

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

GENDER AFTER GENOCIDE How Violence Shapes Long-Term Political Representation

By NIKHAR GAIKWAD, ERIN LIN, and NOAH
ZUCKER

World Politics
July 2023
75, no. 3

Replication data are available at:

Gaikwad, Nikhar, Erin Lin, and Noah Zucker. 2023. "Replication Data for: Gender after Genocide: How Violence Shapes Long-Term Political Representation." Harvard Dataverse, V 1. At <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KQGW3M>.

Gender After Genocide: How Violence Shapes Long-Term Political Representation

Appendices

- A. Case of Cambodia
- B. Research Ethics
- C. Additional Interview Evidence
- D. Additional Details of Gravesite Measure
- E. Adjusted Gravesite Bandwidths
- F. Technical Details on Pre-Treatment Controls
- G. Detail on West and Southwest Zones
- H. Descriptive Statistics and Graphics
- I. Regression Model Specifications
- J. Gravesite Size Tests
- K. Political Outcomes by Party
- L. Border Discontinuity for Socioeconomic Outcomes
- M. Mechanism Tests
- N. Two-Stage Least Squares Models
- O. Pre-Khmer Rouge Province Fixed Effects
- P. Data Availability

APPENDIX A. CASE OF CAMBODIA.

Patriarchal culture before the Khmer Rouge

May Ebihara's two-volume 1968 dissertation (published by Cornell University Press in 2018) provides one of the most comprehensive ethnographic accounts of village life before the Khmer Rouge. Her study reveals that the man is undisputedly the head of the household. She writes, "the husband is technically the supreme authority who is owed deference, respect, and obedience by his family" (53). While the husband steers the ship, his wife maintains all the activities to keep it running on course: "Her role in the maintenance of the family is critical and her activities are varied; she has primary responsibility for the care of children and household; she is a coworker in the fields" (53). To this day in Cambodia, elders tell newlyweds, "seedlings are there to nurture the farmland; women are there to nurture men." Cambodians use the phrase—*somnab yeong dei, srey yeong broh* in the Khmer language—to refer to a wife's twin obligations to both defer to and take care of her husband.¹

Geographically limited, women depended on men for safety in order to venture outside of their village with confidence. In her observation of the village Svay, a traditional farming hamlet ten miles

¹ Nevertheless, Khmer women have had autonomy in certain spheres of life, such as choice in husband and retention of assets and titles. Property ownership is usually strongly individual in nature, with each spouse retaining "title to whatever goods he or she brought into the union (or inherits during marriage)" (Ebihara 2018, 202). Villagers deny that parents ever arrange marriages. "Boys and girls do as they wish," they tell Ebihara (p.191). She observes, "The male does indeed initiate marriage negotiations; individuals do often make their own choices; and parents generally do not explicitly force a child into or away from a union that they themselves may favor or disapprove of" (Ebihara 2018, 191). In addition, there are no formal norms that determine whether the couple lives in the wife's or the husband's village. Instead, the couple makes a pragmatic decision based on the particular circumstances: "which of the two homes has more room, which spouse has received or will inherit any (or a greater amount of) land or other property, which set of parents has a stronger desire or need for a married child to remain in residence, etc." (Ebihara 2018, 58).

outside of the capital Phnom Penh, women seldom leave the village, and only when accompanied by a male relative, if they did. “From the time of adolescence,” she finds that “females are constantly warned not to stray from the security of the village or to go anywhere without escort; they thus develop a certain timidity that is reinforced by the generally insular outlook of villagers.... Males, on the other hand, are given much more freedom to do as and go where they please, and they are much more adventuresome and self-assured in dealing with new persons and places” (Ebihara 2018, 59).² In this sense, women only experienced autonomy in a confined physical space around the house; other interactions were mostly chaperoned by men.

Ebihara conducted her research from 1959 to 1960, roughly fifteen years before the Khmer Rouge overthrew the incumbent Lon Nol regime. At the time of her fieldwork, she writes that the village was composed of 790 people, split equally between men and women. After the genocide, she returned once visa restrictions were lifted in the early 1990s and found that the Khmer Rouge had killed off the majority of the village’s adult men—women now made up 80.5% of the population.

Controlling for communist strength in qualitative analysis

Since Khmer Rouge violence could be correlated with the intensity of communist beliefs (hardliners are more likely to be violent), we trace our theory across zones that represent the range of communist resistance. The Northeast Zone was the birthplace of Pol Pot’s rebellion, and thought to be his favorite Zone. Though a neurotic leader, he trusted the Jarai villagers (his earliest supporters) to the point that he hand-picked them to be his personal bodyguards. Overall, the Khmer Rouge had widespread civilian support, and many villages were part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, moving communist supplies into South Vietnam. Some survivors thought it was “the best place to have lived during the [Democratic Kampuchea] period” (Kiernan 2008, 307-308). Only 9% of the 1977 population lost their lives by the end of the genocide (Padwe 2020, 147). Conversely, the Northwest Zone had come to experience some of the harshest living conditions. At first, the regional administration consisted of local school teachers, who were not direct disciples of Pol Pot and were moderate in their beliefs. They allowed troops to play “old society songs” while the original singers were killed in neighboring Zones (Kiernan 2008, 221). In 1976, Pol Pot began to purge these leaders, fearing they would turn on him, and replaced them with a “harsh, deceptive, dictatorial regime” (Kiernan 2008, 220). These new leaders followed his written instructions to purge anyone who seemed remotely anti-communist or loyal to the former leadership. Population soon plummeted, followed by declines in production, mass starvation, and reports of cannibalism (Vickery 1984, 103). By comparing these two cases, this qualitative design lets us evaluate the impact of more than one explanatory variable: the role of communist ideology in addition to the role of localized violence.

² Ebihara provides an array of anecdotes to demonstrate how female villagers are harassed or even endangered by strangers outside their village. When temple festivals necessitate young women to travel to neighboring villages, Ebihara observed how “several young women from West Svay became embroiled in a heated verbal exchange with girls from another village who made insulting comments about the formers’ dress” (Ebihara 2018, 229, fn.6). Later, when traveling with a group of Svay youth to cut grass in the marshlands, the group was “frightened by some strange men who called out suggestively: ‘Hey, girls, come help me cut this grass—it is so high.’ (To which a West Svay man angrily retorted: ‘Cut it yourself!’)” (Ebihara 2018, 229, fn.6). Ebihara also documented a widely-known story from the neighboring village Chouk, where “two young women had been hired along with several other girls to dance at a festival in another community.” They were “abducted and ‘made to be like wives’ by several men. (One of the girls did not reappear for two weeks, while the other was still missing after a month’s time when I left the area.)” (Ebihara 2018, 229).

