages decrease from trade (Milner and Kubota, 2005).

We also probe the joint effects of informing respondents about both the ethnic and the economic winners and losers from trade. Among high-rank groups, we find no evidence of an interaction across the ethnicity and skills treatments. But among low-rank groups, support for trade is higher for respondents who received both the skills and ethnic treatments. This important finding substantiates our claim that the overlap of ethnicity and skill leads to greater support for free trade among disadvantaged communities than if either economic or identity-based considerations alone shaped attitudes.

Finally, we introduce survey evidence from Nigeria, South Africa, and the Philippines to show that our findings hold in other ranked ethnic systems in the developing world—like South Africa and the Philippines—but not in an unranked ethnic system like Nigeria.

This paper contributes to a nascent literature on the role of identity-related factors in international political economy (Baker, 2015; Guisinger, 2017; Baccini and Weymouth, 2021; Li, Pandya and Sekhri, 2022). We demonstrate that greater overlap between ethnic and economic interests increases how much voters within communities develop similar views on trade policy. Our evidence aligns with theories of cross-cutting and overlapping cleavages (Dunning and Harrison, 2010; Huber and Suryanarayan, 2016) and research on how the internal characteristics of ethnic groups shape preferences toward redistributive policy (Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Lieberman and McClendon, 2013). Additionally, remarkably little research exists on even the economic basis of trade support in developing countries (Rudra 2008; Jamal and Milner 2013; Mukherjee 2016). Our finding that low-skilled individuals are more supportive of trade speaks to this growing body of work and suggests that the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model predictions are in fact at work in large developing democracies like India. This contrasts with recent studies from the developed world that question factor-proportion models of trade preferences (Rho and Tomz, 2017).

This paper is the first to present evidence on the determinants of trade preferences across states, economic classes, and ethnic groups in India. Scholars of India’s ethnic politics have studied how

identity shapes domestic policy preferences and political outcomes—from voting to riots to public goods (Varshney, 2002; Chandra, 2004; Wilkinson, 2004; Thachil, 2014). Our paper’s novelty lies in connecting ethnic identities to preferences over foreign economic policy, underlining how globalization scrambles group-based control of resources and markets. These findings may surprise observers of India’s integration into the global economy. Typically, trade policy isn’t thought to be within the realm of mass politics; prevailing work has explained trade liberalization as an elite-driven phenomenon (Alamgir, 2009). Our findings suggest an alternate explanation for India’s gradual embrace of trade liberalization in recent decades; that permissive trade policies enjoy bottom-up electoral support from large sections of society. Additionally, our finding that disadvantaged communities express support for free trade suggests that economic policy might be a profitable electoral tool for upper-caste Hindu politicians (Gaikwad, 2018).

Theory of Ranked Ethnic Systems in a Globalizing World

Economic Determinants

Our theoretical analysis begins from the premise that economic interests shape voters’ support for trade policy (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Economic theory predicts that when factors are mobile, following the HO framework, cleavages form between owners of different factors of productions, such as labor and capital (Rogowski 1989).³ Developing countries typically have a comparative advantage in producing labor-intensive, low-skill goods due to an abundant supply of low-skill labor. Consequently, we should expect the locus of support for trade liberalization in developing countries to lie with low-skilled workers employed in labor-intensive sectors that stand to expand production with access to markets in advanced industrialized nations. Conversely, high-skilled workers in capital-intensive industries that are relatively less competitive in global markets are predicted to oppose trade liberalization.⁴

³Scholars also highlight several alternate determinants of trade preferences, including ideational, cultural, sociotropic, and geopolitical determinants (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Mutz and Kim, 2017; Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2022). Recent research questions how much individuals know about trade (Rho and Tomz, 2017).

⁴Milner and Kubota (2005); Jamal and Milner (2013); Dolan and Milner (2022).

Ethnic Determinants

Economic theories of trade preferences assume that material factors shape skill endowments, which in turn create economic cleavages and organize economic production. But in many multiethnic settings, ethnocultural differences across groups structure both social cleavages and market relations (McNamara, 2020). Members of particular ethnic groups could have asymmetric access to market opportunities, and hence stand to benefit differently from employment. Thus, ethnicity may predict winners and losers in domestic markets. While different ethnic groups might hold distinct policy preferences due to a variety of “taste-based” reasons, we focus on how *economic* differences between ethnic groups shape their preferences over redistributive policy (Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Lieberman and McClendon, 2013).

In what contexts are ethnic groups demarcated along economic lines? Following Horowitz (1985), we focus on ranked ethnic systems, where ethnicity and economic class overlap and where some groups are wealthy and others poor.⁵ In practice, this means high-ranked groups have better-paying jobs, more economic assets such as property and capital, and preferential access to labor market opportunities. Correspondingly, because of discrimination, low-rank groups encounter systematic barriers to economic advancement in domestic labor markets. In *unranked* systems ethnic differences aren’t expected to matter for group skills, wealth, or access to market opportunities.

Overlapping Economic and Ethnic Determinants

We now explicate how an *economic logic* of ethnic differences between groups shapes preferences toward global economic integration. We consider how two features of ranked ethnic systems—discrimination and skills-based occupational specialization—shape individuals’ relationships to markets under autarky and then under free trade.

Ranked Ethnic Systems under Autarky In closed economies isolated from the rest of the world, ranked differences between groups are perpetuated by formal institutions, legal codes, cultural norms, and informal social practices and networks that sustain labor-market discrimination against

⁵Ranked ethnic systems exist in societies characterized by sociopolitical oppression. Examples include differences between Blacks and whites in South Africa and the United States (most explicitly during apartheid and the Jim Crowe-era, but informally too in subsequent periods), between Hutus and Tutsi in Rwanda, between whites and indigenous groups in Bolivia, and between high and low castes in India.

low-rank groups. This results in asymmetric access to market opportunities, and forced skills specialization for differently ranked ethnic groups.

Imagine two ethnic groups whose economic relations in the market are defined by their ascriptive/inherited rank, which in turn reinforce the ranked system. Members of low-rank groups face obstructions like:

- Barriers to education and vocational training.
- Impediments to hiring and promotion in lucrative occupations and sectors.
- Lack of geographical mobility due to the pervasiveness of ranked hierarchies in other parts of the closed economy.
- Systematic wage differential for identical jobs.
- Exclusion from high-value career opportunities due to kinship-based professional networks.

This system represents an equilibrium. High-rank groups—benefiting economically and socially from the architecture of the ranked system—are incentivized to maintain these discriminatory systems. They lack motivation to dismantle structures that could promote upward mobility for low-rank groups. They can deploy institutional and cultural strategies to punish members—high- or low-rank—who attempt to transgress these modes of market interactions.

Meanwhile, members of low-rank groups know they face material and cultural sanctions if they challenge the social order. Additionally, anticipating discrimination, they may avoid taking costly measures (such as investing in education) to advance their economic station. Thus, both structural and individual factors reinforce ranked differences in how groups access labor-market opportunities.

A direct consequence of these cultural modes of exclusion is that low-rank groups are forced to specialize in low-skill occupations, while high-rank groups dominate high-skill jobs. Low-rank groups must perform menial occupations like handling sewage or cadavers, which reinforces social norms of “purity” and “pollution”—and further stigmatizes low-rank groups.⁶

Such discriminatory market arrangements have defined a host of ranked ethnic systems, both in cases where formal institutions perpetuate group-based skills specialization, and where informal institutions do the same. For example, South Africa under apartheid legally enforced segregation,

⁶These arrangements are passed on intergenerationally, as children learn the skills of their kin and reside in ghettoized communities that specialize in particular low-skill occupations.

labor controls and the disenfranchisement of the Black majority.⁷ State policies gave whites preferential positions in the labor market (especially manufacturing), and protected them from being displaced by cheaper labor, primarily that of Blacks (Simons and Simons, 1969).

As for cases where informal structures perpetuate discrimination and skills-specialization, Hechter (1978) calls this the “cultural division of labor.” The historical relations between Irish and English in Great Britain (Hechter, 1975) and between indigenous and nonindigenous communities in Bolivia (Gisselquist, 2013) are examples of societies featuring such systems.

Ranked Ethnic Systems under Globalization We now consider the implications for market arrangements in a ranked ethnic system that begins integrating into the global economy. Imagine a case where all else remains equal, but a policy shift allows domestic market actors to begin trading with international actors.⁸

In the postliberalization economy, the emergence of new sets of foreign actors—employers, buyers, and sellers—asymmetrically reshapes the incentives of different ethnic groups. It’s well established that liberalization creates economic winners and losers, but we argue that liberalization also creates *ethnic* winners and losers. Why?

First, foreign employers have little material and cultural interest in perpetuating discrimination related to domestic ethnic-group hierarchies. Osgood and Peters (2017) document that women-owned enterprises in patriarchal countries are more export-oriented because the global economy allows women to escape from domestic gender discrimination. Applying this insight to our analysis of opportunities the global economy affords to low-rank ethnic groups, we underscore how foreign actors:

- Have clear economic incentives to seek best-quality talent and goods for the cheapest price.
- Are less likely to rely on locality-specific hiring; they cast a wider net for qualified workers and production inputs.
- Have less incentive to lean into ethnic networks to achieve economic needs, and might in fact consider ethnic hierarchies detrimental to their organization, as these undermine their management authority and reduce efficiency.

⁷Several features of South Africa’s political and social system echo the definition of a ranked ethnic system. South Africans were assigned a “rank” at birth: White, Asian, Colored, African (Seidman, 1999). The state granted legal and political rights based on this rank and prohibited inter-racial marriages and sex. Segregation under apartheid meant racial separation in schools, restaurants, and public spaces.

⁸For example, the policy change might permit crossborder imports and exports, allow foreign firms to open factories and employ domestic workers, or let citizens emigrate for employment.

- Might even *prefer* hiring and purchasing goods produced by low-rank groups because the ranked ethnic system itself discounts the labor, wages, and products of these groups. That is, ranked hierarchies give foreign actors opportunities for considerable economic arbitrage.
- May be more willing to invest in upgrading workers' skills, whatever their ethnic background, to enhance productivity and profits.

Consequently, because globalization disrupts ethnically-organized markets, low-rank groups will view liberalization as a chance to compete on a more even footing in the global economy. By contrast, for high-rank groups, weakening ethnic discrimination through liberalization introduces more market competition, diminishing their rank-based employment and wage advantages in markets vis-à-vis low-rank groups.

Theoretical Predictions The preceding discussion underlines how liberalization creates an ethnic basis of trade support, leading us to derive the following prediction:

Hypothesis 1: Members of low-rank ethnic groups will be more supportive of trade than those in high-rank groups.

As noted, globalization rewards individuals with particular skills profiles over others. Trade theory predicts that those who own factors of production that are abundant in the domestic economy stand to gain from international economic integration, whereas owners of relatively scarce factors of production lose materially from trade. In developing countries, low-skilled individuals therefore benefit from trade, whereas capital owners and high-skilled labor lose due to stiffer import competition, leading us to predict:

Hypothesis 2: Low-skilled individuals will be more supportive of trade than high-skilled individuals.

