

The second part of the book describes Pakistan's rock solid relations with China and Saudi Arabia. In 'Pakistan-China strategic relations ...', Julian Schofield examines why Beijing has not only supplied Islamabad with conventional weapons, but also offered it sensitive technologies for building nuclear weapons and missile systems (157–158). Schofield's assessment reveals that China's proliferation assistance to Pakistan is mostly directed at counterbalancing India. Beijing also seeks Pakistani support to secure access to Gulf energy, and to combat Islamist uprisings in the Xinjiang Province.

Relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are so warm that it is often speculated if Riyadh wishes to acquire nuclear weapons it may possibly buy one from Islamabad. In 'Pakistan-Saudi Arabia relations ...', Gawdat Bahgat rejects such speculations. Bahgat argues that Pakistan's nuclear assets are for deterring India, and Islamabad is unlikely to transfer nuclear technologies for money (199).

The book concludes with an optimistic note on the safety of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. In 'The Nuclear Question ...', Shaista Tabassum rejects Indian and western concerns that a military mutiny or blackmail by senior Army officers may compromise the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Tabassum contends that Islamabad has a strong command and control system, which certainly enhances the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence (245). One has to note that this is an assessment backed by Pakistani nationalism, which may fail to convince the Indian and US policy-makers.

In summary, students and researchers of international relations (IR) will find this book interesting for two reasons: methodological rigour and theoretical clarity. The use of historicist methodology allows a lucid analysis of Pakistan's external relations from the Cold War to the post-9/11 era. It is interesting to note that historic data are used to analyse both within-country and cross-country comparisons, which is a standard practice in social science research. In addition, the book employs neo-classical realist theory of IR, which examines how international systemic pressures are channelled through domestic political processes to shape Pakistan's foreign and security policy decisions. Foreign policy practitioners will certainly benefit from the book's analysis of Pakistan's strategic priorities in the broader regional and global contexts.

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Globalization and economic nationalism in Asia, edited by Anthony P. D'Costa, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, 288 pp., ISBN 978-0-19-964621-0

Arguing against the viewpoint that globalization is coterminous with the retreat of the nation-state, this volume of essays marshals strong evidence to support its claim that governments are just as interventionist in the economic domain today as in prior periods of autarky. Anthony P. D'Costa outlines the central argument of the book in Chapter 1, 'Capitalism and economic nationalism...', noting that although Asian governments might have renounced orthodox forms of protectionism and socialism, they nonetheless 'protect and promote national economic interests' by safeguarding wages and championing particular national industries (3). Economic nationalism today is both nuanced and inventive. Because globalization constrains state capacity to regulate capital, yet affords governments

fresh opportunities to induce export-led growth, it facilitates a style of neo-mercantilism in which the state sponsors certain industries and these industries, in turn, support the state.

Surajit Mazumdar explores this argument in the context of India in Chapter 3, 'Big business and economic nationalism in India.' At first glance, India's 1991 economic reforms appear as a decisive break that tore asunder linkages between the state and industrial vested interests. Mazumdar argues, however, that the capitalist class was a staunch supporter of government policies both before and after the onset of liberalization. Whereas influential corporate actors had previously benefitted from industrial protectionism under the License Raj, their interests were no longer tied to the protected manufacturing sectors on the eve of liberalization. Big business had diversified into new sectors such as automobiles, chemicals, and consumer electronics that were poised to benefit from the newer technologies, markets, and source materials promised by the global economy.

Mazumdar provides an essential correction to conventional accounts that highlight the role of institutions and bureaucracies in exogenously jumpstarting economic liberalization. This focus on the 'mutually reinforcing, two-sided process' (76) between the state and big business also provides a useful lens to evaluate more recent developments, such as the development of the services sector in India. Government policies such as foreign investment caps and restricted licensing, for instance, helped domestic firms retain a competitive advantage while concurrently forging joint ventures with foreign firms. In the information technology sector, moreover, state-sponsored software technology parks, infrastructure support, and tax holidays provided crucial support for domestic firms. These business actors, in turn, supported the state and its policies of economic nationalism.

This chapter proposes an innovative and intuitive theoretical framework of corporate–state relations in India, yet creates some ambiguity because it does not advance a precise definition of the state. Are the linkages between firms and state policy outcomes underpinned by political parties or government bureaucrats? The answer to this question is important for evaluating both the theory and empirical evidence. A focus on political parties might suggest an electoral logic to the argument, with certain parties cultivating the support of certain types of corporate constituencies; by contrast, a focus on government bureaucrats might point to the role of special interests, lobbying, and quid pro quo connections between firms and state regulators that cut across partisan boundaries. Without knowing which logic applies, it is difficult to interpret the empirical evidence of business–state linkages. The differences between the federal government and different state governments are also potentially important for the argument. The nexus between the state and the software sector, for example, is specific to a certain subset of regions in India; this suggests that the local political factors that made some states early movers in attracting investment are also important explanatory variables that predict corporate–state linkages.

Perhaps the most exciting part of this book is that it lays the foundations of a research agenda to explore extensions such as those outlined above. Demonstrating that economic nationalism in Asia is just as robust today as in prior periods is the book's primary objective – one that it achieves with clarity and rigour. Future studies can advance this argument by explicating the specific mechanisms by which firms and governments jointly shape contemporary economic policy environments in countries such as India.

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