The consequences of female political empowerment

Len Solida believes that the men in her village are more difficult to govern because they drink alcohol too often. Male villagers, she says, shaking her head, “are not really focused...For example, if the commune council tries to disseminate any information, they don’t focus... [They’re] drinking with their friends. After one glass or two glasses of alcohol, that’s the end of the day” (Interview 47). Yet Solida’s criticism appears to draw male pushback. One female farmer shakes her head, as she remembers hearing “old people—men” gossiping and jokingly criticizing her, saying that “the female Village Chief is only a woman” (Interview 45). In their defense, they were just saying those things for fun, she says. “What else can they expect from her?” she laughs, “she’s a good village chief.” But this farmer still defends Len Solida to the old men. She says, “My friends and I tell them that she’s still a Village Chief who can accomplish big things as long as she’s sure and confident in herself. As long as she commits to helping people. And as long as she’s spreading the benefits to all people—instead of being selfish and taking all benefits for herself.” Although this farmer is quick to defend her village chief against gender discrimination, she is aware that the chief is still moving against a dominant social current, so the job requires a thick skin. In her opinion, good job performance appears to be the best way to quell the murmurs of dissatisfaction.

References

- Chandler, David. 1991. *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ebihara, May, 2018. *Svay: A Khmer Village in Cambodia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kiernan, Ben. 2008. *How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930–1975*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Padwe, Jonathan. 2020. *Disturbed Forests, Fragmented Memories: Jarai and Other Lives in the Cambodian Highlands*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Vickery, Michael. 1984. *Cambodia: 1975-1982*. Boston: South End Press.

APPENDIX B. RESEARCH ETHICS.

This paper makes use of in-person interviews and oral histories conducted with adult men and women in genocide-affected communities in Cambodia. The conduct and use of these interviews was approved by Institutional Review Boards at (University Names and Protocol Numbers Redacted). Independent of IRB review, care was taken to ensure that this work met a high ethical standard in compliance with the American Political Science Association’s *Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research*. In particular, we adhered to the disciplinary body’s general principles and guidelines pertaining to power, consent, deception, harm and trauma, confidentiality, impact, laws/regulations, compensation, and shared responsibility (see also Tolleson-Rinehart 2008; Belmont Report 1979).

The overarching principle we followed was to respect the autonomy and well-being of study subjects and their broader communities who might plausibly have been affected by the research. Our interview subjects included socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals. Professional deminers provided introductions to local chiefs and councils, who gave us permission to interview their constituents. We also asked deminers for introductions to villagers—strangers as well as people they already know. Having female deminers introduce us to other women who normally do not speak for the household provided the

opportunity to study actors at a permanent disadvantage, such as those lacking education or freedom to leave the domicile (Wood 2007). To protect the safety and well-being of all interviewees, we use pseudonyms for the names of both individuals and locations. Individuals' names were never collected. Audio recordings of the interviews were collected with consent, stored on a secure computer, and destroyed after being transcribed to protect participants' privacy.

Careful and considerate acquisition of informed consent is particularly important in conflict and post-conflict settings (Wood 2006). Informed consent was acquired from all participants in Khmer, the official language of Cambodia. Enumerators emphasized to potential interviewees that their participation was wholly voluntary and that they could skip individual questions if they wanted. Potential interviewees were provided with additional information on the study, including researchers' names, affiliations, and contact information; an overview of the research objectives; a summary of what the interview process would entail; an overview of risk to participants; and information on confidentiality and the anonymization process. Researchers' contact information was also provided if participants had additional questions.

We paid particular attention to the possibility of harm or trauma to participants. Given the content matter of the questionnaires and the interview process, we did not anticipate adverse effects; no harm or trauma was observed over the course of the research. We considered the risk that oral histories would raise psychological discomfort for subjects recollecting the genocide. Consequently we asked no questions about what happened during the Khmer Rouge regime. Some respondents voluntarily brought up the genocide, nevertheless; we note that these subjects expressed a sense of empowerment in sharing their experiences and perspectives on the legacies of the genocide. Potential interviewees were also informed about the possible benefits of participation, namely a better understanding of how to promote development in communities like theirs and an ability to contribute narratives to document the history of their regions.

No deception or covert research practices were used in the study. Compensation was not offered to subjects. The research protocol was designed to mitigate impact on local social, economic, and political processes; no such impact was expected or observed. The procedures used to conduct the interviews for this study fully complied with laws both in Cambodia and in the home countries of the researchers.

References

- Tolleson-Rinehart, Sue. 2008. "A Collision of Noble Goals: Protecting Human Subjects, Improving Health Care, and a Research Agenda for Political Science." In "Symposium: Protecting Human Research Participants, IRBs, and Political Science Redux." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 41(3): 507–511. doi: 10.1017/S1049096508080876.
- The National Commission for the Protection Of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research [The Belmont Report]. 1979. Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research. <https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/belmont-report/index.html>
- Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2006. "The Ethical Challenges of Field Research in Conflict Zones." *Qualitative Sociology* 29: 373–386. doi: 10.1007/s11133-006-9027-8.
- Wood, Elisabeth. 2007. "Field Research." In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. New York: Oxford University Press.

APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL INTERVIEW EVIDENCE.

I. New Gender Norms Emerge in Regions Surrounding Mass Graves

1. Gender Egalitarianism in Political Life

“In my village, if there are 100 men, only 6 participate [in village commune meetings]. The group leader in the village are women, not men.... The other villages are similar, even in {village name redacted} the village chief, the commune chief, are women...They prioritize giving these positions to women...Because men are not humble. That is what I want to say...To do the same job, they are not really focused...They don't focus, for example, if the commune council tries to disseminate any information, they don't focus...[They focus on] drinking with their friends. After one glass or two glasses of alcohol, that's the end of the day, that's why...[The party wants women] to hold positions...because women are more humble than men. Men don't care much about this work. So if they invite women, they are eager to understand more about social issues.” (Interview 47)

“There were both men and women who were candidates [in commune elections]. There were 4 men and besides that there were women... They select more women.” (Interview 47)

“She [the village chief] deals with everything from the land dispute, when there is a complaint, even when people own interest [money]... She is good. She doesn't drink.” (Interview 46)

“The female Village Chief is just a female Village Chief. Me and my friends tell them that she's a female Village Chief who can still accomplish big things as long as she's sure and has confidence [in herself]. Also as long as she commits to helping people. As long as she's spreading the benefits to all people instead of being selfish and taking benefits for herself.” (Interview 45)