Hypothesis 1 focuses on an ethnic basis of trade attitudes, whereas Hypothesis 2 focuses on a skills basis for preference formation. If members of low-rank ethnic groups are characterized solely by their skills profiles, then accounting for skills should rule out the role of ethnic identity in shaping preferences. But the intersection of ethnic and economic identities could shape preferences in two additional ways.

First, if *discrimination* experienced by low-rank groups in local labor markets is the decisive factor in shaping preferences, both high- and low-skilled low-rank ethnic members may consider a postliberalization context more lucrative.

Hypothesis 3a: Both high- and low-skilled members of low-rank ethnic groups will be more supportive of trade than those in high-rank groups.

Second, if trade support is disproportionately driven by low-skilled, low-rank individuals who hold complementary skills and ethnic profiles, then skills and ethnicity may create a reinforcing effect leading to greater support for trade from low-skilled low-rank individuals than high-skilled low-rank individuals (who face competing economic and ethnic pressures).

Hypothesis 3b: Low-skilled, low-rank individuals will be more supportive of trade than high-skilled, low-rank individuals.

The Indian Case

We test our arguments in India, where ethnic differences within the caste system—which historically placed individuals into descent-based occupational castes—are central to explaining group-wise economic outcomes.⁹ Caste differences have brought employment discrimination, impeded trade across castes, and weakened access to critical public goods (Munshi, 2019; Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2005). Persistent caste-based economic discrimination creates inefficiencies in labor-market institutions and weakens human capital development (Thorat and Newman, 2007). Additionally, the Hindu-Muslim divide further shapes economic relations (Jha, 2013).¹⁰

India’s postindependence economy was largely protected from foreign competition through trade barriers and a highly bureaucratic import-licensing system. In 1991, after a balance of payments crisis, India suddenly shifted to trade liberalization, causing the external sector to grow from 16 percent of its GDP in 1990 to 38 percent in 2020.

It wasn’t obvious ex-ante how liberalization would impact the fortunes of low-rank groups. Communities historically excluded from socio-economic networks faced being “marginalized all over again” (Still, 2015, 11-12). But scholars who studied the impact of liberalization on marginalized groups found that trade reduced poverty among SCs in states with greater trade openness (Mukim and Panagariya, 2012).

⁹The hierarchical organization of castes along occupations led to SCs being spatially segregated and forced into low-paying, low-skill jobs. SCs have traditionally worked as agricultural labor, scavengers, sanitation workers, leatherworkers, and other professions considered menial by higher-caste groups (Thorat, 2002; Thorat and Sadana, 2009; Vidyarthi, 2015).

¹⁰Muslims routinely experience labor- and housing-market discrimination. India’s Muslims have seen sharp declines in their economic and political status in the postindependence era (Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004; Sachar, 2006).

Two channels emerge to explain this. First, SCs were well positioned to exploit the open economy because they specialized in skills that benefited from international trade. In Karnataka state, for example, SC leatherworkers could invest in international leather production, reducing their financial dependence on UCs and increasing their social and economic mobility (Kumar, 1998; Charsley, 2010). This was partly because their specialized sector was long considered “degrading and polluting” as it involved touching raw animal hides. Charsley (2010) finds that SCs were adept at all aspects of the leather-manufacturing value chain: securing hides, tanning, leather production, and leather financing, leaving them well positioned to gain from international trade.

The second factor driving these successes was the relative lack of ethnicity-based discriminatory practices in sectors that benefited from liberalization. Surveys asking SC respondents to compare their socio-economic outcomes before and after trade liberalization show that Dalits (synonymous with SCs) left their traditional occupations to enter new-economy professions, and reported less discrimination. In this finding, market reforms led to a “rapid erosion in discriminatory processes that stigmatised dalits” (Kapur et al., 2010). Scholars engaging with the cultural, social, and economic consequences of trade liberalization on Dalits have noted that SCs “were entering caste-neutral occupations” (Babu and Prasad, 2009, 25).¹¹

Examples abound of low-rank groups benefiting from globalization. Carswell and De Neve (2013, 13) focus on Southern India’s Tiruppur garment industry, with exports worth around \$2.5 billion and half-a-million employees in 2010. They find that SC workers comprised 20 percent of the workforce. One SC interviewee said, “employers look to the talent, not at the caste.” This contrasts with practices in the same state’s rural hinterlands, as yet unexposed to global markets, where SCs still faced workplace discrimination, indebtedness, and social exclusion (Carswell and De Neve, 2013, 66). Ethnographic scholarship reveals similar trends in other other states and sectors. For example, the owner of a multinationally owned vehicle manufacturing plant in Punjab noted that the plant is “more modern” and similar to the rest of the global economy precisely because of its impersonal labor practices. Here, the language of globalization “advocates for formal mechanisms

¹¹Dalit activist Chandra Bhan Prasad notes that economic liberalization helped Dalits by leading to the “democratization of manufacturing.” This opened up jobs for Dalits in companies and factories, where they benefited relatively more than other groups (that had flourished under India’s previously closed economy). Increasing competition from globalization also created opportunities for entrepreneurs, leading to more Dalit-owned businesses and to greater “freedom of the underclass” (Rajagopalan, Shruti. “Ideas of India: On Ambedkarism, Caste and Dalit Capitalism.” *Discourse*. February 11, 2011).

for hiring...and meritocratic principles,” equating ethnic- or caste-based hiring with practices of the past (Newman and Jodhka, 2010, 69).

These ethnographic accounts appear to buttress the two theoretical mechanisms in our argument—skills specialization and discrimination—by which liberalization shapes the economic fortunes of groups in ranked ethnic systems. Yet scant evidence exists about whether these mechanisms generalize to mass preferences, especially given concerns about the ability of India’s discriminated groups to navigate the postliberalization economy (Still, 2015).

In fact, scholars disagree on whether liberalization benefited the poor and low-skilled in the first place. Topalova (2007) shows that the sudden reduction of trade tariffs brought more poverty and greater inequality to trade-affected rural districts. Rudra (2008) argues that the growth in jobs to low-skilled workers, while benefiting the poor, weakened the middle class because of historically weak labor institutions. Others, notably Ural, Mitra and Hasan (2007), find that trade openness didn’t worsen poverty; to the contrary, trade-exposed states experienced lower overall poverty, especially in regions with more flexible labor-market institutions.

The following sections describe three tests we conducted to examine how ethnic and economic identities shape trade preferences, offering new empirical insights into these ongoing debates.

Correlational Evidence from Public Opinion Surveys

We use National Election Studies (NES) surveys conducted after the 1999, 2004, and 2009 general elections to examine correlations between ethnic identity, skills, and trade preferences.¹² Survey questions probed attitudes toward trade policy, as well as respondents’ socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. See Appendix A.1 for descriptive statistics.

Trade Policy Preference: Our primary dependent variable captures answers to:

“Foreign companies should not be allowed free trade in India.”

Do you agree or disagree?

The question presents the choice of supporting or opposing trade liberalization in terms easily

¹²The surveys targeted large samples of voters across the Indian states and were conducted face-to-face in local languages. For example, the 2004 survey was conducted in 22 Indian languages and had 27,189 respondents.

understood by different categories of respondents, including the poor and less educated. In 1999, respondents were given three choices: “agree,” “no opinion,” or “disagree.” In 2004 and 2009, five choices were offered, ranging from “fully agree” to “fully disagree.” We rescaled the variables to hold a three-point value between 0 and 2, with higher values indicating greater support for liberalization.

Ethnic Variables: We operationalize ethnic categories as follows:

- Marginalized Ethnic Groups: This categorical variable takes a value of 1 if an individual is SC, ST, or Muslim; and a value of 0 if an individual is UC, OBC, or another religion.
- Politically Salient Ethnic Groups: This categorical variable sorts respondents into six categories, an approach used by scholars working on ethnicity and voting behavior in India (Dunning and Harrison, 2010; Huber and Suryanarayan, 2016). The categories are: UC, OBC, SC, ST, Muslims and other religions.

Economic Variables: We operationalize skills in two ways:

- Income: We use self-reported measures to classify whether an individual is above or below the average income in the sample (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).¹³ As higher-skilled workers tend to command higher wages, income serves as a proxy for skill levels.¹⁴
- Education: We measure whether a respondent’s education is below or above the sample average. We use education as an indicator of skills, but it might impact policy preferences through channels outside of material self-interest, such as norms of cosmopolitanism (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006).

Empirical Results

Table 1 examines the relationship between ethnicity and trade support. In each of the ordered logit regressions, we include respondents’ age and gender, a dummy for the Northeast states, state and year fixed effects, and robust standard errors.¹⁵ Column 1 probes the relationship between a respondent’s ethnicity classified as *Marginalized Ethnic Groups*. The results are striking. In line with H1, compared to UCs, OBCs and other religions (the base category), the dummy variable

¹³Because income wasn’t collected in the 1999 survey, we restrict our analysis to the 2004 and 2009 surveys.

¹⁴Income can influence consumption preferences (Baker, 2003). Thus, we also use education to proxy for skills.

¹⁵We include state fixed effects to control for any unobserved variables that shape both state-level ethnic and economic structures; the state is the key level at which policy intervention occurs in India’s federal democracy.

for low-rank groups is positive and robust at conventional thresholds.¹⁶ In Columns 2 and 3, we examine the effect of skills using the *Education* and *Income* measures. Corroborating H2, the coefficients for these variables are negative and statistically significant, showing that low-skilled respondents support trade more than high-skilled. These results support the HO model’s prediction that low-skilled individuals are more likely to support free trade in developing countries.

Recall that H3a predicts that, irrespective of their skills profiles, all members of low-rank groups will support trade because liberalization offers an escape from discrimination. In Columns 4 and 5, we control for respondents’ skills and show that the coefficients on the low-rank group dummy, while smaller in size, continue to remain significant across specifications. This suggests that while some of the initially-observed effects of ethnicity on trade preferences can be explained by respondents’ skills profiles, their ethnic identities have an independent and robust correlation with trade support. In Columns 6 and 7, we probe H3a further, splitting the sample into high- and low-skilled respondents using the *Education* measure. We find that both high-skill and low-skill low-rank respondents are more supportive of trade compared to high rank respondents with the same skill profiles.

Finally, we explore whether trade preferences cleave across high- and low-skill members of marginalized groups. H3b predicts that low-skill, low-rank individuals are more supportive of trade than high-skill, low-rank individuals because the former do not face competing pressures related to skills and ethnicity. Column 8, which restricts the sample to respondents from low-rank groups, provides evidence to support this claim; low-skilled respondents favor trade more than high-skilled respondents.

