

The Majority-Minority Divide in Attitudes Toward Internal Migration: Evidence from Mumbai

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Sampling Procedure

We implemented a multi-stage sampling protocol in order to obtain a representative sample of Mumbai. To begin, we defined our primary sampling units (PSUs) as the metropolitan area's 36 assembly constituencies---the main state-level political districts. Our strategy then proceeded in two stages. Based on the population of the assembly constituencies, we first sampled each one in proportion to its size, randomly selecting polling booths in each constituency. We used as our sampling frame the city's electoral rolls. These are publicly available records of all individuals registered to vote, organized by polling booth. They include voters' names and full addresses and constitute the most complete enumeration of the city's population we could access. Enumerators were instructed to locate every tenth individual on the list from a random starting point within the polling booth locality; in situations where an individual could not be located, or declined to be interviewed, the enumerator simply moved on to the next tenth individual.

For the second stage of the sampling design we identified via fieldwork those PSUs containing high concentrations of our three low-frequency types: high-skilled Hindus and Muslims of both skill levels. These constituencies were then oversampled via the random selection of additional polling booths, in the same manner just outlined, so as to generate roughly similar numbers of the four respondent types. Oversampling of Mumbai's Muslim community is a special advantage of our experiment, and enables us to test with precision the hypothesis that the determinants of migration attitudes vary across dominant and minority group members.

Of the 4,509 respondents pinpointed by our sampling strategy, enumerators were able to successfully contact 3,469 individuals (77 percent) and interview 1,585 (35 percent) of them. The refusal and attrition rates were 42 percent and 0.02 percent, respectively. One drawback of our sample is that it substantially underrepresents women, who comprise a mere 27 percent of respondents. While not ideal, this is comparable to rates registered in surveys in other developing nations (e.g. Dunning and Harrison 2010).

A novelty of our study was the use of hand-held tablet devices that automated the randomization and considerably eased the interview process. A random-number generator was used to assign respondents to treatment conditions; data were immediately uploaded to a central server; interview location was geo-coded; and a number of checks on enumerator probity were put in place.

Additional Details About Sampling Procedure: Localities Sampled

The following localities were sampled in proportion to their population size:

Localities Sampled	Population
Borivali	292,178
Dahisar	266,124
Magathane	258,230
Kandivali East	241,287
Charkop	280,112
Malad West	270,993
Jogeshwari East	274,051
Dindoshi	254,989
Goregaon	293,033
Versova	235,936
Andheri West	278,083
Andheri East	268,900
Mulund	291,392
Vikhroli	230,815
Bhandup West	271,794
Ghatkopar West	292,323
Ghatkopar East	233,354
Mankhurd Shivaji Nagar	253,212
Vile Parle	264,929
Chadivali	348,150
Kurla	273,078
Kalina	250,585
Vandre East	255,407
Vandre West	290,404
Anushakti Nagar	224,073
Chembur	246,017
Dharavi	265,126
Sion Koliwada	287,893
Wadala	239,534
Mahim	252,456
Worli	277,605
Shivadi	261,395
Byculla	266,891
Malabar Hill	263,082
Mumba Devi	253,864
Colaba	267,563

Additional Details on Survey Design

Religion Treatment

We took the following steps to ensure that our respondents would accurately associate the religious names treatment with the intended religion. First, we borrowed an existing list of Indian names used for a successful resume audit experiment that explored labor-market discrimination in Delhi (Banerjee 2009).¹ Next, to guarantee that Mumbai residents accurately perceived the religious distinctiveness of these names, we conducted online surveys of Indian respondents using Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk platform in which we asked Indian respondents to identify the religion and caste status associated with each respective name.² The average correct recognition rate in this convenience sample was 93 percent ($N=99$), enhancing our confidence that the religious treatments were effective.³

Skills Treatment

Our skills treatment comprised two parts: a migrant said to be either “highly skilled” or “not highly skilled,” and said to want to enter a specific occupation that fit within one of these skill categories. To ensure that Mumbai respondents accurately associated the assigned occupational treatments with the appropriate skill categories, we asked the same online convenience sample to tag the ten occupations as “highly skilled” or “not highly skilled.” Again, respondent classifications conformed to expectations; the average correct recognition rate was 81 percent ($N=99$). Although this recognition rate is somewhat lower than for religion, we reinforced the skill treatment by explicitly stating the migrant's skill level, following prior studies (e.g., Hainmuller and Hiscox 2010).