“Each village always has one or two women working in the village...they work with the Village Chief. For example, there are three of them. There's one boss, then the deputy, the assistant. We just think they're the same.” (Interview 38)

“When there is a commune chief or a village chief, we will accept it [their authority]. [This means that if there is a female leader her constituents will accept her]. No one decides if the village chief is male or female.” (Interview 16)

[When asked whether the commune chief treats a female village chief differently than a male village chief, respondent answers:] “It depends. It depends on who can volunteer or who can control the village [the best].” (Interview 7)

“I don't really have a lot of education. Before, I can only see the Khmer alphabet. Now I can say it and spell certain words... When I'm working here [as the Village Chief], I read a lot. I'm getting better. I have practiced a lot so I can read and write... The organization came and taught me how to count the population in the village. For example, ‘how many children do they have?’ Or, ‘how much land do they have?’” (Interview 7)

2. How Female Politicians Benefit Constituents

“Most of the women also like having a woman on the Commune Council because we can talk about things more honestly with each other. We can talk to each other, women to women, women can tell each other what they want...Because women always want to go to a woman to talk. They will not run to a man, they will always choose a woman first... They talk about their families or their husbands. So, they’ll say there’s something wrong with their family or their husband or that he drinks too much— they’ll ask ‘what should I do?’ or ‘should I get a divorce?’ Now, women can speak more. In the past, they couldn’t even if they wanted to. Now, women understand more, and they ask more. Sometimes, more than the men. Before, they were very shy. Now, they can talk to us.” (Interview 8)

“They [meeting with other Commune Chiefs] talk about the plants that the organization wants to offer them. They also meet about the health of villagers...Health, health. They talk about the health of pregnant women. They have to check their health frequently— they go to check if the pregnant women are healthy or not. They talk about taking children to school [when they reach the appropriate age].” (Interview 7)

“She [female Deputy Commune Chief] just reports female diseases and pregnancies to the health center...And then she advises pregnant woman on how to take care of themselves.” (Interview 4)

“She [deputy woman] takes care of women, she protects them. She will keep track of recent births, and try to tell the women in the village what to do to have a healthy birth. Women will also come to her and tell her about issues they might be having.” (Interview 6)

3. Gender Egalitarianism in Family Life:

“Q: There are women who are housewives and women who are the heads of the household.

A: Yes.

Q: Are you the head of your household?

A: Yes.

Q: So, you make all of the decisions for her daughters—

A: If I’m poor or rich, it’s on me. [Idiom which means the decisions are on her].

Q: Are a lot of women the head of the household?

A: More, many more.

Q: There are some husbands who don’t do anything. The wife is then the one who earns the income. There are a lot more like you.

A: Women like me.

Q: Yeah, there are more women who have become the head of their household. Why are they becoming the head of the household?

A: Because the wife works harder than the husband.

Q: What do the men do here?

A: Sometimes, when the men drink too much, they don't do anything.

Q (Community Liaison): Bullshit.

A: [Laughs] Yes. When they're drunk, they don't do anything. They get up, and they drink again.

Q: Are there a lot of those men?

A: Yes, quite a lot." (Interview 39)

"There are a lot of men here but when we're growing rice, it's all women... Now, we think that the woman could work just like the man. [Like they're equally competent]... Sometimes, women earn the most and then she's the head of the family. Sometimes, men earn the most and then he's the head of the family." (Interview 38)

"[On whether there are more male or more female heads of households] It's almost the same. In [commune name redacted], there are nine villages. I think that all of the villages are the same. Definitely, a third of them." (Interview 38)

"Yes, there are many [female heads of family in this village], but not as fearless as me. There are more men that work or do business, but I lead my husband. If I don't lead, he doesn't want to go." (Interview 16)

"There isn't much difference [between female or male heads of the family]. For example, if there is something that's heavy and needs to be removed, we can just ask our husbands. For example, if the husband doesn't know much, then the woman will be the leader and she'll tell him what to do..." (Interview 7)

4. Transformations in Women and Men's Activities:

"Women who are around here are better [at bringing home income]...In some families, women work very hard while their husbands clink their glasses [as in drink]...When they meet with their friends, they drop their work for one whole day or sometimes a half day, while their wives work really hard on the field...Orchard and rice field. Some just only drive the mini-tractor, doing nothing, just letting their wives and children work." (Interview 47)

When asked if it was mostly men or women who earn household income: "Both. If the wife has children, they stay at home. Then, the husbands go out and do day labor or something like that to earn money. Sometimes, they work on their own farm and plant beans and corn and so on. If the husband's sick, the wife goes to find work. They don't mind." (Interview 45)

"Because the wife works harder than the husband...Sometimes, when the men drink too much, they don't do anything... If you ask what the percentage is, I'm going to say 100%. There are so many drunk

men...After they drink, they sleep. After they sleep, they drink...Yes, there are things to do but they do it only to get money to drink, we don't save any money. They work for themselves...The money they get from [their work] is for drinking...Some men give the money to their family, some don't." (Interview 39)

II. Traditional Gender Norms Persist in Regions Away from Mass Graves

1. Gender Norm Persistence in Political Life

"Yes, there are women who are leaders. They're in different villages. There are women who are managers, but they're not always the boss. They're always under the man, because they have lower education. But, the women have different jobs than men. The villagers here are very uneducated. They know but they're not clear [meaning that they know how to do certain things but not a lot]." (Interview 1)

"In this commune, all women that have run for commune leader have lost." (Interview 2)

"Village chiefs are men but they have wives. But the wife doesn't do anything. They only farm. Because they don't have the knowledge to do the work... [explaining why there hasn't been female village chiefs or commune chiefs]" (Interview 34)

"The majority [of village officials] are men, but they also have the so-called village elders. The village elders act as a village council, like the commune council, so in the village they have a village council as well...No women [as village or commune chief]" (Interview 37)

"There aren't any restrictions against women [running]... There are supposed to be more men than women, that's how the political parties want it. The party picks more men than women... They empower women to join the parties... Yes, they give chances to women... Normally, [women have been chosen] not for the chief position though but for lower positions." (Interview 43)

2. Gender Norm Persistence in Family Life

"The heads of the household are men...Women stay at home and look after children. In their spare time, they'll look after the cows and other things as well...The women who don't have children work freelance jobs... Mostly, they do freelance work like cutting grass or clearing brush. During the harvest season, they'll go harvest the corn." (Interview 44)

"If there are women who are the heads of their family, I wouldn't know because it's not my family." (Interview 20)

"I ate vegetables and fish if I found fish. For women, they couldn't go everywhere because they'd had to look after babies. I found fish in the pond." (Interview 23)

"Yes, women took care of the children and would look after the house. Men would go to study first [the field]... No. If they were afraid, they have nothing to feed their wife and children. So all men had to go [clear orchards for farming]." (Interview 24)

“They [women] do the housework... Some farm. They help out with farming.” (Interview 43)

APPENDIX D. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF GRAVESITE MEASURE.