Robustness Checks Our results are robust to alternate coding choices of ethnicity and skills. In Appendix Table A.4 we replicate Table 1 using the *Politically Salient Ethnic Groups* variable, which categorizes respondents into six groups, and find that SCs and Muslims are more supportive of trade than high-rank respondents.¹⁷ The skills variables remain negative and robust, and identity is not a significant predictor of trade for other ethnic groups. Additionally, in Appendix Table A.6, we replicate Table 1 using continuous measures of *Education* and *Income*, as well as alternate measures of respondents’ skills: (a) *Wealth* created using a count measure of assets owned and (b)

¹⁶Following Kleinberg and Fordham (2018), we retain the “don’t know” and “no opinion” respondents instead of treating these as missing values. In Appendix Table A.3, we use multinomial logit regressions, and include “no opinion” as a separate category. The coefficient on the low-rank group dummy remains positive and robust.

¹⁷In Appendix Table A.5, we refit the model using multinomial logit regressions, and include “no opinion” as a separate outcome category and find that the results hold.

Table 1: Individual-Level Relationship Between Support for Trade and Measures of Ethnicity

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|--------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| | | | | | | Low Educ | High Educ | SC/ST/Muslim |
| SC/ST/Muslim | 0.064*** (0.015) | | | 0.048*** (0.015) | 0.059*** (0.016) | 0.042** (0.018) | 0.057* (0.029) | |
| Education | | -0.121*** (0.019) | | -0.113*** (0.019) | | | | -0.068** (0.034) |
| Income | | | -0.089*** (0.016) | | -0.081*** (0.016) | | | |
| N | 69609 | 69665 | 60562 | 69609 | 60506 | 46599 | 23010 | 27254 |

– Models are estimated using ordered logit, state and year fixed effects with robust standard errors.
– Dependent variable is a three-point variable measuring trade support with values between 0 and 2
– Standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
– Results with controls for age, gender and dummy for the North-East are provided in Table A.2

Occupation using self-reported occupations which we categorize as high- or low-skill; both created from the NES. Each of these specification show that the skills measures remain robust, and all of the substantive interpretations of our findings hold.¹⁸

We also buttress the individual-level findings by examining state-level support for trade. We do this because in India’s federal system, states retain jurisdiction over many economic policy levers, including tariffs and FDI inducements. India’s states also vary markedly in ethnic composition. Appendix B details our research design and approach; we measured skills using fine-grained occupational data. As Appendix Table A.7 shows, after controlling for a host of economic and ethnic factors, a greater proportion of low-rank groups is associated with greater trade support at the state level. We also find a robust and negative relationship between the proportion of high-skilled workers and support for liberalization. These results corroborate our individual-level analyses.

Our observational data shows that low-rank groups support trade more than high-rank groups. Additionally, both low- and high-skilled members of low-rank groups support trade more than their high-rank counterparts. Finally, among the marginalized, low-skilled individuals support trade more than high-skilled. Together, these findings are consistent with an economic logic of trade support among disadvantaged groups, who hold skills that disproportionately benefit from trade and for whom trade offers less discriminatory avenues for upward mobility. Yet the correlations documented above are only suggestive. Our interpretations are limited by the specifics of the survey question

¹⁸The NES surveys used random sampling at the state level, with efforts to over-sample under-privileged groups to get a balanced sample. We refit Table 1 using cluster robust standard errors and our main results hold.

wording and an inability to adjudicate mechanisms. Therefore, we next use a survey experiment to probe the causal mechanisms by which ethnic and economic determinants shape trade support.

Experimental Study

We embedded a vignette experiment within a large, nationally representative survey of voting-age citizens in India conducted July–October, 2017.¹⁹

Sample: We used Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing, drawing on the database of all mobile phone and landline connections in the country.²⁰ To maximize participation, we offered the survey in 11 languages.²¹ On key demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, income, religion, caste, and geography), our sample matched India’s population according to the 2011 census. See Appendix D.1 for survey methodology, Appendix D.2 for descriptive statistics, and Appendix D.3 for geocoded locations of respondents.

Experimental Design: The vignette embedded in the survey began: “We want to hear your views on trade between India and other countries.” We assigned respondents to one of six treatment groups:

- T1 (Control): Suppose trade will increase the wages of **some workers**. But trade will lower the wages of **other workers**.
- T2 (Skills Treatment): Suppose trade will increase the wages of **some workers who are low-skilled and have not passed high school**. But trade will lower the wages of **other workers who are high-skilled and have passed high school**.
- T3 (Co-ethnic Gains Treatment): Suppose trade will increase the wages of workers like **[co-ethnic category and name / non-co-ethnic category and name]**. But trade will lower the wages of **other workers**.

¹⁹We presented our theory and observational survey results at the [Redacted] India Political Economy Workshop in December 2016. We thank workshop participants for encouraging us to use experimental manipulations to probe underlying mechanisms.

²⁰See Appendix C for this study’s research ethics.

²¹Hindi, Punjabi, Gujarati, Marathi, Kannada, Malayalam, Tamil, Telugu, Odiya, Bangla and Asamiya.

- T4 (Co-ethnic Loses Treatment): Suppose trade will increase the wages of **some workers**. But trade will lower the wages of workers like **[co-ethnic category and name / non-co-ethnic category and name]**.
- T5 (Skills + Co-ethnic Gains Treatment): Suppose trade will increase the wages of workers like **[co-ethnic category and name / non-co-ethnic category and name] who are low skilled and have not passed high school**. But trade will lower the wages of **other workers who are high-skilled and have passed high school**.
- T6 (Skills + Co-ethnic Loses Treatment): Suppose trade will increase the wages of **some workers who are low-skilled and have not passed high school**. But trade will lower the wages of workers like **[co-ethnic category and name / non-co-ethnic category and name] who are high-skilled and have passed high school**.

Following this vignette, we asked: “Based on this information, to what extent do you support or oppose increasing trade between India and other countries?” We coded responses on a scale from 1 (“very much support”) to 5 (“very much oppose”).

T1 simply informs respondents that trade has distributive impacts, without specifying who wins or loses. T2 follows Rho and Tomz (2017) by giving information about the skills and educational profiles of workers the HO model predicts will either benefit or lose from trade. High-skilled (low-skilled) respondents are expected to decrease (increase) their trade support.²² T2, along with T5 and T6, provides this information to respondents. We created a variable “Skills Treatment,” which took a value of 1 if the respondent received information about the skills-based distributive impact of trade and a value of 0 if not.

T3 and T4 provide information about the religion/caste of workers who gain or lose from trade. We matched this with respondents’ own religions/castes to determine an ethnic match or mismatch. In T3, either a co-ethnic or non-co-ethnic gains from trade, whereas in T4 either a co-ethnic or non-co-ethnic is harmed by trade. We predict that members of low-rank (SC, ST, and Muslim) groups will, on average, prefer co-ethnics benefiting from trade compared to non-co-ethnics, in line with our theoretical framework, but we don’t expect a similar effect high-rank groups.

²²Loss aversion theory predicts that trade opposition stemming from wage or job losses is more pronounced than trade support based on potential future income increases (Hiscox, 2006).

To construct these treatments in the context of a culturally diverse national sample, we followed a rigorous protocol.²³ We conducted qualitative research to determine the four or five most populous religious and caste groupings in each state. We then ascertained the most popular name associated with each state’s religious and caste groupings.²⁴ At the survey’s start, respondents disclosed their state of residence; we used this to select which state-specific religion or caste names the respondents would observe in the ethnic treatments.

To code whether a respondent was paired with a co-ethnic or a non-co-ethnic, we matched the respondent’s self-reported “jati” (sub-caste and sub-religion categories) to the religion/caste name they’d encounter in the vignette. We followed the NES methodology of allowing respondents to select one of approximately 1,000 jatis that are most salient in the country. We then aggregated respondents’ jatis up to broader caste and religious categories to create fine-grained ethnicity matches and mismatches. Each respondent had a 20-25 percent chance of getting a religion/caste match. Based on a co-ethnic match or mismatch, we created a variable, “Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment,” that took a value of 1 if a respondent’s co-ethnic stood to gain (in T3 and T5) or not lose (in T4 and T6) from trade, and 0 otherwise.

T5 and T6 provides information about the distributive impact of trade in terms of both skills and ethnicity. Respondents learn that trade will differentially affect both high- and low-skilled individuals and members of co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic communities. Our prediction is that ethnicity concerns will be especially pronounced for low-skilled, low-rank communities due to the overlap between skills- and ethnicity-related concerns in this group.

Table 2 summarizes the treatments and Appendix D.4 presents examples. Both our skills-based and co-ethnicity treatments achieved balance on a battery of pretreatment covariates (see Appendix D.5).²⁵ We include pretreatment demographic controls in our results, but all of our results are robust to the exclusion of these control variables.

²³We followed Gaikwad and Nellis (2017) in giving respondents a hypothetical worker’s name, designed to convey religion or caste.

²⁴Typically, castes and religious groups are identified by different names across states, and we wished to provide names that respondents could relate to. We subjected the names to manipulation checks on MTurk to confirm that respondents from particular states associated the names with the intended caste and religion.

²⁵Across a large number of comparisons, one variable (gender) was unbalanced, as might have been expected by chance alone. We control for this variable in our experimental analysis.

Table 2: Summary of Ethnic and Economic Experimental Manipulations

| | Treatments | Experimental Manipulations |
|---------|---------------------------|---|
| T1 | Control | |
| T2 | Skills Treatment | Skills profiles that gain or lose from trade |
| T3 + T4 | Ethnic Treatment | One of four ethnic groups in respondent's state gaining or losing from trade |
| T5 + T6 | Skills + Ethnic Treatment | Both skills profiles and one of four ethnic groups in respondent's state gaining or losing from trade |

Experimental Results

We analyze our experimental treatments in a step-wise fashion. To test H2, we study whether giving respondents information on the winners and losers of trade evokes opposition among the high-skilled and support among the low-skilled. Table 3 presents the effects of the skills treatment on average opposition to trade (higher values of the outcome variable indicate greater opposition). We begin by compartmentalizing our sample into high-skilled (Column 1) and low-skilled (Column 2) respondents.²⁶ High-skilled respondents who learn about the distributive impact of trade are significantly less likely to support free trade compared to those who didn't receive this information; economic groups that are poised to be harmed by international trade display protectionist sentiments, in line with their material interests and supporting the HO model.

Table 3: Effect of Skills Treatment on Opposition to Trade

| | High-Skilled | Low-Skilled | Interaction with Respondent Skill |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Skills Treatment | 0.33*** (0.08) | -0.01 (0.06) | -0.01 (0.06) |
| Respondent Skill | | | -0.13* (0.07) |
| Skill Treatment x Respondent Skill | | | 0.34*** (0.10) |
| Constant (control mean) | 2.13 | 2.24 | 2.25 |
| N | 1,493 | 2,681 | 4,174 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

– Results for control variables provided in Table A.14.