¹ These names had initially been taken from candidate lists for Delhi elections. We made minor adjustments to this list based on evidence gleaned from qualitative research and pilot studies.

² After restricting the sample to MTurk users with IP addresses in India, we further informed users that they must currently live in Mumbai in order to take this survey. IP addresses were clustered around Mumbai.

³ One possible objection to our experimental approach is that some Hindu names, such as names from southern India, carry specific regional associations, whereas Muslim names do not, being mostly pan-Indian. To alleviate this concern, we used a corpus of names that could not be attributed to the south. Despite some spread, India's Muslim population is also largely concentrated in regions outside of the south. For additional assurance, we asked our online convenience sample to identify the regions associated with specific names and found no noticeable difference between Hindu and Muslim names.

Table A1: Most Common Occupational Groups in Mumbai Labor Force

Occupational group (official description, National Classification of Occupations 2004)	Proportion of workforce
Manufacturing laborers	.026
Housekeeping and restaurant services workers	.028
Protective services workers	.029
Shop salespersons and demonstrators	.032
Textile, garment and related trades workers	.036
Other office clerks	.041
Motor vehicle drivers	.067
Business professionals	.247

Notes: Data for are taken from the National Sample Survey 64th round 2007-08 on Employment and Unemployment; Mumbai and Mumbai Suburban districts only.

Table A2: Most Common Occupations in Mumbai Labor Force

Occupation (official description, National Classification of Occupations 2004)	Proportion of workforce
Retail sale of readymade garments, including hosiery goods	.017
Monetary intermediation of commercial banks, saving banks and discount houses	.019
General construction of residential buildings	.021
Manufacture of all types of textile garments and clothing accessories	.024
General public service activities of the local government bodies	.025
Other non-scheduled passenger land transport by motor vehicles	.055

Notes: Data for are taken from the National Sample Survey 64th round 2007-08 on Employment and Unemployment; Mumbai and Mumbai Suburban districts only.

Table A3: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Variable type and range	Mean (standard deviation, where applicable)
<i>Dependent variables:</i>		
Accept migrant	Binary (0-1)	0.706 (0.455)
Introduce reservations	Binary (0-1)	0.692 (0.462)
Give migrant voter ID	Binary (0-1)	0.581 (0.494)
<i>Respondent characteristics:</i>		
Age	Continuous (18-90)	39.0 (12.5)
Education (years)	Continuous (0-23)	10.9 (4.5)
College	Binary (0-1)	0.237
Income	Ordinal (1-8)	3.52 (1.13)
Hindu	Binary (0-1)	0.503
Female	Binary (0-1)	0.267
Born in Mumbai	Binary (0-1)	0.656
Marathi speaking level	Ordinal (1-5)	3.70 (1.36)
Ethnically Marathi	Binary (0-1)	0.409
Religiosity	Ordinal (0-1)	0.891 (0.249)
Ethnocentrism	Continuous (0-1)	0.726 (0.201)
Native party supporter	Binary (0/1)	0.304

Table A4: Main Treatment Effects Varying Migrant Skill Level, Excluding Controls

	Respondent:				
	Full sample	Muslim	Hindu	Low income	High income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Migrant skill treatment (1=highly; 0=not highly)	0.064 (0.023)	0.060 (0.029)	0.073 (0.034)	0.085 (0.025)	-0.034 (0.052)
<i>N</i>	1584	786	798	1323	258

Notes: Dependent variable takes 1 (accept migrant) or 0 (don't accept migrant). Coefficients represent the results of t-tests of differences in means. Standard errors in parentheses; unequal variances assumed.

Table A5: Main Treatment Effects Varying Migrant Religion, Excluding Controls

	Respondent religion:	
	Muslim	Hindu
	(1)	(2)
Migrant religion treatment (1=Hindu; 0=Muslim)	-0.064 (0.029)	0.007 (0.034)
<i>N</i>	786	798

Notes: Dependent variable takes 1 (accept migrant) or 0 (don't accept migrant). Coefficients represent the results of t-tests of differences in means. Standard errors in parentheses; unequal variances assumed.