Alternative measures of genocide exposure include the minimum distance from a village to a gravesite and, for commune-level tests, the total number of gravesites in a commune. We prefer a bandwidth-based measure for several reasons. First, minimum distance to a grave does not account for the intensity of exposure to the genocide, which is the concept we seek to measure. Second, villages tend to be spatially clustered around mass graves. Because single gravesites can indicate legacies of violence in multiple surrounding communities, simply summing the number of graves in a commune could underestimate historical exposure to violence. Further, commune-level sums would likely underestimate the genocide exposure of communities located near commune borders, as nearby graves in a neighboring jurisdiction would not be recorded.

	Sex ratio (65+)		Sex ratio (15–64)	
Grave sites (≤ 5 km)	-0.018***	-0.008*	-0.006**	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mean elevation		0.000***		0.000***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Latitude		0.014		-0.022***
		(0.011)		(0.005)
Dist. to Phnom Penh		0.000		0.000***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital		0.000**		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Median dist. to road		0.000		0.000**
		(0.000)		(0.000)
N	1609	1609	1609	1609

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

Table D-1: Regressions of commune-level sex ratios — for people ages 65+ and 15–64 — on gravesite measure with 5km bandwidth. All models include Khmer Rouge zone fixed effects (see Appendix E). Sex ratio is calculated as number of men in given age cohort divided by number of women.

Our claim is that this gravesite measure captures the local intensity of Khmer Rouge violence. The qualitative evidence described in the text offers support for this. As an additional test of concept, we regress contemporary commune-level sex ratios on this gravesite measure, using data from the 2008 Population Census. The results, listed in Table D-1, offer further support for this claim. Proximate grave sites are associated with significant reductions in local populations of older men (ages 65+), who were those most exposed to Khmer Rouge violence. There is a notably weaker relationship with sex ratios in younger cohorts (ages 15–64), corresponding with the notion that male populations tend to recover relatively quickly after an armed conflict ends. Collectively, this indicates that this measure effectively captures fine-grained variation in the local intensity of genocidal killings.

APPENDIX E. ADJUSTED GRAVESITE BANDWIDTHS.

Our primary measure of genocide exposure is the number of Khmer Rouge gravesites within 5km of a given village centroid. In these tests, we adjust the bandwidth to 2.5km and 10km.

Outcomes: Party lists and commune councilors

	% women, party list		% women, council			% women, party list		% women, council	
Grave sites (≤ 2.5 km)	0.031***	0.023***	0.029***	0.026***	Grave sites (≤ 10 km)	0.005**	0.001	0.005**	0.003*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mean elevation		0.000*		0.000**	Mean elevation		0.000*		0.000**
		(0.000)		(0.000)			(0.000)		(0.000)
Latitude		0.009		-0.010	Latitude		0.015+		-0.007
		(0.008)		(0.007)			(0.008)		(0.007)
Dist. to Phnom Penh		-0.000+		0.000	Dist. to Phnom Penh		-0.000*		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)			(0.000)		(0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000***		-0.000***	Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000***		-0.000***
		(0.000)		(0.000)			(0.000)		(0.000)
Median dist. to road		0.000		0.000***	Median dist. to road		0.000		0.000***
		(0.000)		(0.000)			(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.246***	0.175+	0.142***	0.300**	Constant	0.244***	0.119	0.139***	0.261**
	(0.007)	(0.097)	(0.007)	(0.081)		(0.007)	(0.097)	(0.008)	(0.083)
Observations	1281	1281	1566	1566	Observations	1281	1281	1566	1566

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

Table E-1: Regressions of political outcomes on gravesite measure with 2.5km and 10km bandwidth. Remaining specifications are the same as in the main models.

Outcomes: % FHH and female literacy rates

	% FHH		% F. literacy			% FHH		% F. literacy	
Grave sites (≤ 2.5 km)	1.778***	1.301***	6.431***	3.361***	Grave sites (≤ 10 km)	0.771***	0.526***	2.627***	0.973***
	(0.339)	(0.346)	(0.537)	(0.482)		(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.184)	(0.174)
Mean elevation		-0.009**		-0.025***	Mean elevation		-0.008*		-0.023***
		(0.003)		(0.006)			(0.003)		(0.006)
Latitude		-1.642**		-2.586**	Latitude		-1.661**		-2.445**
		(0.509)		(0.832)			(0.507)		(0.833)
Dist. to Phnom Penh		-0.000+		-0.000***	Dist. to Phnom Penh		-0.000		-0.000***
		(0.000)		(0.000)			(0.000)		(0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000***		-0.000***	Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000***		-0.000***
		(0.000)		(0.000)			(0.000)		(0.000)
Median dist. to road		0.000		0.000*	Median dist. to road		0.000		0.000*
		(0.000)		(0.000)			(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	26.689***	49.852***	64.659***	114.092***	Constant	25.587***	48.765***	60.983***	110.483***
	(0.701)	(6.188)	(1.156)	(10.338)		(0.719)	(6.123)	(1.185)	(10.358)
Observations	1609	1609	1609	1609	Observations	1281	1281	1566	1566

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

Table E-2: Regressions of economic outcomes on gravesite measure with 2.5km and 10km bandwidth. Remaining specifications are the same as in the main models.

Outcomes: Business management and educational attainment

	Women as business managers				Years of schooling for women			
	FHH		MHH		FHH		MHH	
Grave sites (≤ 2.5 km)	0.035** (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.023** (0.008)	0.014+ (0.008)	0.505*** (0.111)	0.347** (0.105)	0.559*** (0.082)	0.392*** (0.075)
Mean elevation		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.001 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)
Latitude		-0.028 (0.031)		-0.015 (0.018)		0.179 (0.225)		0.056 (0.132)
Dist. to Phnom Penh		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000+ (0.000)		-0.000* (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.000** (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)
Median dist. to road		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000** (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)
N	2,456	2,456	8,926	8,926	1,819	1,819	6,974	6,974

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

	Women as business managers				Years of schooling for women			
	FHH		MHH		FHH		MHH	
Grave sites (≤ 10 km)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.011+ (0.006)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.264*** (0.038)	0.169*** (0.039)	0.263*** (0.029)	0.152*** (0.029)
Mean elevation		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)
Latitude		-0.029 (0.031)		-0.021 (0.018)		0.178 (0.225)		0.037 (0.139)
Dist. to Phnom Penh		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000** (0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000** (0.000)		-0.000* (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)
Median dist. to road		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000** (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)
N	2,456	2,456	8,926	8,926	1,819	1,819	6,974	6,974

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table E-3: Regressions of household-level economic outcomes on gravesite measure with 2.5km and 10km bandwidth. Remaining specifications are the same as in the main models.

Outcomes: Education spending

	% spending on education			% spending on female education			Education spending per woman/girl		
	All	FHH	MHH	All	FHH	MHH	All	FHH	MHH
Grave sites (≤ 2.5 km)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.017** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.004** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	43.472*** (13.020)	8.342 (15.728)	51.856*** (14.168)
Mean elevation	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	0.024 (0.123)	0.150 (0.199)	0.011 (0.115)
Latitude	0.007 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.010 (0.008)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.002)	32.283+ (18.923)	0.441 (35.512)	41.132* (19.729)
Dist. to Phnom Penh	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.000)
Median dist. to road	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
N	11,382	2,456	8,926	11,268	2,456	8,812	4,561	781	3,780

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

	% spending on education			% spending on female education			Education spending per woman/girl		
	All	FHH	MHH	All	FHH	MHH	All	FHH	MHH
Grave sites (≤ 10 km)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.001* (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	14.427*** (4.061)	12.367* (5.124)	14.972*** (4.385)
Mean elevation	0.000 (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)	0.073 (0.132)	0.190 (0.199)	0.062 (0.125)
Latitude	0.007 (0.008)	0.000 (0.011)	0.009 (0.009)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.002)	33.516+ (19.286)	-4.708 (32.836)	43.060* (20.396)
Dist. to Phnom Penh	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Median dist. to road	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)
N	11,382	2,456	8,926	11,268	2,456	8,812	4,561	781	3,780

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

Table E-4: Regressions of household-level spending outcomes on gravesite measure with 2.5km and 10km bandwidth. Remaining specifications are the same as in the main models.

APPENDIX F. TECHNICAL DETAILS ON PRE-TREATMENT CONTROLS.

Mean elevation: Drawn from NASA SRTM global digital elevation model of Earth land (<https://urs.earthdata.nasa.gov>). Generated commune-level shapefiles, based on average elevation within commune boundary. Commune-level elevation applied to constituent villages in household-level tests.

Latitude: Drawn from village-level shapefile from 2008 Cambodian Population Census. In commune-level tests, we use the mean latitude across all constituent villages.

Distance to Phnom Penh: Haversine distance from each village centroid to the Phnom Penh centroid. In commune-level tests, we measure the Haversine distance from the mean latitude/longitude of constituent villages to the Phnom Penh centroid.

Distance to nearest provincial capital: Haversine distance from each village centroid to each provincial capital centroid. Each village then assigned the minimum distance. In commune-level tests, we measure the Haversine distance from the mean latitude/longitude of constituent villages to each provincial capital centroid and take the minimum.

Distance to nearest colonial-era highway: The Cambodian Road Network (National Roads 1-7) were built in the 1950s, as King Sihanouk sought to modernize the country and develop its economy. [Open Development Cambodia](#) provides a shapefile of the Cambodian Road Network (accessed February 15, 2021). We draw on polylines and calculate the minimum distance from each village to each highway. We then take the minimum overall distance. In commune-level tests, we use the median distance of constituent villages to their nearest highways.

Khmer Rouge zone: The Khmer Rouge divided the country into seven administrative Zones, and some experienced more violence than others. These Zones were recorded in a shapefile from the Cambodia Genocide Program Geographic Database at Yale University. We first assign village centroids to Khmer Rouge zones using zone polygons. In commune-level tests, we assign communes to zones based on the modal zone of constituent villages.

Schools and government offices: We employ a series of military topographic maps of Cambodia (1962–67), developed by the US Army Map Service for the purpose of military land navigation. The Army Corps of Engineers used aerial photographs and ground intelligence to tag information on schools, village government offices, culverts, and military transit points in order to differentiate potential military targets from civilian settlements. We use this information to construct a binary indicator for the presence

of a major (secondary) school in the commune as well as a binary variable for the presence of governmental offices, which represents whether a village administrative office is located within the commune. These hand-coded variables are used in the border discontinuity model.

APPENDIX G. DETAIL ON WEST AND SOUTHWEST ZONES.

The Khmer Rouge regime's efforts to remake society hinged on the cooperation of its zone secretaries, a coalition of military commanders with diverse backgrounds and beliefs. While Pol Pot issued orders from the capital, Phnom Penh, the implementation of his mandates varied significantly across zones. The central government found it difficult to coordinate policy between zones because the secretaries were effectively governing their former combat theaters and controlled the soldiers in charge of enforcing state policy. Not only did zone commanders hold a great deal of *de facto* authority, but their ideologies also ranged from moderate communists to repressive extremists. Consequently, much of the Khmer Rouge's social project was determined at this level.

For instance, Don Grasse (2022) notes the marked difference between the military commanders who ran the Southwest and West Zones, respectively. Southwest Zone commander Ta Mok followed Pol Pot's instructions diligently. Historian Meng-Try Ea's 2005 study of the Southwest Zone describes a major settlement at Tauch Hill, where Ta Mok immediately sorted people upon arrival: the women lived and worked west of the mountain while the men worked the remaining land (p.118). While Ta Mok oversaw the Southwest Zone, the area further became infamous for executions, torture, and slave labor. He led several massacres during the genocide, earning the nickname the Butcher. Born into a peasant family, Ta Mok became involved in colonial rebellions as a teenager, and absorbed the communist message early on. A true believer, he never struck a deal to surrender or defect to the government, like most Khmer Rouge commanders (New York Times 2006).

Chou Chet, who oversaw the West Zone on the other hand, came from a more privileged background. Before the Khmer Rouge, he studied Pali Sanskrit under the tutelage of Buddhist monks, and worked at a newspaper office, where he met his future wife, whose family helped run the Customs Office in Phnom Penh. When he joined Pol Pot's inner circle, he was labeled as the "intellectual," according to his S-21 personal history (ECCC 2012), and his administrative zone resisted implementing many of the Khmer Rouge's repressive policies. Genocide survivors observed that Chou Chet was not as *khlang* (harsh or strong), and seemed more preoccupied with agricultural production than reeducation and social policy (Kiernan 2008). He was eventually executed at S-21 prison, due to Pol Pot's fear that he lacked party loyalty.

Methodologically, we borrow from a regression discontinuity design in Grasse 2022, a paper that examines the Khmer Rouge's legacy on economic development and also confronts similar questions regarding the need to isolate the role of communist ideology from other factors. The

design exploits the administrative border that divided Kampong Speu province and arbitrarily allocated villages to live in the extremist Southwest Zone or in the moderate West Zone. By putting similar, nearby villages in the control of radically different commanders, the Khmer Rouge’s administrative redistricting arbitrarily assigned exposure to more or less ideological communist programming. Although the two zones vary widely in the intensity of Khmer Rouge social programming, the West and Southwest represent the most deadly zones in the country (0.92 and 0.74 mass graves per commune, respectively). The fine-grain detail of the spatial data illustrate how zone leadership is not predictive of mass killing. If Zone leadership has an independent effect on gender roles, we would observe variation in our outcome at the regional level and a discrete difference at the West-Southwest border. Instead, our empirics show a more localized pattern where places of female empowerment are clustered around mass graves within these zones, suggesting that the murder of millions of Cambodian citizens (mostly men) has a specific and different legacy than the transformative social program.

References

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 2012. “History of the Traitorous Activities of Chou Chet alias Sy, former Secretary of the West Zone.” Document 00013660. Retrieved from the ECCC digital archives, <https://www.eccc.gov.kh>.

Kiernan, Ben. 2008. *How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930–1975*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

New York Times. “Ta Mok, Khmer Rouge Head Facing Trial, Dies.” July 21, 2006.

APPENDIX H. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND GRAPHICS.




Figure H-1: Geographic distribution of women on party lists and commune councils.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
F. councilors (#)	1,618	2.232	1.536	0.000	1.000	3.000	11.000
F. councilors (%)	1,575	0.164	0.096	0.000	0.100	0.200	0.611
F. candidates (#)	1,618	14.157	11.702	0.000	5.000	21.000	74.000
F. candidates (%)	1,281	0.257	0.102	0.022	0.188	0.315	1.000
% FHHs	1,618	24.847	9.315	3.700	18.700	29.800	75.900
F. literacy	1,618	66.119	16.575	2.310	58.377	77.608	97.260
Mean elevation	1,618	48.398	82.632	1.499	10.222	52.193	762.461
Latitude	1,618	12.120	0.999	10.460	11.333	12.980	14.421
Dist. to Phnom Penh	1,618	135.164	98.292	0.352	56.920	216.357	373.979
Dist. to nearest capital	1,618	26.751	16.780	0.228	14.102	36.703	88.988
Dist. to nearest road	1,618	1.075	2.459	0.016	0.250	0.861	34.317
Mean graves (≤ 5 km)	1,618	0.590	0.985	0.000	0.000	0.875	6.286
Mean graves (≤ 10 km)	1,618	1.749	1.883	0.000	0.000	2.846	9.300
Mean graves (≤ 2.5 km)	1,618	0.212	0.545	0.000	0.000	0.098	3.600

Table H-1: Summary statistics for commune-level dataset.

APPENDIX I. REGRESSION MODEL SPECIFICATIONS.

Our primary commune-level model takes the form:

$$Y_{cz} = \beta(\text{gravesites})_c + \gamma \mathbf{X}_c + \zeta_z + \varepsilon_{cz}$$

where Y_c is the political or socioeconomic outcome of interest for commune c in Khmer Rouge zone z , \mathbf{X}_c is the vector of pre-treatment control variables for commune c , ζ_z is the zone fixed effects term, and ε_{cz} is the error term. The model is slightly respecified for household-level tests, taking the form:

$$Y_{hvz} = \beta(\text{gravesites})_v + \gamma \mathbf{X}_v + \zeta_z + \varepsilon_{hvz}$$

where Y_{hv} is the outcome for household h in village v and zone z , \mathbf{X}_v is the vector of pre-treatment controls for village v , and ε_{hvz} is an error term clustered at the village level.

APPENDIX J. GRAVESITE SIZE TESTS.

The number of genocide victims buried at Khmer Rouge gravesites varied. In these tests, we replace our baseline gravesite measure (number of graves within 5km bandwidth) with a measure summing the number of burials at proximate gravesites (within 5km bandwidth), drawn from the Cambodian Genocide Program Database at Yale University. Since this measure has an extreme rightward skew — 813,740 are recorded in one commune, with 16,278 being the average — we drop observations above the 97.5th percentile (139,247.8 burials and above). As indicated in Table H-1, this measure robustly predicts contemporary rates of female representation on party lists and commune councils, in line with our baseline results.

	% women, party list		% women, council	
Grave site burials (standardized)	0.025*** (0.007)	0.015* (0.007)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.020** (0.006)
Mean elevation		0.000* (0.000)		0.000** (0.000)
Latitude		0.013 (0.008)		-0.008 (0.007)
Dist. to Phnom Penh		-0.000* (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)
Median dist. to road		0.000 (0.000)		0.000*** (0.000)
Constant	0.255*** (0.007)	0.139 (0.099)	0.152*** (0.007)	0.287*** (0.084)

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

Table J-1: Regressions of political outcomes on number of gravesite burials within 5km (measured as standard deviations from the mean). Remaining specifications are the same as in the main models.

APPENDIX K. POLITICAL OUTCOMES BY PARTY.

	% women, party list	
Grave sites (5km)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.007** (0.004)
Mean elevation		0.000*** (0.000)
Latitude		0.013* (0.007)
Dist. to Phnom Penh		-0.000*** (0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000*** (0.000)
Median dist. to road		0.000*** (0.000)
N	5,890	5,890

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

Table K-1: Regressions of proportion of women on party lists on standard Khmer Rouge violence indicator. Model estimated at the commune-political party level, with party fixed effects included alongside Khmer Rouge zone fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the commune level.

APPENDIX L. BORDER DISCONTINUITY FOR SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES.

	% FHH		% F. literacy	
Grave sites × Southwest Zone	1.32***	1.64***	4.13***	1.97***
	(0.369)	(0.440)	(0.684)	(0.577)
Grave sites × West Zone	2.16***	2.35***	4.27***	2.27***
	(0.360)	(0.421)	(0.668)	(0.552)
Mean elevation		-0.016		-0.059***
		(0.010)		(0.013)
Latitude		-8.82		-24.4**
		(6.39)		(8.38)
Dist. to Phnom Penh		-0.000		-0.000***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000		0.000***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Median dist. to road		0.003***		-0.003 ⁺
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Major (secondary) school present		1.41		2.76*
		(1.04)		(1.36)
Government office present		2.12 ⁺		-1.32
		(1.15)		(1.51)
Observations	156	156	156	156

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

Table L-1: OLS regressions of socioeconomic outcomes on measure of genocide exposure (5km bandwidth) at the commune level. Robust standard errors included. Observations limited to communes with centroids at most 10km from the West-Southwest border.

APPENDIX M. MECHANISM TESTS.

Interactive models

Our expectation is that there will be a weaker relationship between genocide exposure and female political representation in settings where levels of female economic empowerment are relatively low. To test this, we estimate a series of models that interact the measures of genocide exposure and female socioeconomic empowerment at the household-level. We estimate several traditional multiplicative interactive models along with a series of “binned” models to assess possible non-linearities in the interactive relationship. These binned models effectively reestimate the relationship between genocide exposure and economic empowerment for single subsets of communes, which are binned together by their general level of female economic empowerment (Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu 2019).

While we assert that the genocide generally produced greater female economic empowerment, there are various reasons why we might still observe a wide economic gender gap in some genocide-exposed communities today. In some cases, the gendered effects of the genocide may have been less pronounced, with men and women falling victim to Khmer Rouge violence in more equal numbers. In other cases, post-genocide dynamics may have muted the effects of genocide exposure; as noted in the main text, some scholars have argued that bouts of intense violence can prompt a backlash against

women, which may have diminished levels of female autonomy. In any case, the fact that there is some variation in levels of female empowerment across genocide-exposed communities provides an opportunity for assessing its potential importance as a causal channel.




Figure M-1: Regressions of the proportion of women on party lists and commune councils on the interaction of genocide exposure and the density of female-headed households in a given commune. Results from the binned estimator are depicted as points (one for each tercile of female-headed households). Results from the traditional linear estimator are depicted in the background line. 95% confidence intervals calculated based on robust standard errors. Models include the full covariate set, along with Khmer Rouge zone fixed effects.

The results of these regressions lend support to our claim that the effects of the genocide largely occur through socioeconomic channels. When levels of female economic empowerment are high, genocide exposure has a statistically and substantively significant relationship with female political representation (Figure M-1). In the set of communes with the largest shares of female-headed households (the top tercile: 27.8–75.9%), an additional mass grave within 5km of the average village corresponds to roughly 2.4-percentage point increases in the shares of both party list candidates and councilors who are female. We find substantially weaker relationships between genocide exposure and political representation in communes with low (below ~21%) and middling (~21 to ~28%) densities of female-headed households.

Our second measure of female socioeconomic empowerment—literacy rates—produces similar results (Figure M-2). In communes with relatively low levels of female literacy, we find no significant relationship between genocide exposure and more women on party lists and commune councils.




Figure M-2: Regressions of the proportion of women on party lists and commune councils on the interaction of genocide exposure and the literacy rate among women of at least 15 years of age in a given commune. Results from the binned estimator are depicted as points (one for each tercile of female-headed households). Results from the traditional linear estimator are depicted in the background line. 95% confidence intervals calculated based on robust standard errors. Models include the full covariate set, along with Khmer Rouge zone fixed effects.

Causal mediation analyses

Finally, to complement these interaction models, we conduct a series of causal mediation analyses to evaluate the extent to which the effects of the genocide on contemporary female political representation are channeled through socioeconomic mechanisms. We evaluate both of our primary measures of female socioeconomic empowerment—female-headed households and female literacy—as mediators.³ We estimate these models using the full slate of pre-treatment controls and Khmer Rouge zone fixed effects term.

	<i>Mediator: % FHH</i>		<i>Mediator: % F. literacy</i>	
	% women, party list	% women, council	% women, party list	% women, council
ACME	0.0007***	0.0006*	0.004***	0.003***
ADE	0.01*	0.012***	0.007*	0.009*
Total Effect	0.01***	0.012***	0.011***	0.012***
Proportion Mediated	0.064***	0.051*	0.372***	0.269***

***p <.001; **p <.01; *p <.05; +p <.1

Table M-1: Results of causal mediation analyses, with both the density of female-headed households and female literacy rate in a given commune used as mediators. Table reports both the average causal mediation effect (ACME) and average direct effect (ADE) of genocide exposure, with robust standard errors.

Table M-1 reports the results of these causal mediation analyses. We find a significant portion of the effect of genocide exposure on contemporary female political representation is transmitted by female socioeconomic empowerment. Approximately five-to-six percent of the effect of genocide exposure on

³ We conduct these analyses using the **mediation** package in R (Tingley et al. 2019).

female representation on party lists and commune councils is estimated to be mediated by the density of female-headed households. A larger share of the causal effect is estimated to be mediated by female literacy. More than 37% of the effect of genocide exposure on women’s representation on party lists is mediated by female literacy; about 27% of the effect on women’s representation on commune councils is mediated by female literacy.

	<i>Mediator: Sex ratio</i>	
	% women, party list	% women, council
ACME	0.00003	−0.0001
ADE	0.011***	0.012***
Total Effect	0.011***	0.012***
Proportion Mediated	0.0008	−0.005

***p <.001; **p <.01; *p <.05; +p <.1

Table M-2: Results of causal mediation analyses, with the sex ratio of a given commune used as the mediator (full population on left, ages 65+ on right). Table reports both the average causal mediation effect (ACME) and average direct effect (ADE) of genocide exposure, with robust standard errors.

Notably, we find that sex ratios are *not* a significant mediator of the effect of the genocide on present-day political outcomes. As shown in Table M-2, we find substantively and statistically insignificant results for the average causal mediation effect of sex ratios on both the party list and elected councilor outcomes. This indicates that the greater political representation of women in genocide-exposed communities today is not principally owed to skewed sex ratios.

References

Hainmueller, Jens, Jonathan Mummolo, and Yiqing Xu. 2019. “How Much Should We Trust Estimates from Multiplicative Interaction Models? Simple Tools to Improve Empirical Practice.” *Political Analysis* 27(2): 163–192. doi: 10.1017/pan.2018.46.

Tingley, Dustin, Teppei Yamamoto, Kentaro Hirose, Luke Keele, Kosuke Imai, Minh Trinh, and Weihuang Wong. 2014. “mediation: R Package for Causal Mediation Analysis.” *Journal of Statistical Software* 59(5): 1–38. doi: 10.18637/jss.v059.i05.

APPENDIX N. TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES MODELS.

In these tests, we use the number of grave sites within 5km of villages to instrument for our two primary measures of female economic empowerment: the density of female-headed households (FHHs) and rate of female literacy in a given commune. The assumption of this test is that within Khmer Rouge zones and conditional on the set of pre-treatment controls included here, the precise locations of graves are a “plausibly exogenous” (Conley, Hansen, and Rossi 2012) determinant of female economic autonomy. The results in Table K-1 indicate that both our measures of female economic empowerment correspond to substantially more women standing for and winning election to commune council. A one-percentage point increase in FHH density corresponds to 1.4- and 1.5-point increases in female representation on party lists and commune councils themselves, respectively; an equivalent increase in female literacy corresponds to 0.5-point increases in these political outcomes.

	% women, party list		% women, council	
FHH density	0.014**		0.015**	
	(0.005)		(0.005)	
Female literacy rate		0.005**		0.005***
		(0.002)		(0.001)
Mean elevation	0.000**	0.000**	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Latitude	0.038**	0.019*	0.016	0.005
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)
Dist. to Phnom Penh	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Median dist. to road	0.002	0.000	0.004*	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.583*	-0.343 ⁺	-0.452 ⁺	-0.333 ⁺
	(0.283)	(0.176)	(0.256)	(0.189)
Observations	1281	1281	1566	1566

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; ⁺p < .1

Table N-1: Results of two-stage least squares regressions of the political outcomes on measures of female economic empowerment, instrumented by the mean number of gravesites within 5km of villages in a given commune, and commune-level covariates. All models include Khmer Rouge zone fixed effects and robust standard errors.

References

Conley, Timothy G., Christian B. Hansen, and Peter E. Rossi. 2012. "Plausibly Exogenous." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 94(1): 260–272. doi: 10.1162/REST_a_00139.

APPENDIX O. PRE-KHMER ROUGE PROVINCE FIXED EFFECTS.

In the following tests we replace Khmer Rouge zone fixed effects with a fixed effects term capturing provincial boundaries imposed prior to the Khmer Rouge, specifically looking to those present during French colonial rule of Cambodia in 1920 (map held by Bibliothèque nationale de France; <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k11001779/f76.item>). As there were more provinces than Khmer Rouge zones, this is an alternative means of accounting for unobserved spatial heterogeneity across Cambodia. Communes and villages were assigned to these provinces with the assistance of Tsering Wangyal Shawa (Princeton University).

	% women, party list	
Grave sites (≤5km)	0.009**	0.008*
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mean elevation		0.000
		(0.000)
Latitude		-0.011
		(0.011)
Dist. to Phnom Penh		0.000
		(0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000**
		(0.000)
Median dist. to road		0.000
		(0.000)
N	1,279	1,279

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; ⁺p < .1

Table O-1: Replication of Table 2 (party list outcome), replacing Khmer Rouge zone fixed effects with fixed effects for pre-Khmer Rouge provinces.

	% women, council	
Grave sites (≤ 5 km)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)
Mean elevation		0.000*** (0.000)
Latitude		0.005 (0.009)
Dist. to Phnom Penh		-0.000** (0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000*** (0.000)
Median dist. to road		0.000*** (0.000)
N	1,565	1,565

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

Table O-2: Replication of Table 2 (councilor outcome), replacing Khmer Rouge zone fixed effects with fixed effects for pre-Khmer Rouge provinces.

	% FHH		% F. literacy	
Grave sites (≤ 5 km)	1.326*** (0.194)	0.817*** (0.202)	3.998*** (0.357)	2.133*** (0.339)
Mean elevation		-0.001*** (0.003)		-0.026*** (0.005)
Latitude		1.864+ (0.927)		-2.491* (1.235)
Dist. to Phnom Penh		-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)
Median dist. to road		0.000* (0.000)		0.000** (0.000)
Constant	23.868*** (0.580)	11.402*** (11.824)	61.365*** (0.844)	124.751*** (15.452)
N	1,608	1,608	1,608	1,608

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

Table O-3: Replication of Table 3, replacing Khmer Rouge zone fixed effects with fixed effects for pre-Khmer Rouge provinces.

	Women as business managers				Years of schooling for women			
	FHH		MHH		FHH		MHH	
Grave sites (≤ 5 km)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.022* (0.010)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.013* (0.006)	0.390*** (0.060)	0.265*** (0.063)	0.420*** (0.046)	0.285*** (0.044)
Mean elevation		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)
Latitude		0.098* (0.049)		0.038 (0.030)		0.471 (0.324)		-0.207 (0.200)
Dist. to Phnom Penh		-0.000* (0.000)		-0.000* (0.000)		-0.000* (0.000)		-0.000* (0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital		-0.000** (0.000)		-0.000* (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)
Median dist. to road		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000* (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)
N	2,475	2,475	8,926	8,956	1,832	1,832	7,009	7,009

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

Table O-4: Replication of Table 4, replacing Khmer Rouge zone fixed effects with fixed effects for pre-Khmer Rouge provinces.

	% spending on education			% spending on female education			Education spending per woman/girl		
	All	FHH	MHH	All	FHH	MHH	All	FHH	MHH
Grave sites (≤ 5 km)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.013** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.003)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	36.511*** (7.867)	13.285 (12.979)	41.947*** (8.482)
Mean elevation	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.010 (0.109)	0.089 (0.169)	0.004 (0.104)
Latitude	0.018 (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	0.019 (0.012)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.002 (0.003)	18.016 (20.829)	18.601 (31.504)	20.159 (22.366)
Dist. to Phnom Penh	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)
Dist. to provincial capital	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Median dist. to road	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.005+ (0.003)
N	11,431	2,475	8,956	11,317	2,475	8,842	4,590	787	3,803

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1

Table O-5: Replication of Table 5, replacing Khmer Rouge zone fixed effects with fixed effects for pre-Khmer Rouge provinces.

APPENDIX P. DATA AVAILABILITY.

Two of the datasets used in this paper are privately held and accordingly cannot be shared publicly. Researchers may acquire permission from the data holders to access the datasets.

Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) data on household-level socioeconomic outcomes are available through the National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. These data were accessed via the Princeton University Library (<https://dss.princeton.edu/catalog/resource1825>), where it is available to Princeton faculty, students, and staff; researchers may contact Economics & Finance Librarian/Data Services Librarian Bobray Bordelon (bordelon@princeton.edu) regarding access. Researchers may also independently purchase the data from the National Institute of Statistics; researchers may contact Communications Technology Director Lundy Saint (lundysaint@yahoo.com).

Data on the locations of Khmer Rouge graves sites and shapes of Khmer Rouge zones are accessible through the Cambodian Genocide Program Geographic Database, [Genocide Studies Program](#) at Yale University (P.O. Box 208206; New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8206). Researchers may contact the Genocide Studies Program to inquire about access.