²⁶We use respondents' educational achievement to define high- or low-skilled. Our results are substantively the same using respondents' incomes.

The skills treatment, by contrast, doesn't have a statistically significant impact on attitudes among low-skilled respondents.²⁷ Column 3 provides a formal test of H2 regarding the effect of skills on trade attitudes. Here we use a binary variable indicating whether the respondent was high- or low-skilled and a dummy for the skills treatment. The coefficient on the interaction term indicates that high-skilled respondents react negatively to the skills treatment compared with low-skilled respondents. Our results indicate that groups standing to lose from trade evince protectionist attitudes when informed about the distributive impact of trade, and develop different preferences from those standing to benefit.

Table 4: Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment on Opposition to Trade

| | UC/OBC | SC/ST/MUSLIM | Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy |
|--|--------|--------------|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | -0.01 | -0.30*** | -0.01 |
| | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.07) |
| SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | 0.20*** |
| | | | (0.07) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | -0.29** |
| | | | (0.12) |
| Constant (control mean) | 2.19 | 2.34 | 2.18 |
| N | 2,745 | 1,122 | 3,867 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

– Results for control variables provided in Table A.15.

We now turn to testing our central theoretical claims regarding trade support in ranked ethnic systems. Recall, H1 states that low-rank groups are more supportive of trade than high-rank groups. We study whether giving respondents information about the ethnic winners/losers of trade evokes co-ethnic support among the low-rank but not high-rank groups. In Table 4, we partition our sample into UC/OBC (high-rank) and SC/ST/Muslim (low-rank) respondents. A striking pattern emerges. Low-rank individuals are significantly more likely to support trade when informed that their co-ethnics will benefit from trade, all else equal. But among high-rank individuals there is no

²⁷One explanation is that individuals weigh anticipated losses more than gains and hence are more sensitive to cues informing them of material harm. For example, Hiscox (2006) establishes that antitrade information provokes opposition to trade among American survey respondents, whereas protrade information doesn't congruently generate trade support. Plausibly, material considerations are more pronounced for trade losers than winners.

similar effect. Column 3 interacts the treatment with a dummy variable for low-rank groups and demonstrates that marginalized communities are more positive toward trade following the co-ethnic benefits treatment than are privileged ethnic groups.

Our results show a co-ethnic treatment effect for marginalized groups, and a null effect for privileged groups, in line with H1. This supports our contention that international trade provides opportunities for occupational mobility for ethnic groups suffering from discrimination in domestic labor markets. Marginalized communities develop groupwise solidarity when formulating attitudes on trade policies because they view trade as improving the material prospects of *all* group members. By contrast, privileged ethnic communities don't view their fortunes as tied to those of their co-ethnics, so far as trade is concerned.²⁸

Table 5: Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment on Opposition to Trade, by Social Group and Income

| | UC/OBC High-Skill (1) | UC/OBC Low-Skill (2) | UC/OBC (3) | SC/ST/Muslim High-Skill (4) | SC/ST/Muslim Low-Skill (5) | SC/ST/Muslim (6) |
|--|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | -0.04 (0.11) | 0.01 (0.09) | 0.01 (0.09) | -0.31* (0.19) | -0.30** (0.12) | -0.30** (0.12) |
| Respondent Skill | | | 0.08 (0.08) | | | 0.09 (0.13) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x Respondent Skill | | | -0.06 (0.14) | | | -0.01 (0.22) |
| Constant (control mean) | 2.20 | 2.19 | 2.17 | 2.33 | 2.34 | 2.32 |
| N | 1,056 | 1,689 | 2,745 | 317 | 805 | 1,122 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

– Results for control variables provided in Table A.16.

Next we probe H3a, which claims that both high- and low-skilled members of low-rank groups will support trade. In Table 5, we uncover evidence of a consistent co-ethnic treatment effect among low-rank respondents. Both high-skilled (Column 4) and low-skilled (Column 5) individuals support trade when informed that a co-ethnic will benefit. The lack of a significant interaction

²⁸We constructed the variable “Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment” as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a co-ethnic benefits and 0 if either a non-co-ethnic benefits or if the respondent is assigned to the control group. Appendix Table A.10 distinguishes between the latter two categories. We find that marginalized groups are more supportive of trade when informed about a co-ethnic benefiting, while privileged groups treat non-co-ethnics and co-ethnics similarly.

term in Column 6 indicates that high- and low-skilled individuals in this group respond similarly when informed that trade will improve the fortunes of their co-ethnics relative to non-co-ethnics. In contrast, among high-rank groups, the co-ethnics benefits treatment has no effect among either the high-skilled (Column 1) or low-skilled (Column 2), and both groups are effectively indistinguishable from each other in responses to the experimental treatment (Column 3). This is unsurprising because members of groups who don't face domestic market constraints (that is, high-rank groups) formulate trade preferences based on their varied skills profiles, not their ethnicity.

Appendix Table A.11, which investigates the effect of the skills treatment by ranked ethnic groups, reinforces this point. High-rank, high-skilled respondents are more antitrade when informed about the skills-based impact of trade, while high-rank, low-skilled respondents are not. We discern no such variegated response to the skills treatment among high- and low-skilled respondents of low-rank groups. This suggests that high-rank groups primarily base their views on trade using cues about skills.

We purposefully designed our experimental manipulations to be able to study the joint effects of the ethnicity and skills treatments. We do this by priming respondents in T5 and T6 about *both* the skills and the ethnic winners and losers of trade.

Table 6 interacts the skills treatment and the co-ethnic benefits treatment for each group. When members of low-rank communities are informed about both the skills and ethnic impacts of trade, their support for trade rises markedly (Column 2). This suggests that co-ethnic solidarity emerges when respondents gain knowledge of the skills-based distributive impact of trade. In contrast, the skills and ethnicity treatments don't have an interactive effect for privileged groups (Column 1). Column 3 runs a triple-interaction model, interacting the skills treatment, co-ethnic benefits treatment, and a dummy variable for marginalized groups; the co-efficient on the triple interaction term is statistically significant ($\beta=-0.53$; $p=0.03$), providing support for the reinforcing effect of skills and ethnicity for low-rank groups. These findings suggest that low-rank groups don't simply display co-ethnic solidarity for "taste-based" reasons; instead, an economic logic of "linked fate" seems to be at work.

To further probe the economic underpinnings of co-ethnic support, we restrict our sample to only respondents who received information about the skills-based distributive effects of trade. Thus all respondents start at the same point in understanding the economic effects of trade, allowing

Table 6: Interaction of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment and Skills Treatment, by Social Group

| | UC/OBC | SC/ST/Muslim | Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy |
|--|-----------------|------------------|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | -0.09 (0.09) | -0.12 (0.15) | -0.09 (0.09) |
| Skills Treatment | 0.10 (0.08) | 0.16 (0.12) | 0.10 (0.08) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x Skills Treatment | 0.17 (0.13) | -0.37* (0.20) | 0.17 (0.13) |
| SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | 0.17* (0.10) |
| Skills Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | 0.06 (0.14) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | -0.04 (0.17) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x Skills Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | -0.53** (0.25) |
| Constant (control mean) | 2.14 | 2.26 | 2.00 |
| N | 2,745 | 1,122 | 3,867 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Results for control variables provided in Table A.17.

us to study the marginal effect of being informed about a co-ethnic winning, and how that effect varies by the skills profile of low-rank groups. We achieve this by focusing on respondents who received T2, T5 and T6. In Table 7, among low-rank groups, the co-ethnic benefits treatment is significant, precisely estimated, and qualitatively large ($\beta = -0.49$; $p = 0.00$); no such effect exists among high-rank groups. When we interact the co-ethnic benefits treatment with a dummy for marginalized groups, we find that co-ethnicity is a strong predictor of preferences only for members of subaltern communities, further bolstering H3a.

Appendix Table A.12 reports the marginal effect of the co-ethnic benefits treatment among low-rank groups who also received the skills treatment. Low-skilled, low-rank individuals respond to information about trade benefiting co-ethnics by supporting trade, but this effect isn't statistically

Table 7: Marginal Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment

| | UC/OBC | SC/ST/Muslim | Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy |
|--|--------|--------------|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | 0.08 | -0.49*** | 0.09 |
| | (0.10) | (0.14) | (0.10) |
| SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | 0.23** |
| | | | (0.10) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim | | | -0.57*** |
| | | | (0.17) |
| Constant (control mean) | 2.18 | 2.29 | 2.15 |
| N | 1,339 | 550 | 1,889 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Results for control variables provided in Table A.18.

distinguishable from the effect among high-skilled, low-rank individuals. This further supports H3a; both high- and low-skilled respondents support trade when considering its welfare enhancing effects for the group as a whole.

We conclude by considering if skills and ethnicity have a reinforcing effect for low-rank individuals with complementary skills and ethnic profiles, as posited in H3b. Appendix Table A.13 studies the marginal effect of the skills treatment for low-rank respondents who also received the co-ethnic benefits treatment. Interacting the skills treatment with respondents’ skill levels, we observe heterogeneity by skills within the low-rank group. In line with H3b, low-skilled respondents are more supportive of trade than their high-skilled counterparts, indicating that skills and ethnicity have an overlapping influence in low-rank groups.

Evidence From Other Multiethnic Systems

Finally, we examine whether our arguments extend beyond the Indian case to other multiethnic developing countries. We begin by comparing trade support by ethnic/racial groups in South Africa and Nigeria. While multiple ethnic cleavages (tribe, religion, race, and language) are politically salient in postcolonial Africa, we focus on racial divisions in South Africa and tribal divisions in Nigeria to illustrate how ethnic solidarity for trade emerges. We follow convention in categorizing

South Africa as a ranked system, where an apartheid regime structured politics for almost half a century (Gisselquist, 2013). Recent scholarship has shown that the effects of apartheid-era policies are still pervasive, as Black (80.9% of the population) and Colored (7.8%) citizens report much lower socioeconomic outcomes than white citizens (8.9%) (Armstrong, Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008; Kaus, 2013).

In comparison, we categorize Nigeria as an unranked ethnic system, with over 100 ethnic groups of which three main tribes—Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa—compete politically. Scholars have argued that British colonial policies largely left in place an unranked system of ethnic stratification, and that ethnic mobilization in the postcolonial context was a strategy to gain access to scarce state resources (Bates, 1974; Blanton, Mason and Athow, 2001). Although some tribes, notably the Yorubas, were relatively more represented in colonial government bureaucracies (an advantage that persists today), Nigeria’s main tribes are relatively evenly matched socioeconomically (Horowitz, 1985; Johnson-Kanu, 2021, 17). We conduct a comparative analysis by analyzing a question in the 2016 Afrobarometer data for South Africa and Nigeria (see Appendix E.1 for details). As Appendix Tables A.19–A.20 show, we find that Non-White South Africans support trade more than whites. These results are significant at conventional thresholds, and robust to the skill levels of respondents. In Nigeria, however, we find no differences in support for trade across the three tribal communities relative to an omitted category comprising all other tribes.

Finally, we study trade preferences in the ranked ethnic system in the Philippines, where colonial-era policies and postindependence politics have led to exclusion and state injustice against the minority Muslim population (Horowitz 1985, 29, McDoom 2019*b*). Compared to Christians, the Muslim Moros experience labor-market discrimination, specialize in low-skill occupations, register socioeconomic deprivation, and are “increasingly marginalised” (McDoom and Gisselquist 2016, 1538, McDoom 2019*a*, 871). Analyzing Asian Barometer data, we find that Muslims in the Philippines support trade more than high-rank groups (see Appendix E.1 and Appendix Table A.21).

The results from South Africa and the Philippines suggest that in ranked ethnic systems, similar to the Indian context, an economic logic of “linked fate” makes marginalized ethnic groups more supportive of trade. However, “taste-based” cultural differences in an unranked system like Nigeria don’t lead to the same differences in trade support.

Conclusion

Although trade-liberalization is often considered elite-driven and harmful to lower-skilled workers, we show that those workers may favor international economic integration when they stand to benefit from trade. Two central findings emerge. First, trade support varies by *ethnic* groups. Access to global markets can disrupt ethnic relations in ethnically ranked societies. Drawing on observational data and an original survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of Indian voters, we show that individuals in privileged ethnic groups lack solidarity with their co-ethnics over their views on trade. In contrast, ethnicity shapes the trade preferences of individuals in discriminated groups. This is striking, as we might expect both the privileged and underprivileged to prioritize ethnic identity, to either uphold or upend the status quo. We argue that these findings emerge because trade liberalization provides fewer discriminatory avenues for advancement for low-rank ethnic groups. Additionally, in developing countries, members of low-rank groups possess skills that benefit from trade, unlike the more variegated profiles of privileged groups. So for low-rank groups, trade policies that benefit co-ethnics are viewed as being coterminous with policies that advance their own economic well-being. Our results hold beyond the Indian context in other ranked ethnic systems such as South Africa and the Philippines.

Second, beyond our findings on ethnicity, our paper also addresses debates on the extent to which *economic* considerations shape individual attitudes on trade policy (cf. Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Rho and Tomz 2017). Theoretical models predict that individuals in developing countries will support trade more if they work in sectors that will benefit from free trade. Because developing countries have an advantage in producing labor-intensive goods, low-skilled individuals are expected to gain from, and support, trade. This is indeed what we find: low-skilled workers are more likely to favor liberalization than high-skilled workers. This result holds whether we analyze skills in terms of education, income, or occupation. It holds at the individual level using observational and experimental data, and at the state-level, where support for free trade is higher in states with more low-skilled workers. Thus, the conclusions of prominent studies that question the HO model by drawing on evidence from advanced industrialized countries might be premature.

Scholars have long documented the phenomenon of “linked fate”—the belief that individual life prospects are inextricably tied to the group as a whole (Dawson, 1995; Gay and Tate, 1998). For

scholars of race and politics, linked fate emerges from historical discrimination and segregation in countries like the United States. Shared experiences of racism and oppression generates loyalty to fellow racial-group members—often contrasted with a rational, individualistic, and economic interest-based approach to political behavior. The concept of linked fate has come to be a stand-in for group-based solidarities (Rogers and Kim, 2021). Our findings contribute to this scholarship—which has primarily focused on US race-relations—by showing that disadvantaged communities in other parts of the world express similar solidarity with their co-ethnics. Critically, however, we offer an *economic logic* for why linked fate emerges, focusing on the macro context within which ethnic politics unfolds. Marginalized groups develop linked fate because they understand the ethnic basis of discriminatory market structures within ranked ethnic systems in autarky and, in turn, the disproportionate group-related gains from integration into the global economy as domestic ethnic barriers fall away.

Trade support among low-rank groups in the developed world is a promising area of future research (Guisinger, 2017, 2013). There, low-rank groups face contradictory pressures. Members might support trade because it presents less-discriminatory opportunities. On the other hand, in these contexts low-skilled workers are disadvantaged with respect to global economic integration. Our findings also raise the possibility that studies that have found no evidence of the theoretically predicted relationship between skills and trade support might benefit from considering ethnicity as a factor mediating the relationship between material interests and trade preferences.

The scholarship on domestic economic policymaking in developing countries like India has contrasted economic and ethnic arguments. For example, Ansell (2010) argues that educational spending lagged in India when its closed economy didn't place a premium on skills, compared to the open economy after liberalization. Ansell (2010) notes that global integration rather than the caste system per se should be considered as an explanation for variations in education policies in different time periods. Our findings show that caste and globalization are inextricably linked. Globalization could transform caste-based market structures in profound ways, with implications for the study of a wide range of domestic policy domains for countries transitioning from autarky.

Finally, our paper suggests that permissive trade policy in developing countries might have broad bases of support. Scholars have argued that trade policy in India, for example, has primarily been determined by elites—bureaucrats, technocrats, officials from international organizations, and

business leaders (Alamgir, 2009). These accounts would suggest that—if anything—it’s narrow coalitions of the relatively rich and educated that spearhead trade liberalization. Our finding of the opposite empirical pattern among voter preferences in India thus promises to open up a new line of research on the electoral bases of support for international economic cooperation in the developing world.

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Appendix

“Attitudes toward Globalization in Ranked Ethnic Societies”

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A Observational Individual-Level Analysis

A.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Observational Sample

| Variable | Mean |
|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Age | 40.15 years |
| Education | 2.3 – Below High School Diploma |
| HH Monthly Income | 3.48 – Rs.2001 - Rs.3000 |
| Wealth | 42 – Wealth Index |
| Gender | 47% |
| Upper Caste | 22% |
| Other Backward Classes | 30% |
| Scheduled Caste | 14% |
| Scheduled Tribe | 13% |
| Muslim | 11% |
| Others | 11% |
| NES 1999 | 13% |
| NES 2004 | 37 % |
| NES 2009 | 50 % |
| N | 69,665 |

A.2 Main Manuscript Table 1 with Control Variables

Table A.2: Individual-Level Relationship Between Support for Trade and Measures of Ethnicity

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|--------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | | | | | | Low Educ | High Educ | SC/ST/Muslim |
| SC/ST/Muslim | 0.064*** (0.015) | | | 0.048*** (0.015) | 0.059*** (0.016) | 0.042** (0.018) | 0.057* (0.029) | |
| Education | | -0.121*** (0.019) | | -0.113*** (0.019) | | | | -0.068** (0.034) |
| Income | | | -0.089*** (0.016) | | -0.081*** (0.016) | | | |
| Female | 0.096*** (0.014) | 0.078*** (0.014) | 0.071*** (0.015) | 0.079*** (0.014) | 0.070*** (0.015) | 0.103*** (0.018) | 0.033 (0.026) | 0.073*** (0.023) |
| Age | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.001 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) | -0.001 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.001) | -0.001 (0.001) | -0.001 (0.001) |
| North-East | -0.201*** (0.055) | -0.185*** (0.055) | -0.227*** (0.054) | -0.194*** (0.055) | -0.240*** (0.054) | -0.145** (0.069) | -0.327*** (0.102) | -0.347*** (0.078) |
| N | 69609 | 69665 | 60562 | 69609 | 60506 | 46599 | 23010 | 27254 |

– Models are estimated using ordered logit, state and year fixed effects with robust standard errors.

– Dependent variable is a three-point variable measuring trade support with values between 0 and 1

– Standard errors in parentheses: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

A.3 Modeling “No Opinion”

Table A.3: Individual-Level Relationship Between Support for Trade and Measures of Ethnicity

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | | | | | | Low Educ | High Educ | SC/ST/Muslim |
| DV=“No Opinion/Don’t know” | | | | | | | | |
| SC/ST/Muslim | 0.413*** (0.020) | | | 0.246*** (0.021) | 0.331*** (0.022) | 0.232*** (0.024) | 0.336*** (0.048) | |
| Education | | -1.353*** (0.025) | | -1.312*** (0.025) | | | | -1.240*** (0.042) |
| Income | | | -0.703*** (0.022) | | -0.663*** (0.022) | | | |
| Female | 0.823*** (0.019) | 0.656*** (0.020) | 0.774*** (0.021) | 0.660*** (0.020) | 0.774*** (0.021) | 0.679*** (0.023) | 0.580*** (0.043) | 0.576*** (0.031) |
| Age | 0.015*** (0.001) | 0.006*** (0.001) | 0.014*** (0.001) | 0.007*** (0.001) | 0.015*** (0.001) | 0.008*** (0.001) | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.006*** (0.001) |
| NE | -0.804*** (0.078) | -0.698*** (0.078) | -0.829*** (0.080) | -0.772*** (0.078) | -0.933*** (0.081) | -0.909*** (0.090) | -0.085 (0.165) | -0.886*** (0.110) |
| DV=“Supportive of Trade” | | | | | | | | |
| SC/ST/Muslim | 0.046** (0.020) | | | 0.042** (0.021) | 0.051** (0.022) | 0.031 (0.026) | 0.051 (0.034) | |
| Education | | -0.024 (0.020) | | -0.018 (0.020) | | | | 0.012 (0.035) |
| Income | | | -0.057*** (0.021) | | -0.051** (0.021) | | | |
| Female | 0.041** (0.019) | 0.038** (0.019) | 0.028 (0.020) | 0.039** (0.019) | 0.028 (0.020) | 0.059** (0.025) | 0.003 (0.031) | 0.046 (0.032) |
| Age | -0.001** (0.001) | -0.002** (0.001) | -0.001** (0.001) | -0.002** (0.001) | -0.001** (0.001) | -0.002* (0.001) | -0.002 (0.001) | -0.002* (0.001) |
| NE | -0.333*** (0.073) | -0.329*** (0.072) | -0.388*** (0.074) | -0.333*** (0.073) | -0.396*** (0.075) | -0.309*** (0.091) | -0.391*** (0.123) | -0.588*** (0.109) |
| N | 69609 | 69665 | 60562 | 69609 | 60506 | 46599 | 23010 | 27254 |

– Models are estimated using multinomial logit, state and year fixed effects with robust standard errors.

– Dependent variable is a three-point variable measuring trade support with values between 0 and 2

– Standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

A.4 Expanded Ethnic Category

Table A.4: OLOGIT- Individual-Level Relationship Between Support for Trade and Measures of Ethnicity

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | | | | Low Educ | High Educ |
| Backward Caste | 0.032 (0.021) | 0.010 (0.021) | 0.007 (0.023) | -0.001 (0.027) | 0.020 (0.035) |
| Scheduled Caste | 0.100*** (0.024) | 0.071*** (0.024) | 0.084*** (0.026) | 0.060** (0.030) | 0.084* (0.045) |
| Scheduled Tribe | 0.042 (0.026) | 0.008 (0.027) | 0.016 (0.029) | 0.023 (0.033) | -0.075 (0.054) |
| Muslim | 0.116*** (0.028) | 0.090*** (0.028) | 0.102*** (0.030) | 0.042 (0.036) | 0.171*** (0.049) |
| Others | 0.054 (0.036) | 0.038 (0.036) | 0.049 (0.038) | 0.023 (0.047) | 0.054 (0.053) |
| Education | | -0.113*** (0.019) | | | |
| Income | | | -0.084*** (0.016) | | |
| Female | 0.097*** (0.014) | 0.079*** (0.014) | 0.070*** (0.015) | 0.103*** (0.018) | 0.034 (0.026) |
| Age | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.001 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.001) | -0.002 (0.001) |
| NE | -0.189*** (0.055) | -0.183*** (0.055) | -0.229*** (0.055) | -0.140** (0.069) | -0.305*** (0.103) |
| N | 69609 | 69609 | 60506 | 46599 | 23010 |

- Models are estimated using ordered logit, state and year fixed effects with robust standard errors.
- Dependent variable is a three-point variable measuring trade support with values between 0 and 2
- Standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table A.5: MLOGIT- Individual-Level Relationship Between Support for Trade and Measures of Ethnicity

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | | | | | Low Educ | High Educ |
| DV=1 or "No Opinion/Don't know" | | | | | | |
| Backward Caste | 0.429*** (0.028) | 0.200*** (0.029) | 0.328*** (0.031) | 0.179*** (0.029) | 0.182*** (0.059) | 0.198*** (0.035) |
| Scheduled Caste | 0.680*** (0.033) | 0.388*** (0.034) | 0.538*** (0.037) | 0.297*** (0.034) | 0.477*** (0.074) | 0.366*** (0.040) |
| Scheduled Tribe | 0.872*** (0.037) | 0.528*** (0.038) | 0.679*** (0.041) | 0.391*** (0.039) | 0.570*** (0.088) | 0.544*** (0.044) |
| Muslim | 0.483*** (0.037) | 0.215*** (0.038) | 0.411*** (0.041) | 0.264*** (0.038) | 0.319*** (0.080) | 0.178*** (0.045) |
| Other | 0.381*** (0.046) | 0.222*** (0.047) | 0.328*** (0.050) | 0.230*** (0.047) | 0.297*** (0.086) | 0.194*** (0.058) |
| Education | | -1.280*** (0.025) | | | | |
| Income | | | -0.626*** (0.022) | | | |
| Wealth | | | | -0.017*** (0.000) | | |
| Female | 0.826*** (0.019) | 0.665*** (0.020) | 0.776*** (0.021) | 0.825*** (0.020) | 0.587*** (0.043) | 0.684*** (0.023) |
| Age | 0.015*** (0.001) | 0.007*** (0.001) | 0.015*** (0.001) | 0.014*** (0.001) | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.008*** (0.001) |
| North-East | -0.853*** (0.077) | -0.819*** (0.078) | -0.970*** (0.079) | -0.918*** (0.078) | -0.137 (0.165) | -0.963*** (0.089) |
| DV=2 or Supportive of Trade | | | | | | |
| Backward Caste | 0.002 (0.027) | -0.002 (0.027) | -0.012 (0.028) | 0.003 (0.027) | 0.014 (0.039) | -0.021 (0.038) |
| Scheduled Caste | 0.073** (0.032) | 0.069** (0.033) | 0.083** (0.035) | 0.074** (0.033) | 0.073 (0.053) | 0.050 (0.043) |
| Scheduled Tribe | -0.050 (0.038) | -0.056 (0.038) | -0.060 (0.040) | -0.050 (0.039) | -0.131** (0.067) | -0.041 (0.049) |
| Muslim | 0.106*** (0.036) | 0.099*** (0.036) | 0.100*** (0.038) | 0.104*** (0.036) | 0.185*** (0.056) | 0.037 (0.048) |
| Other | 0.032 (0.043) | 0.030 (0.043) | 0.034 (0.045) | 0.033 (0.043) | 0.040 (0.060) | 0.024 (0.062) |
| Education | | -0.020 (0.021) | | | | |
| Income | | | -0.057*** (0.021) | | | |
| Wealth | | | | -0.000 (0.000) | | |
| Female | 0.042** (0.019) | 0.039** (0.019) | 0.029 (0.020) | 0.042** (0.019) | 0.004 (0.031) | 0.059** (0.025) |
| Age | -0.001** (0.001) | -0.002** (0.001) | -0.001** (0.001) | -0.001** (0.001) | -0.002 (0.001) | -0.002* (0.001) |
| North-East | -0.310*** (0.073) | -0.312*** (0.073) | -0.374*** (0.075) | -0.310*** (0.073) | -0.363*** (0.124) | -0.294*** (0.091) |
| N | 69609 | 69609 | 60506 | 69602 | 23010 | 46599 |

- Models are estimated using multinomial logit, state and year fixed effects with robust standard errors.

- Dependent variable is a three-point variable measuring trade support with values between 0 and 2

- Standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

A.5 Main Manuscript Table 1 using expanded education and income measures and alternate measures of skill

Table A.6: Individual-Level Relationship Between Support for Trade and Measures of Ethnicity

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|----------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| SC/ST/Muslim | | | | | 0.040*** (0.015) | 0.051*** (0.016) | 0.046*** (0.015) | 0.057*** (0.015) |
| Education Full | -0.033*** (0.004) | | | | -0.031*** (0.004) | | | |
| Income Full | | -0.030*** (0.004) | | | | -0.028*** (0.004) | | |
| Wealth | | | -0.001*** (0.000) | | | | -0.001*** (0.000) | |
| Occupation | | | | -0.044*** (0.016) | | | | -0.038** (0.017) |
| Age | -0.001** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.001** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) |
| Female | 0.064*** (0.015) | 0.066*** (0.015) | 0.093*** (0.014) | 0.085*** (0.015) | 0.065*** (0.015) | 0.066*** (0.015) | 0.093*** (0.014) | 0.086*** (0.015) |
| NE | -0.170*** (0.055) | -0.232*** (0.054) | -0.196*** (0.054) | -0.150*** (0.057) | -0.177*** (0.055) | -0.242*** (0.054) | -0.203*** (0.055) | -0.168*** (0.058) |
| N | 69353 | 59877 | 69658 | 66729 | 69297 | 59821 | 69602 | 66684 |

– Models are estimated using ordered logit, state and year fixed effects with robust standard errors.

– Dependent variable is a three-point variable measuring trade support with values between 0 and 1

– Standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

B Observational State-level Analysis

We buttress the individual-level findings by examining state-level support for trade liberalization. We do this because in India’s federal system, states retain jurisdiction over many economic policy levers such as tariffs, subsidies, FDI inducements, special economic zones, amongst other business-related policies. India’s states also vary markedly in their ethnic composition. We create state-level averages of public support for trade liberalization using the same NES data discussed above. To construct state-level measures of ethnic and economic determinants, we use nationally-representative data from three rounds of the Government of India’s NSSO “Employment and Unemployment” surveys. The surveys were conducted the years before the parliamentary elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009, yielding over 100,000 respondents each. The NSSO collects data on each respondent’s state of residence, caste, religion, wages, and primary occupation as categorized by India’s National Industrial Classification (NIC) codes. We categorized respondents into high- and low-skilled industries according to their NIC codes.²⁹

We created the following state-level measures for the ethnicity and skills variables:

- ELF: This measure calculates the ethnolinguistic fractionalization score using the ethnic groups defined for the variable *Ranked Ethnicity* in each state.
- Percent SC/ ST/Muslim: This variable measures the percentage of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Muslims in the state.
- Percent High-Skill: This variable (which we term, *Percent High-Skill*) captures the percentage of a state’s workforce that is employed in high-skilled industries.
- Percent Agriculture: This variable captures the percentage of the workforce reporting to be employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing, and related activities.³⁰

Appendix Table A.7 shows that a greater proportion of SC/ST/Muslims in a state is associated with higher levels of trade support. We also find a robust and negative relationship between the percent of high-skilled workers in a state and support for trade. These results corroborate our individual-level analyses. In column 1 of table 6 we regress state-level measure of trade support on ELF while controlling for state-level Percent Skilled Workforce, GDP, Gini, year and state fixed effects. We should expect a robust relationship between ELF and the support for trade if we believe the mechanism through which ethnic politics operates is the numerical competition between groups in the state. We find no significant relationship between ELF and trade support. In column 2 we investigate the relationship between the percentage of SC/ST/Muslim in the state to probe whether trade support is contingent on specific types of discriminated ethnic groups. We find that greater proportion of SC/ST/Muslims in a state is associated with higher levels of support for trade in the state and the coefficient on this variable is significant, similar to the individual-level findings. In Columns 1 and 2 we find a robust and negative relationship between the percent of high-skilled workers in a state and support for trade. In column 3 we substitute the Percent High Skill with another measure of state-level economic variation – Percent Agriculture – which is a proxy for low skilled labor. The coefficient on the Percent SC/ST/Muslim remains positive and significant in this model. Taken together these provide further corroborating evidence to the claims that ethnic groups that have historically been marginalized are more supportive of trade, a finding similar to the individual-level analysis presented earlier.

²⁹Low-skilled industries included agriculture, forestry, and fishing, as well as low-skilled manufacturing. High-skilled industries included chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and automobiles. Our results are robust to different classifications of respondents into high- and low-skilled industries. Because the NIC codes differed across the NSSO rounds, we created manual concordances to standardize the classification systems across all rounds.

³⁰We restricted the analysis to NIC codes 01–05.

Table A.7: State-Level OLS regressions of Support for Trade on Measures of Ethnicity

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| ELF | -0.014 (0.086) | 0.092 (0.088) | 0.128 (0.085) |
| Percent SC/ST/Muslim | | 0.198** (0.081) | 0.214*** (0.078) |
| Percent High Skill | -0.504** (0.194) | -0.393** (0.196) | |
| Percent Agriculture | | | 0.298** (0.140) |
| State GDP | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) |
| State Gini Index | -0.648** (0.318) | -0.746** (0.326) | -0.747** (0.320) |
| N-E Dummy | 0.018 (0.047) | -0.028 (0.046) | -0.055 (0.047) |
| Constant | 1.310*** (0.195) | 1.173*** (0.172) | 0.861*** (0.154) |
| Adj. R-squared | 0.072 | 0.103 | 0.100 |
| N | 68 | 68 | 68 |

–All models include year fixed effects with robust standard errors.

–Dependent variable is average trade support in state-year.

–Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

C Research Ethics

This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of [University Name and Protocol Number Redacted].

Voluntary informed consent was obtained by all human subjects. In our original survey, which was conducted via telephone, informed consent was obtained verbally and was built into the survey flow. Subjects were free to decline participation in the survey at any point during the study.

Prior to providing consent, subjects were informed about the goals of the research, foreseeable risks and benefits associated with the research, the scholarly nature of the research, compensation, the voluntary nature of the study, and relevant contact information. No deception was used in the surveys.

Survey respondents were not compensated monetarily for participating in the study; respondents were sampled at random from the general population and asked if they were interested in participating in a survey. We worked with a survey company (CVoter News Pvt. Ltd.) that does polling, market, and academic research and does not compensate survey takers.

Finally, in order to ascertain the appropriateness of the study with respect to local laws, cultural, social and political contexts, our research design and study was reviewed by a country expert not affiliated with the research project and experienced and knowledgeable about the local laws, regulations and customs.

D Experimental Results

D.1 Survey Methodology

Our survey was implemented using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) that was able to draw on the population-wide database of all mobile phone and landline connections in the country. An automated predictive dialer randomly selected phone numbers to dial from all Indian telecom circles and digital exchanges. Given that the teledensity rate and, in particular, mobile phone usage is extremely high in India, we were able to access the vast majority of demographic groups through this mode of contact. There are several advantages to our mode of interviewing. Telephone surveys help mitigate privacy and social-desirability concerns that typically arise in the context of face-to-face surveys conducted in group settings in India (for example, if men insist on supervising interviews of women in the household), increasing in turn the truthfulness of elicited responses. Whereas certain types of individuals are extremely difficult to sample through Face-to-Face interviewing (such as, for example, employed workers in time intensive jobs) or internet-based interviewing (for instance, illiterate individuals), it is relatively easier to schedule and conduct telephone interviews with a broad range of citizens, boosting the representativeness of the sample. Additionally, we were able to record and supervise in real time the interviews, eliminating enumerator errors and enhancing the quality of responses. The survey was conducted by the firm CVoter News Pvt. Ltd.

In order to obtain a geographically and socio-economically representative sample, we over-sampled members of low-frequency type demographic groups. Note, also, that incoming calls are free for telephone users; respondents therefore did not have to bear any financial costs for the interviews, which meant that members of particular groups (such as the poor, for example) were no less likely to drop out of our sample frame than others. Additionally, public opinion interviews are exempted from the “Do Not Call” registry maintained by the Indian government for citizens who wish to avoid marketing and sales calls.

Our sample included the entire geography of India, and excluded only a few of the remote north-eastern states and union territories.

D.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.8: Descriptive Statistics of Experimental Sample

| Variable | Mean |
|---|----------|
| Age | 35 years |
| Gender | 56% |
| Upper Caste | 35% |
| Other Backward Classes | 29% |
| Scheduled Caste | 12% |
| Scheduled Tribe | 3% |
| Muslim | 14% |
| Christian | 3% |
| Sikh | 2% |
| Others (Buddhist, Jain, etc.) | 2% |
| No Formal Education (Cannot Read/Write) | 4% |
| No Formal Education (Can Read/Write) | 24% |
| Primary School | 16% |
| Secondary School | 20% |
| Senior Secondary School | 27% |
| Graduate School | 9% |
| Diploma/Vocational Course | <1% |
| HH Monthly Income (< Rs. 1,000) | 3% |
| HH Monthly Income (Rs. 1,001 - 5,000) | 18% |
| HH Monthly Income (Rs. 5,001 - 10,000) | 25% |
| HH Monthly Income (Rs. 10,001 - 20,000) | 21% |
| HH Monthly Income (Rs. 20,001 - 30,000) | 12% |
| HH Monthly Income (Rs. 30,001 - 40,000) | 6% |
| HH Monthly Income (> Rs. 40,000) | 12% |
| N | 4,217 |

D.3 Geographic Distribution of Sample




Figure A.1: This map shows the geocoded locations from where respondents were sampled.

D.4 Treatment Examples

T3 presented to a respondent from West Bengal could look as follows: “We want to hear your views on trade between India and other countries. Suppose trade will increase the wages of **workers like an upper caste named Sudeb Banerjee**. But trade will lower the wages of **other workers**.”

T6 for a respondent from Haryana state could be: “Suppose trade will increase the wages of **some workers who are low-skilled and have not passed high school**. But trade will lower the wages of **workers like an OBC named Dinesh Kumar Yadav who are high-skilled and have passed high school**.”

D.5 Balance Tests

Table A.9: Tests of Covariate Balance (Vignette Experiment)

| | Treatment: | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------------------------|-------|--------------------|
| | Skills Treatment: | | | Co-ethnicity Treatment: | | |
| | No | Yes | Diff (col 1-2) | No | Yes | Diff (col 4-5) |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| <i>Respondent</i> | | | | | | |
| <i>Characteristics</i> | | | | | | |
| Age | 34.67 | 35.17 | -0.497 (0.375) | 35.07 | 34.60 | 0.470 (0.396) |
| Gender | 1.46 | 1.45 | 0.013 (0.026) | 1.46 | 1.42 | 0.036** (0.016) |
| Education | 3.72 | 3.76 | -0.044 (0.083) | 3.76 | 3.77 | -0.011 (0.052) |
| Income | 3.74 | 3.82 | -0.084 (0.094) | 3.79 | 3.79 | -0.001 (0.058) |
| State | 16.22 | 16.29 | -0.067 (0.452) | 16.66 | 16.95 | -0.292 (0.277) |
| Ethnic Group | 3.96 | 3.91 | 0.051 (0.118) | 3.93 | 3.97 | -0.046 (0.071) |
| N | 722 | 699 | | 2,777 | 1,397 | |

Notes: Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 report the group means of the covariates under different treatment conditions. Columns 3 and 6 display the results of two-sided t-tests between the treatment conditions, assuming unequal variances.

D.6 Additional Results

Table A.10: Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment on Opposition to Trade

| | UC/OBC | SC/ST/Muslim | Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| <i>Co-ethnic Benefits Control</i> | | | |
| Non-Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | 0.33*** (0.08) | 0.23* (0.12) | 0.33*** (0.08) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | 0.16** (0.08) | -0.19 (0.12) | 0.16** (0.08) |
| SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | 0.25** (0.10) |
| SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | -0.10 (0.14) |
| x Non-Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | | | -0.35** (0.14) |
| x Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | | | |
| Age | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Gender | 0.07 (0.06) | 0.11 (0.10) | 0.08 (0.05) |
| Constant (control mean) | 2.03 | 2.24 | 2.02 |
| N | 2,745 | 1,122 | 3,867 |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

In this Table we compare respondents in the control condition to respondents who received information about a co-ethnic benefiting as well as those who received information about a non-co-ethnic benefiting. The results further elucidate the mechanisms in our theoretical argument. Among marginalized groups, a non-co-ethnic benefiting from trade generates opposition to trade, whereas a co-ethnic benefiting from trade is associated with an uptick in support. But respondents belonging to privileged groups treat both non-co-ethnics and co-ethnics similarly, evidencing protectionist sentiments when both types of workers are predicted to benefit from trade. Our primary interest lies in Column 3, which shows that the effect of the co-ethnic benefits treatment relative to the control is significantly different for marginalized groups as compared to privileged groups.

Table A.11: Effect of Skills Treatment on Opposition to Trade, by Social Group and Income

| | UC/OBC High-Skill (1) | UC/OBC Low-Skill (2) | UC/OBC (3) | SC/ST/Muslim High-Skill (4) | SC/ST/Muslim Low-Skill (5) | SC/ST/Muslim (6) |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|
| Skills Treatment | 0.51*** (0.14) | 0.13 (0.11) | 0.13 (0.11) | 0.45 (0.27) | 0.02 (0.17) | 0.02 (0.17) |
| Respondent Skill | | | -0.17 (0.15) | | | -0.11 (0.28) |
| Skill Treatment x Respondent Skill | | | 0.38** (0.18) | | | 0.43 (0.32) |
| Age | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| Gender | 0.13 (0.12) | 0.20** (0.10) | 0.17** (0.08) | 0.10 (0.22) | 0.12 (0.15) | 0.12 (0.12) |
| Constant (control mean) | 1.78 | 1.94 | 1.94 | 1.90 | 1.99 | 1.99 |
| N | 697 | 1,120 | 1,817 | 205 | 535 | 740 |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

This Table focuses on the skills treatment. Previously, we had documented how the skills treatment had a strong effect among high-skilled respondents but not among low-skilled respondents. We now show that the effect of the skills treatment is concentrated among high-skilled UC/OBC respondents, and that the treatment effect is significantly different across high- and low-skilled respondents in these groups. By contrast, the skills treatment does not have an effect among either high- or low-skilled SC/ST/Muslim respondents (Columns 4–6).

Table A.12: Marginal Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment, Conditional on Receiving Skills Treatment

| | High Skill | Low Skill | Interaction with High-Skill Dummy |
|--|------------|-----------|--------------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | -0.42 | -0.50*** | -0.50*** |
| | (0.26) | (0.17) | (0.17) |
| High-Skill Dummy | | | 0.29 |
| | | | (0.18) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x High-Skill Dummy | | | 0.08 |
| | | | (0.31) |
| Age | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Gender | -0.05 | -0.00 | -0.02 |
| | (0.25) | (0.17) | (0.14) |
| Constant (control mean) | 2.55 | 2.15 | 2.18 |
| N | 163 | 387 | 550 |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

In this table we study the marginal effect of receiving a co-ethnic benefit treatment amongst low-ranked respondents who have also received the skills treatment (sub-setting our sample to T2, T5, and T6). Column 2 shows that low-skill respondents who receive co-ethnic cues become more favorable to trade. Column 3, which interacts the co-ethnic treatment with respondents' skill level, shows that the coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically significant, indicating that low-skill respondents are not statistically different than high-skill respondents in their response to co-ethnic cues. We interpret this as evidence of H3a where both high and low skill respondents support trade when told about its welfare enhancing effect for the group as a whole.

Table A.13: Marginal Effect of Skills Treatment, Conditional on Receiving the Co-Ethnic Benefits Treatment

| | High-Skill | Low-Skill | Interaction with High-Skill Dummy |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Skills Treatment | 0.33 (0.33) | -0.25* (0.14) | -0.26* (0.15) |
| Respondent Skills | | | -0.25 (0.18) |
| Skills Treatment x Respondent Skills | | | 0.58** (0.26) |
| Constant (control mean) | 1.72 | 2.32 | 2.23 |
| N | 213 | 516 | 729 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y |

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

In this table we study the marginal effect of receiving a skills treatment amongst low-ranked respondents who have also received the co-ethnic benefits treatment (sub-setting our sample to T3, T4, T5, and T6). Column 1 shows no statistically significant effect of the skills treatment on the high-skilled. Column 2 shows that low-skill respondents who receive skills cues become more favorable to trade. Column 3, which interacts the skills treatment with respondents' skill level, shows that the coefficient on the interaction term is significant, indicating that there is heterogeneity within the low-ranked group by skills. We interpret this as evidence of H3b where low-skill respondents are more supportive of trade than their high-skills counterparts due to the overlapping influence of both skills and ethnicity for members of this group.

D.7 Results for the Main Manuscript Tables in the Experimental Section with Control Variable

Table A.14: Effect of Skills Treatment on Opposition to Trade

| | High-Skilled | Low-Skilled | Interaction with Respondent Skill |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Skills Treatment | 0.33*** (0.08) | -0.01 (0.06) | -0.01 (0.06) |
| Respondent Skill | | | -0.13* (0.07) |
| Skill Treatment x Respondent Skill | | | 0.34*** (0.10) |
| Age | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00* (0.00) |
| Gender | 0.02 (0.08) | 0.09 (0.07) | 0.06 (0.05) |
| Constant (control mean) | 2.13 | 2.24 | 2.25 |
| N | 1,493 | 2,681 | 4,174 |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

– Replication, with results of control variables, of Table 3.

Table A.15: Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment on Opposition to Trade

| | UC/OBC | SC/ST/MUSLIM | Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy |
|--|--------|--------------|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | -0.01 | -0.30*** | -0.01 |
| | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.07) |
| SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | 0.20*** |
| | | | (0.07) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | -0.29** |
| | | | (0.12) |
| Age | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Gender | 0.67 | 0.11 | 0.08 |
| | (0.06) | (0.10) | (0.05) |
| Constant (control mean) | 2.19 | 2.34 | 2.18 |
| N | 2,745 | 1,122 | 3,867 |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Replication, with results of control variables, of Table 4.

Table A.16: Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment on Opposition to Trade, by Social Group and Income

| | UC/OBC High-Skill | UC/OBC Low-Skill | UC/OBC | SC/ST/Muslim High-Skill | SC/ST/Muslim Low-Skill | SC/ST/Muslim |
|--|----------------------|---------------------|--------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | -0.04 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.31* | -0.30** | -0.30** |
| | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.19) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Respondent Skill | | | 0.08 | | | 0.09 |
| | | | (0.08) | | | (0.13) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x Respondent Skill | | | -0.06 | | | -0.01 |
| | | | (0.14) | | | (0.22) |
| Age | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.00) |
| Gender | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.11 |
| | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.18) | (0.12) | (0.10) |
| Constant (control mean) | 2.20 | 2.19 | 2.17 | 2.33 | 2.34 | 2.32 |
| N | 1,056 | 1,689 | 2,745 | 317 | 805 | 1,122 |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.
– Replication, with results of control variables, of Table 5.

Table A.17: Interaction of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment and Skills Treatment, by Social Group

| | UC/OBC | SC/ST/Muslim | Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy |
|--|-----------------|------------------|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | -0.09 (0.09) | -0.12 (0.15) | -0.09 (0.09) |
| Skills Treatment | 0.10 (0.08) | 0.16 (0.12) | 0.10 (0.08) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x Skills Treatment | 0.17 (0.13) | -0.37* (0.20) | 0.17 (0.13) |
| SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | 0.17* (0.10) |
| Skills Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | 0.06 (0.14) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | -0.04 (0.17) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x Skills Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | -0.53** (0.25) |
| Age | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Gender | 0.07 (0.06) | 0.11 (0.10) | 0.08 (0.05) |
| Constant (control mean) | 2.14 | 2.26 | 2.00 |
| N | 2,745 | 1,122 | 3,867 |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

– Results for control variables provided in Table 6.

Table A.18: Marginal Effect of Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment

| | UC/OBC | SC/ST/Muslim | Interaction with SC/ST/Muslim Dummy |
|--|--------|--------------|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment | 0.08 | -0.49*** | 0.09 |
| | (0.10) | (0.14) | (0.10) |
| SC/ST/Muslim Dummy | | | 0.23** |
| | | | (0.10) |
| Co-ethnic Benefits Treatment x SC/ST/Muslim | | | -0.57*** |
| | | | (0.17) |
| Age | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.00 |
| | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.00) |
| Gender | 0.19** | -0.28 | 0.13* |
| | (0.09) | (0.14) | (0.08) |
| Constant (control mean) | 2.18 | 2.29 | 2.15 |
| N | 1,339 | 550 | 1,889 |

– Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

– Dependent variable is a five-point variable measuring trade opposition with values between 0 and 4.

– Results for control variables provided in Table 7.

E External Validity

E.1 Measuring Trade Policy Preference in Nigeria, South Africa and Philippines

Like for India, our primary dependent variable aims at capturing individuals' attitudes toward trade policy. Respondents in the Philippines were asked to give their opinion to the statement: “*We should protect our farmers and workers by limiting the import of foreign goods.*” As they explicitly relate to trade in terms accessible to all respondents while not mentioning particular countries, such a question closely resembles the one used for India.

In Nigeria and South Africa, subjects were asked to choose which of these two statements they most agree with: “*1. People living in Nigeria/Southern Africa should be able to move freely across international borders in order to trade or work in other countries*” or “*2. Because foreign migrants take away jobs, and foreign traders sell their goods at very cheap prices, governments should protect their own citizens and limit the cross-border movement of people and goods.*” While the Afrobarometer assertions conflate immigration and trade issues, they are beneficial in our context to the extent that they capture broad preferences toward globalization and the main issues surrounding free trade in plain terms, and do so without naming specific countries. Additionally, under certain assumptions, factor proportion models offer similar predictions for trade and immigration preferences in this context (see Dolan and Milner 2022 for an extended discussion).

In the Philippines subjects were given five choices: strongly agree, agree, no opinion, disagree, and strongly disagree. In Nigeria and South Africa, respondents were given the possibility to strongly agree or agree with one of the two statements below, but also to choose neither of them. Converting this choice into a five-point scale by associating the first statement to support for free trade, and the second to opposition to such policies is thus quite straightforward. Like for the main analysis, we re-scale the variables to hold a five-point value between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating greater support for trade liberalization. In line with the Indian case, we keep “Don't know” and “No opinion” respondents and assign them a median score.

In order to test the effects of respondents' ethnic or racial background on their attitude toward trade while accounting for skill effects, these categories were operationalized like in the Indian case. In Nigeria, we created three categorical variables—*Yoruba*, *Igbo* and *Hausa*—that each take the value of 1 if respondent identifies as a member of one of those groups, and zero otherwise. These three groups comprise approximately 64% of the population of Nigeria (Johnson-Kanu, 2021; Horowitz, 1985; Blanton, Mason and Athow, 2001; Posner, 2004; Bates, 1974).

In South Africa, a *non-White* categorical variable takes a value of 1 if a respondent identifies as a member of a group most exposed to labor market discrimination, and 0 if the respondent identifies as White. In South Africa, it covers Black and Indian respondents (Gisselquist, 2013; Armstrong, Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008; Kaus, 2013).

In the Philippines, a similar categorical variable is used to differentiate between ethnic Christian and Muslim communities who have historically been exposed to discrimination (Horowitz 1985, 29; McDoom 2019a, 1538; McDoom and Gisselquist 2016, 871; McDoom 2019b). Muslims are coded as 1 and others, mainly Christians, are coded as 0.

As in the case of India, the following specifications control for education using a dummy variable *Education* measuring whether a respondent completed high school or not. Skills are also accounted for using a self-reported measure of individual income/standards of living, with a dummy variable *Income* classifying whether an individual is above or below the average income in the sample.

Table A.19: Individual-Level Relationship Between Support for Trade and Measures of Ethnicity in Nigeria (Afro-Barometer)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) High Educ | (7) Low Educ |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Yoruba | -0.108 (0.195) | | | -0.129 (0.194) | -0.151 (0.195) | -0.016 (0.212) | -0.607 (0.431) |
| Igbo | 0.044 (0.232) | | | 0.038 (0.233) | -0.008 (0.234) | 0.136 (0.285) | -0.316 (0.430) |
| Hausa | 0.263 (0.191) | | | 0.271 (0.190) | 0.259 (0.191) | 0.259 (0.243) | 0.031 (0.336) |
| Education | | -0.077 (0.089) | | -0.063 (0.089) | | | |
| Income | | | -0.066 (0.090) | | -0.063 (0.090) | | |
| Gender | -0.103 (0.079) | -0.109 (0.080) | -0.109 (0.080) | -0.111 (0.080) | -0.114 (0.080) | -0.118 (0.102) | -0.105 (0.136) |
| Age | 0.003 (0.004) | 0.002 (0.004) | 0.003 (0.004) | 0.002 (0.004) | 0.003 (0.004) | 0.001 (0.005) | 0.003 (0.006) |
| <i>N</i> | 2250 | 2247 | 2197 | 2247 | 2197 | 1420 | 827 |

- Models are estimated using ordered logit, region fixed effects with robust standard errors.

- Models control for age and gender of respondent.

- Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.20: Individual-Level Relationship Between Support for Trade and Measures of Ethnicity in South Africa (Afro-Barometer)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) High Educ | (7) Low Educ |
|-----------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Non-White | 0.245** (0.123) | | | 0.283** (0.128) | 0.267** (0.123) | 0.264* (0.143) | 0.898*** (0.340) |
| Education | | 0.065 (0.082) | | 0.094 (0.093) | | | |
| Income | | | 0.096 (0.086) | | 0.075 (0.093) | | |
| Gender | -0.017 (0.082) | -0.046 (0.076) | -0.047 (0.076) | -0.015 (0.082) | -0.016 (0.083) | -0.046 (0.108) | -0.047 (0.131) |
| Age | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.003) | 0.005 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.001 (0.004) | 0.009** (0.004) |
| <i>N</i> | 1916 | 2232 | 2220 | 1915 | 1903 | 1124 | 791 |

- Models are estimated using ordered logit, regional fixed effects with robust standard errors.

- Standard errors in parentheses.

- Whites are reference category. Non Whites include Indian and Black respondents.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.21: Individual-Level Relationship Between Support for Trade and Measures of Ethnicity in the Philippines (Asian-Barometer)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) High Educ | (7) Low Educ |
|-----------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Muslim | 0.844*** (0.245) | | | 0.816*** (0.248) | 0.810*** (0.242) | 0.919** (0.394) | 0.915*** (0.340) |
| Education | | -0.219* (0.116) | | -0.187 (0.118) | | | |
| Income | | | -0.324** (0.131) | | -0.293** (0.134) | | |
| Gender | -0.044 (0.112) | -0.031 (0.111) | -0.040 (0.112) | -0.034 (0.112) | -0.043 (0.112) | 0.162 (0.149) | -0.298* (0.180) |
| Age | -0.002 (0.004) | -0.005 (0.004) | -0.003 (0.004) | -0.004 (0.004) | -0.002 (0.004) | -0.005 (0.005) | 0.001 (0.006) |
| <i>N</i> | 1200 | 1200 | 1185 | 1200 | 1185 | 718 | 482 |

- Models are estimated using ordered logit, region fixed effects with robust standard errors.

- Models control for age and gender of respondent.

- Standard errors in parentheses. Roman Catholic are reference category.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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