Table A6: Probit Regression of Effects of Varying Migrant Skill Level

	Respondent:				
	Full sample (1)	Muslim (2)	Hindu (3)	Low income (4)	High income (5)
Migrant skill treatment (1=highly; 0=not highly)	0.071 (0.023)	0.066 (0.029)	0.083 (0.035)	0.085 (0.025)	-0.022 (0.052)
Log-L	-926.2	-393.4	-505.2	-798.2	-131.9
<i>N</i>	1578	785	793	1321	257

Notes: Dependent variable takes 1 (accept migrant) or 0 (don't accept migrant). Coefficients represent the marginal effects from probit regressions with covariates set at means. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include controls for demographic, pre-treatment respondent characteristics: age, gender, born in Mumbai, and (in models 1-3) income.

Table A7: Probit Regression of Effects of Varying Migrant Religion

	Respondent religion:	
	Muslim	Hindu
	(1)	(2)
Migrant religion treatment (1=Hindu; 0=Muslim)	-0.069 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.035)
Log-L	-393.2	-508.1
<i>N</i>	785	793

Notes: Dependent variable takes 1 (accept migrant) or 0 (don't accept migrant). Coefficients represent the marginal effects from probit regressions with covariates set at means. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include controls for demographic, pre-treatment respondent characteristics: age, gender, born in Mumbai, and income.

Table A8: OLS Estimates of the Interaction of Migrant Religion and Respondent Religiosity on Main Outcome

	Respondent religion:	
	Muslim	Hindu
	(1)	(2)
Migrant religion (1=Hindu; 0=Muslim)	-0.016 (0.086)	-0.379 (0.186)
Respondent religiosity	0.246 (0.071)	0.020 (0.135)
<i>Interaction:</i>		
Migrant religion x Respondent religiosity	-0.061 (0.096)	0.396 (0.194)
Constant (control mean)	0.564	0.570
<i>N</i>	785	793

Notes: Dependent variable takes 1 (accept migrant) or 0 (don't accept migrant). Respondent religiosity is an ordered variable scaled between 0 (not religious) and 1 (very religious). Religiosity was measured by using responses to the question, "How often do you do puja/namaz [prayers]: daily, weekly, monthly, only on festivals, never?" Robust standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include controls for demographic, pre-treatment respondent characteristics: age, gender, born in Mumbai, and income.

Note to reader: A noteworthy feature of the Muslim result is its uniformity across respondent types. In particular, Muslim respondents' religiosity does not influence the extent of co-ethnic favoritism. For Hindus, we do see evidence of an interaction—more devout Hindu respondents show greater in-group bias than less-devout ones. However, it is important to stress that for the 85 percent of Hindus who report praying daily, the co-ethnic effect is null. In other words, the interaction result is driven by the very small number—only 118 respondents—of less-religious Hindus, who in fact show a (statistically insignificant) preference for Muslim migrants. The slight positive out-group sentiments expressed by less-religious Hindus—who, according to our ethnocentrism index, are significantly more tolerant than the average respondent—may be evidence of bias "over-correction" (see, for example: Harber, Kent. 1998. "Feedback to Minorities: Evidence of a Positive Bias." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 74(3): 622–528).

Table A9: Migrant Acceptance Rate by Respondent Religion and Support for Nativist Parties

	Respondent religion	
	Hindu (overall acceptance = 63%)	Muslim (overall acceptance = 78%)
Voted for nativist party, 2012	54% N=412	70% N=69
Didn't vote for nativist party	72% N=386	79% N=717

Table A10: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Respondents' Religion on Perceptions of Discrimination

	CATI Survey of Representative Sample of Mumbai City			
	Job discrimination		Political representation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Respondent religion (1=Muslim; 0=Hindu)	-0.228 (0.034)	-0.222 (0.036)	-0.214 (0.053)	-0.201 (0.056)
Constant	0.789 (0.019)	0.816 (0.098)	2.331 (0.030)	2.348 (0.162)
<i>N</i>	797	722	743	683
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: For job discrimination, respondents were asked, “If you were to try to get a new job in Mumbai, do you think that employers would discriminate against you on the basis of your religion?” (0=Yes; 1=No). For political representation, respondents were asked, “How well are people of your religion represented in city and state politics?” (1=Not well represented; 2=Somewhat well represented; 3=Very well represented). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include controls for demographic, pre-treatment respondent characteristics: age, gender, born in Mumbai, and income.

Table A11: Probit Estimates of the Effect of Respondents' Religion on Perceptions of Discrimination

	CATI Survey of Representative Sample of Mumbai City			
	Job discrimination		Political representation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Respondent religion (1=Muslim; 0=Hindu)	-0.223 (0.033)	-0.220 (0.035)	-0.136 (0.025)	-0.140 (0.027)
Log-L	-465.2	-425.4	-300.6	-275.152
<i>N</i>	797	793	743	683
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: For job discrimination, respondents were asked, “If you were to try to get a new job in Mumbai, do you think that employers would discriminate against you on the basis of your religion?” (0=Yes; 1=No). For political representation, respondents were asked, “How well are people of your religion represented in city and state politics?” (0=Not well represented; 1=Somewhat or very well represented). Coefficients represent the marginal effects from probit regressions with covariates set at means. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include controls for demographic, pre-treatment respondent characteristics: age, gender, born in Mumbai, and income.

Table A12: Differences-in-Means between Religious Groups on Evaluations of Economic Security

	<i>Respondent religion:</i>		
	Hindu (A)	Muslim (B)	Difference (B-A)
Job security (0-1; 1 is very secure)	0.662	0.599	-0.063 (0.013)
Wages vary (0-1; 1 is wages don't vary)	0.584	0.554	-0.030 (0.014)
Job competition (0-1; 1 is no competition)	0.388	0.291	-0.097 (0.020)
Jobs in future (0-1; 1 is more jobs in future)	0.653	0.622	-0.031 (0.014)

Notes: Difference-in-means tests, allowing for unequal variances between groups. All dependent variables have been re-scaled to zero-one, where one indicates the respondent has a positive perception of his/her economic condition and zero indicates a negative perception.

Table A13: Muslim Perceptions about the Socio-Economic and Political Status of Muslims in India

	Representative Nationwide Surveys of Indian Muslim Percentage Muslim Responding “Yes”		
	2007 (1)	2010 (2)	2014 (3)
Do you feel that Muslims face difficulties in getting a house on rent?	69%	63%	77%
Do you feel that Muslims in India face discrimination in getting jobs?	67%	74%	85%
Is government biased toward Muslim-dominated areas?	58%	68%	74%
Should there be reservations for Muslims in education institutions?	69%	88%	77%
Should there be reservations for Muslims in jobs?	64%	88%	74%
Should there be reservations for Muslims in elections?	56%	87%	79%
Do you think that politicians use Muslims just as a vote bank?	62%	87%	70%
<i>N</i>	1073	1612	1600
Source	The Week	TSI	TSI

Notes: Nationally representative surveys were conducted using both face-to-face and telephony methods in 20 regional languages. The 2007 survey was restricted to Muslim youth. Surveys were administered by CVoter News Inc.

**Table A14: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Caste on Migrant Evaluations,
by Respondent Religion**

	Respondent religion:			
	Hindu		Muslim	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant caste treatment (1=high caste name; 0=low caste name)	0.006 (0.047)		0.013 (0.040)	
Caste match (1=match; 0=mismatch)		-0.026 (0.047)		-0.004 (0.040)
Constant (control mean)	0.632	0.647	0.810	0.818
<i>N</i>	430	430	370	370


Notes: Dependent variable takes 1 (accept migrant) or 0 (don't accept migrant). Robust standard errors in parentheses. The samples are limited to respondents treated with a migrant of the same religion. We code caste "matches" and "mismatches" between the caste of the purported migrant and the caste of the respondent using respondents' self-reported caste level (high-caste Hindu, low-caste Hindu, high-caste Muslim, low-caste Muslim).

Table A15: OLS Estimates of the Correlates of Nativism (Public Goods)

	Full Sample
Public Goods Index	0.326 (0.066)
Constant	0.451 (0.072)
<i>N</i>	1,576


Notes: Dependent variable takes 1 (accept migrant) or 0 (don't accept migrant). Public Goods Index is an ordered variable scaled between 0 (very bad) and 1 (very good). The index was calculated by averaging responses to three questions: (a) "How good is access to electricity in your area?"; (b) "How good is access to clean drinking water in your area?"; and (c) "How good is the quality of the streets in your area?" Robust standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include controls for demographic, pre-treatment respondent characteristics: age, gender, born in Mumbai, and income.

Figure A1: Growth in Mumbai's overall and migrant population, 1901-2001



Notes: Data are compiled from the Census of India, Mumbai Human Development Report (2009), and Singh (2007).

Figure A2: Occupational diversity of Hindus and Muslims in Mumbai grouped by skill-level



Notes: Proportion of sampled Hindu and Muslim workers in Mumbai in high- and low-skilled occupations. Data are taken from the 64th round of the National Sample Survey, 2007-2008 ($N=1,148$). Skill categories are based on the Indian National Classification of Occupations (2004).

Figure A3: Hypothesized crosscutting effects of migrant religion and skills on native attitudes

		<i>S_j</i> (Migrant skills)	
		Threatening to native (-1)	Non-Threatening to native (+1)
<i>R_j</i> (Migrant religion)	Co-ethnic of native (+1)	0 (Offsetting)	2 (Reinforcing)
	Not co-ethnic of native (-1)	-2 (Reinforcing)	0 (Offsetting)

Notes: Numbers represent the hypothetical utility to native_{*i*} from accepting migrant_{*j*} with varying religion and skill characteristics.

Migration's Fiscal Impact in Mumbai

A sizable welfare state exists in Mumbai. Social protection for permanent migrants is available via the Public Distribution System, which provides state-subsidized food and cooking fuel to poor households (Bhatia and Chatterjee 2010, 24). Migrant families also make disproportionate use of municipally-provided public schools and health services (Mili 2011). The outlays of the Municipal Corporation---which employs 108,000 people and has an annual budget of Rs.310 billion---are funded primarily by levying property taxes and octroi. While richer, propertied residents contribute a larger share to municipal revenues, poorer natives, too, foot a substantial portion of city bills via regressive taxes like octroi and sales tax (Karnik et al. 2004). By contrast, migrants contribute less, both because the informal settlements where most migrants live are not directly taxed, and also because migrants remit a large part of their incomes to rural areas, which limits their spending in the local economy. Importantly, natives widely perceive that migrants are responsible for overcrowded city services. For example, one complaint is that migrant slum dwellers illegally connect to the water grid, harming “honest tax paying citizen[s] of Borivali and Dahisar who often face water cuts and shortages,” in the words of one wealthy resident (Graham et al. 2013, 126). Capturing these frustrations, MNS politician Raj Thackeray has commented that, “[t]he city cannot take the burden anymore. Look at our roads, our trains and parks. On the pipes that bring water to Mumbai are 40,000 huts...The footpaths too have been taken over by migrants” (*Times of India*, February 10, 2008).

Bhatia, Navin and Arnav Chatterjee. 2010. “Financial inclusion in the slums of Mumbai.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 45:23-26.

Graham, Stephen, Renu Desai and Colin McFarlane. 2013. “Water wars in Mumbai.” *Public Culture* 25:115-141.

Karnik, Ajit, Anita Rath and, and J.C. Sharma. 2004. “Reforming Property Tax System: Simulated Results for Mumbai City.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 39:3818-3826.

Mili, D. 2011. “Migration and healthcare.” *The Health* 2:82-85.

Qualitative Case Study Evidence on Political Strategies of Mumbai Politicians

Case-study literature on the electoral strategies of Mumbai politicians reinforces the voter-level evidence. The career of Abu Asim Azmi—a Deobandi Muslim politician who is widely considered the “leader of the north Indian [i.e. migrant] Muslims in Mumbai”⁴—nicely illustrates the theory at work. Azmi is credited with reviving the Samajwadi Party in Mumbai.⁵ The party’s expansion there has been predicated on capturing the votes of Muslim natives and, above all, of Muslim migrants. Speaking to a rally in the Muslim-dominated city of Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh, for instance, Azmi exhorted would-be migrants: “Come to Mumbai and Maharashtra ... They are places where we north Indians go as paupers and end up striking gold ... I will ensure that your dignity is not violated till the last drop of my blood.”⁶ He has repeatedly positioned himself as a staunch defender of Muslim migrant interests.⁷ Electoral motivations plainly lie behind this stance. In a Muslim rally held in the Saki Naka area of Mumbai prior to the 2014 elections, Azmi declared: “I urge all north Indians in Mumbai to vote for the SP candidate here on April 24.”⁸ Thus we see a Muslim politician reaching out to co-ethnic migrants with the intention of strengthening the base of minority electoral support. This presents a marked contrast to the electoral approach pursued by Mumbai’s main Hindu parties, which, as discussed earlier, have built reputations on shunning internal migrants.⁹

⁴ See, e.g., *Tehelka*, August 5, 2006.

⁵ The Samajwadi Party is a regional party from north India, but now commands Muslim support in Mumbai (Hansen 2000).

⁶ See, e.g., *Hindustan Times*, November 18, 2009.

⁷ For recent examples, see: *DNA*, January 1, 2014; *Times of India*, May 1, 2014.

⁸ See, e.g., *Indian Express*, April 22, 2014

⁹ Anti-migrant diatribe peppers the speeches of Shiv Sena and MNS leaders. In the words of one prominent MNS politician, “these [UP-Bihari] thugs want to take over Maharashtra and Mumbai. I am a hurdle in their path.” *Lok Prabha*, February 12, 2008.

Is Majority-Group Discrimination Domain Specific?

It is worth noting that we are not the first to identify a disparity in levels of in-group bias displayed by Hindus and Muslims in India (Chhibber 2013, Heath 2015). An intriguing question is why studies document Hindu groups engaging in anti-Muslim discrimination in certain domains, such as communal politics (Wilkinson 2004), but not in others like internal migration. One possibility is that majority-group members who perpetrate the most discrimination---for example, “riot entrepreneurs” and their followers in the case of communal politics (Brass 2005)--act as self-appointed community gatekeepers whose attitudes are unrepresentative of the average majority-group citizen. Alternatively, the high degree of antipathy that we detect among majority-group respondents toward migration may impose a “floor effect” on discrimination: so intense is majority-group aversion toward migration in general, and especially toward low-skilled migrants, that other, non-economic attributes are overlooked or washed out when forming judgments about individuals.¹⁰ The domain-specific nature of discriminatory attitudes merits further study.

References:

Chhibber, Pradeep and Jasjeet S Sekhon. 2013. “The Asymmetric Role of Religious Appeals in India.” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley.

Heath, Oliver, Gilles Verniers and Sanjay Kumar. 2015. “Do Muslim voters prefer Muslim candidates? Co-religiosity and voting behaviour in India.” *Electoral Studies* 38:10-18.

Thachil, Tariq. 2014. “Ethnicity, Class, and Urban Migration: Ethnographic and Experimental Evidence from India.” Paper Presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting.

¹⁰ This is consistent with Thachil’s (2014) observations about urban political elites in Delhi, who tend to view internal migrants their as an “undifferentiated underclass.” It appears that majority-group citizens in Mumbai perceive migrants in a similar fashion.

Table A16. Countries with Minority Groups Facing Similar Levels of Discrimination as Muslims in India

Source: Minorities at Risk Project (2015)

No.	Minority Group	Country	Political	Economic	Distinctive from Majority Group?			
			Discrimination Index	Discrimination Index	Language	Custom	Religion/Sect	Race
	Muslims	India	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
1	Haitian Blacks	Dominican Republic	4	4	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
2	Mayans	Mexico	3	3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
3	Zapotecs	Mexico	3	3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
4	Other Indigenous Peoples	Mexico	3	3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
5	Indigenous Peoples	Guatemala	3	3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
6	Black Karibs	Honduras	3	4	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
7	Indigenous Peoples	Honduras	3	3	Yes	Yes	--	Yes
8	Blacks	Panama	3	3	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
9	Indigenous Peoples	Panama	3	3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
10	Chinese	Panama	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
11	Blacks	Colombia	3	3	No	Yes	No	Yes
12	Indigenous Peoples	Colombia	3	3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
13	Blacks	Venezuela	3	3	No	Yes	No	Yes
14	Blacks	Ecuador	3	3	No	Yes	No	Yes
15	Indigenous Highland Peoples	Ecuador	3	3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
16	Lowland Indigenous Peoples	Ecuador	3	3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
17	Blacks (Afro-Peruvians)	Peru	3	2	No	No	No	Yes
18	Afro-Brazilians	Brazil	3	3	No	Yes	No	Yes
19	Amazonian Indians	Brazil	4	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
20	Lowland Indigenous Peoples	Bolivia	3	2	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
21	Indigenous Peoples	Argentina	3	3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
22	Muslim (Noncitizens)	France	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
23	Roma	France	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
24	Foreign Workers	Switzerland	4	2	Yes	No	No	No
25	Roma	Czech Republic	3	3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
26	Roma	Italy	3	3	Yes	Yes	--	Yes
27	Roma	Macedonia	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
28	Serbs	Croatia	3	3	Yes	No	Yes	No
29	Sandzak Muslims	Yugoslavia	3	2	Yes	No	Yes	No
30	Roma	Yugoslavia	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
31	Muslims	Greece	3	1	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
32	Roma	Greece	4	1	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
33	Roma	Romania	3	3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
34	Chechens	Russia	4	4	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
35	Roma	Russia	4	4	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
36	Ingush	Russia	4	2	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
37	Russians	Estonia	4	4	Yes	No	Yes	No
38	Poles	Belarus	4	3	Yes	No	Yes	No
39	Diolas in Casamance	Senegal	4	2	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
40	Kewri	Mauritania	3	3	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
41	Black Moors	Mauritania	3	4	No	No	No	No
42	Fulani	Guinea	3	0	Yes	No	No	No
43	Malinke	Guinea	3	0	Yes	No	No	No
44	Westerners	Cameroon	4	3	Yes	No	Yes	No
45	Bamileke	Cameroon	3	0	Yes	No	No	No
46	Ijaw	Nigeria	3	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
47	Southerners	Chad	3	0	Yes	No	No	No
48	Lari	Rep. of the Congo	3	2	Yes	No	Yes	No
49	Ngbandi	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	3	0	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
50	Somalis	Kenya	4	2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
51	Hutus	Rwanda	3	2	No	No	No	No
52	Cabinda	Angola	4	3	Yes	Yes	No	No
53	Europeans	Zimbabwe	4	4	Yes	Yes	--	Yes
54	San Bushmen	Namibia	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
55	San Bushmen	Botswana	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
56	Nuba	Sudan	4	4	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
57	Darfur Black Muslims	Sudan	4	4	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
58	Baha'is	Iran	4	4	No	Yes	Yes	No
59	Baluchis	Iran	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
60	Kurds	Iran	4	2	Yes	No	Yes	No
61	Turkmen	Iran	4	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
62	Arabs	Iran	1	3	Yes	Yes	No	No
63	Christians	Iran	4	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
64	Kurds	Turkey	4	2	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
65	Copts	Egypt	3	0	No	Yes	Yes	No
66	Kurds	Syria	4	3	Yes	Yes	No	No

Table A16. Countries with Minority Groups Facing Similar Levels of Discrimination as Muslims in India

Source: Minorities at Risk Project (2015)

No.	Minority Group	Country	Political	Economic	Distinctive from Majority Group?			
			Discrimination Index	Discrimination Index	Language	Custom	Religion/Sect	Race
	Muslims	India	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
67	Palestinians	Lebanon	4	4	No	No	Yes	No
68	Palestinians	Jordan	3	2	No	No	No	No
69	Arabs	Israel	4	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
70	Palestinians	Israel	4	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
71	Russians	Turkmenistan	4	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
72	Uzbeks	Tajikistan	3	3	Yes	No	No	No
73	Uzbeks	Kyrgyzstan	3	2	Yes	Yes	No	No
74	Russians	Uzbekistan	3	0	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
75	Tajiks	Uzbekistan	3	3	Yes	No	No	No
76	Russians	Kazakhstan	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
77	Germans	Kazakhstan	3	2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
78	Turkmen	China	4	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
79	Tibetans	China	4	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
80	Aboriginal Taiwanese	Taiwan	3	1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
81	Koreans	Japan	4	3	No	Yes	Yes	No
82	Kashmiris	India	4	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
83	Muslims	India	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
84	Lhotshampas	Bhutan	4	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
85	Ahmadis	Pakistan	4	3	Yes	No	Yes	No
86	Hindus	Pakistan	4	4	Yes	No	Yes	No
87	Sindhis	Pakistan	3	2	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
88	Hindus	Bangladesh	4	3	No	Yes	Yes	No
89	Biharis	Bangladesh	4	4	Yes	Yes	No	No
90	Rohingya (Arakanese)	Burma	4	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
91	Zomis (Chins)	Burma	4	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
92	Kachins	Burma	3	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
93	Karens	Burma	4	4	Yes	Yes	No	No
94	Mons	Burma	4	4	Yes	Yes	No	No
95	Shans	Burma	4	4	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
96	Indian Tamils	Sri Lanka	3	3	Yes	No	Yes	No
97	Sri Lankan Tamils	Sri Lanka	4	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
98	Vietnamese	Cambodia	4	4	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
99	Montagnards	Vietnam	4	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
100	Chinese	Malaysia	3	0	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
101	Malays	Singapore	3	1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
102	Chinese	Indonesia	4	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
103	East Indians	Fiji	3	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes