Overcoming the Political Exclusion of Migrants: Theory and Experimental Evidence from India

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ONLINE APPENDIX

Note: All references to "Supplementary Information" ("SI") relate to the document, supplementary-information.pdf available at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/G1JCKK

Online Appendix

Contents

A Voter turnout rates among naturalized immigrants versus native-born citizens globally

Table A1: Average voter turnout rates by natives versus naturalized immigrants, according to the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (2010-14). Turnout percentages are calculated using data from all countries where responses to two questions were gathered: "Respondent immigrant?" (1 = yes; 0 = no), and "Vote in elections?" (1 = always/usually; 0 otherwise). Included countries are: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Belarus, Chile, Taiwan, Colombia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Haiti, India, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Jordan, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Egypt, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

Native turnout percent	Naturalized immigrant turnout percent
81.82	71.1

B Indian Human Development Survey-II analysis

In this section we characterize India's migrant population using nationally representative survey data. We do this to shed light on the political behaviors of migrants versus non-migrants, and to assess the extent to which our sample conforms to—or deviates from—the demographic traits of the country's migrant population at large.

Our primary resource for conducting these analyses is the second round of the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS-II). To our knowledge, IHDS-II is unique among nationally representative surveys in posing both detailed questions about respondents' migration history and asking a battery of questions about political participation. Table SI3 gives a full roster of the IHDS-II variables used in the subsequent analyses and notes the manner in which they were recoded, where appropriate.

Note, in what follows, we decompose the IHDS-II sample into rural and urban areas for the purposes of most analysis (according to the primary sampling unit's designation given in the 2011 Census of India). This is based on the presumption that rural areas are overwhelmingly migrant-*sending* regions whereas urban areas are largely migrant-*receiving* regions. In rural areas, we examine differences between households that did and did not report having had a member who engaged in seasonal migration during the past five years (a question directly posed on the survey). In urban areas, defining who is a migrant is more complex. Respondents were asked about the migration history of their "families" and when their family first came to their current town or city of residence. We class as internal migrants those reporting that their families arrived from a different Indian district or state within the past 10 years.

B.1 Political participation

Turning to the substantive analysis, we first investigate whether migrants and migrant-sending households participate less in politics than non-migrants. We generate a Political Engagement Index, which sums whether (a) the household respondent reported being a member of a political party, (b) a member of the village panchayat (in rural areas) or ward committee (in urban areas), and (c) whether they reported having attended a panchayat or ward committee meeting within the last year.

For both urban (Table A2) and rural (Table A3) samples, we find strong evidence that migrants and migrant-sending households, respectively, are less likely to be politically engaged than households not involved in migration.

In Table A4, we demonstrate in the pooled (rural and urban) data that the migrant/non-migrant participation gap persists after controlling for households' religious affiliation.

While IHDS-II does not ask directly about voting, this analysis significantly adds to the body of evidence suggesting that India's internal migrants are politically disempowered.

Table A2: [Exploratory] Are migrant households less politically engaged than non-migrant households in urban areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:			
	Political Engagement Index	Political Party Member	Ward Committee Member	Attended Ward Committee Meeting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant	−0.039***	−0.035***	−0.007	−0.077***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.017)
Constant	0.073***	0.042***	0.022***	0.154***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Observations	14,500	14,546	14,504	14,516
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.0005	−0.00003	0.001

<div align="right">*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01</div>

Table A3: [Exploratory] Are migrant-sending households less politically engaged than non-migrant-sending households in rural areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:			
	Political Engagement Index	Political Party Member	Panchayat Member	Attended Panchayat Meeting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant-sending household	−0.010**	−0.013***	−0.015***	−0.002
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.010)
Constant	0.153***	0.037***	0.052***	0.370***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Observations	26,936	27,040	26,948	26,989
Adjusted R^2	0.0001	0.0004	0.0003	−0.00004

<div align="right">*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01</div>

Table A4: [Exploratory] Are migrant and migrant-sending households less politically engaged than non-migrant households after controlling for religion? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Urban and rural samples are pooled. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:
	Political Engagement Index
Migrant/migrant-sending household	−0.013***
	(0.004)
Muslim	−0.020***
	(0.003)
Urban	−0.080***
	(0.002)
Constant	0.156***
	(0.001)
Observations	41,436
Adjusted R^2	0.038

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.2 Politician attachments and receipt of government benefits

We next turn to evaluate the extent to which migrants (in urban areas) and migrant-sending households (in rural areas) are embedded in networks of clientelistic exchange operated by local politicians. To be sure, measuring quid pro quo transactions of material benefits for votes is challenging. To understand how likely it is that households are involved in such transactions, we make use of two sets of questions put to respondents in the IHDS-II survey instrument: acquaintance with local politicians, and income received from government schemes. Our reasoning is that households who are not acquainted with local politicians are unlikely to be able to access state benefits via clientelistic mechanisms, and, from another angle, that those not receiving substantial income from government schemes are unlikely to be involved in a substantial votes-for-benefits exchange relationship with local politicians, who have significant sway over how state resources are allocated. The Acquaintance Index is the average of the four component binary acquaintance measures.

In Tables A5 we observe that migrants in urban India are similarly acquainted with local politicians as are non-migrants, while Table A6 demonstrates that urban migrants are significantly less likely to receive income from state-run schemes.

Table A5: [Exploratory] Are migrant households less connected to politicians than non-migrant households in urban areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:				
	Acquaintance Index	Acquaintance: Politician in Community	Acquaintance: Politician Outside Community	Acquaintance: Party Worker in Community	Acquaintance: Party Worker Outside Community
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Migrant	0.0005	0.001	0.004	0.004	−0.008
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Constant	0.118***	0.068***	0.145***	0.104***	0.158***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	14,458	14,533	14,496	14,509	14,470
Adjusted R^2	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0001

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A6: [Exploratory] Do migrant households receive less income from government schemes than non-migrant households in urban areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:
	Winsorized Benefits Income
Migrant	−272.713***
	(80.823)
Constant	659.872***
	(13.059)
Observations	14,572
Adjusted R^2	0.0005

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Looking at the rural sample, Table A7 shows that migrant-sending households are substantially less likely to have connections with local politicians by comparison with other households. They also receive somewhat less in income from government schemes (see Table A8).

Table A7: [Exploratory] Are migrant-sending households less connected to politicians than non-migrant-sending households in rural areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:				
	Acquaintance Index	Acquaintance: Politician in Community	Acquaintance: Politician Outside Community	Acquaintance: Party Worker in Community	Acquaintance: Party Worker Outside Community
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Migrant-sending household	-0.034^{***}	-0.024^{***}	-0.043^{***}	-0.020^{***}	-0.046^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Constant	0.093^{***}	0.066^{***}	0.127^{***}	0.063^{***}	0.115^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	26,924	27,026	26,965	26,996	26,931
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002

$^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table A8: [Exploratory] Do migrant-sending households receive less income from government schemes than non-migrant-sending households in rural areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:
	Winsorized Benefits Income
Migrant-sending household	-60.649^*
	(34.996)
Constant	$1,048.111^{***}$
	(11.611)
Observations	27,080
Adjusted R^2	0.0001

$^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

B.3 Confidence in political institutions

IHDS-II respondents were asked about their confidence in various political institutions. We see that migrant households in urban areas (Table A9) and migrant-sending households in rural areas (Table A10) express less confidence in major political institutions than households not involved in migration. In what follows, the Confidence Index is the average of the three component confidence measures.

Table A9: [Exploratory] Do migrant households express less confidence in political institutions than non-migrant households in urban areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:			
	Confidence Index	Confidence: Ward Committees	Confidence: Politicians	Confidence: State Government
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant	−0.034**	−0.122***	−0.016	−0.069
	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.044)
Constant	0.447***	1.046***	0.577***	1.061***
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Observations	14,467	14,517	14,536	14,482
Adjusted R^2	0.0003	0.001	−0.0001	0.0001

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A10: [Exploratory] Do migrant-sending households express less confidence in political institutions than non-migrant-sending households in rural areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:			
	Confidence Index	Confidence: Panchayats	Confidence: Politicians	Confidence: State Government
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant-sending household	−0.008	−0.038**	−0.031**	0.021
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Constant	0.470***	1.112***	0.604***	1.103***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Observations	26,942	27,009	27,027	26,968
Adjusted R^2	0.00004	0.0002	0.0001	0.00003

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.4 Urban versus rural political participation

Might migrants' low participation in cities be a consequence of socialization in rural areas, where participation is lower than in cities? As discussed in the main text, aggregate studies of turnout in India have consistently documented that voter turnout is higher in rural areas. Here, we assess whether this pattern is maintained for the broader metric of political participation in the IHDS-II data, and after controlling for salient demographic attributes that might also impact turnout.

Table A11 presents this analysis. Consistent with expectations, there is clear evidence that political engagement is substantially lower in urban areas. Moreover, this pattern persists after controlling for religion, caste, and household wealth (as captured in the IHDS-II asset index).

Table A11: [Exploratory] Is political participation lower in urban areas than in rural areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:	
	Political Engagement Index	
	(1)	(2)
Urban	-0.080^{***}	-0.104^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Muslim		-0.011^{***}
		(0.003)
SC/ST		0.012^{***}
		(0.002)
Asset Index		0.004^{***}
		(0.0002)
Constant	0.152^{***}	0.095^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.003)
Observations	41,934	41,924
Adjusted R^2	0.036	0.050

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.5   Documentation

In order to register to vote, applicants must submit personal identification and proof of residency documentation. Are migrants and migrant-sending households less likely to possess such documents? The IHDS-II survey asks detailed questions about documentation among household members, enabling us to test whether documentation rates fall short among households not engaged in migration. Tables A12 and A13 unearth clear evidence of a lag, among migrants in urban areas and migrant-sending households in rural areas respectively. Lack of access to documentation steepens the challenge of going through the bureaucratic registration process for migrants, in line with the paper's central finding.

Table A12: [Exploratory] Are migrant households less likely to possess documents than non-migrant households in urban areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:	
	Has Proof of Residence	Has Photo ID
	(1)	(2)
Migrant	-0.196^{***}	-0.131^{***}
	(0.029)	(0.022)
Constant	0.866^{***}	0.989^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.001)
Observations	14,508	14,515
Adjusted R^2	0.006	0.023

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A13: [Exploratory] Are migrant-sending households less likely to possess documents than non-migrant-sending households in rural areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:	
	Has Proof of Residence	Has Photo ID
	(1)	(2)
Migrant-sending household	-0.180^{***}	-0.014
	(0.027)	(0.009)
Constant	0.868^{***}	0.987^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.001)
Observations	14,280	14,287
Adjusted R^2	0.006	0.0002

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.6 Demographic profile

Finally, we examine the profile of the overall population of households involved in migration compared to households not engaged in migration (either in destination urban areas, as recent migrant households, or in rural sending regions, as migrant-sending households). We find that migrant-engaged households have a similar religious demography to non-migrant households, with comparable shares of Muslims in both groups. Households engaged in migration, however, are more likely to belong to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes and have fewer household assets, on average.

Table A14: [Exploratory] Do migrant- and migrant-sending households differ according to socio-economic status compared to households not engaged in migration? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Urban and rural samples are pooled. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:		
	Muslim	SC/ST	Asset Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Migrant/migrant-sending household	0.005	0.092^{***}	-2.784^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.104)
Urban	0.061^{***}	-0.119^{***}	6.447^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.059)
Constant	0.095^{***}	0.334^{***}	13.387^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.039)
Observations	41,651	41,652	41,629
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.019	0.238

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C T1 further information

C.1 Official forms

Figure A1: Election Commission of India, Form 6.

ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
FORM-7

(See Rules 13(2) and 26) of Registration of Electors Rule-1960

Acknowledgement No._____
(To be filled by office)

Application for Objecting Inclusion of Name of Other Person / Seeking Deletion of Own Name/Seeking Deletion of Any Other Person's Name in Electoral Roll due to Death/Shifting.

To, The Electoral Registration Officer, ...Assembly / Parliamentary Constituency

I hereby object to the proposed inclusion of the name of the under mentioned person in the electoral roll ☐

I hereby request that entry relating to name of the person mentioned below is required to be deleted ☐

I request that the entry relating to myself is to be deleted from Electoral Roll ☐

Particulars in support of my objection/deletion are given below:-

Particulars of the applicant

(a) Name

(b) Surname(if any)

(c) Part No. ☐☐☐ (d) Serial No. ☐☐☐☐

(e) EPIC No. (If issued)

Details of person inclusion of whose name is objected to/whose entry is to be deleted:

(a)Name

(b)Surname(if any)

(c) Part No. ☐☐☐ (d)Serial No. ☐☐☐☐

(e)EPIC No.(If issued)

(f) Reason(s) for objection/deletion:

Declaration *I hereby declare that the facts and particulars mentioned above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I am aware that making a statement or declaration which is false and which I know or believe to be false or do not believe to be true, is punishable under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950).*

Place.............................

Date.............................   Signature of Applicant..

Remarks of Field Level Verifying Officer:

Details of action taken
(To be filled by Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency)

The application of Shri / Shrimati/ Kumari ....objecting to inclusion/

seeking deletion of name of Shri / Shrimati/ Kumari .... in the electoral roll in Form 7 has been acepted/rejected.

Detailed reasons for acceptance [under or in pursuance of rule 18/20/26(4)] or rejection [under or in pursuance of rule 17/20/26(4)] are given below:

Place:

Date: Signature of ERO   Seal of the ERO

Intimation of decision taken (to be filled by Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency and to be posted to the applicant on the address available in the record)

The application in Form 7 of Shri/Shrimati/Kumari...

Current address where applicant is ordinarily resident		House No.		Postage Stamp to be affixed by the Electoral Registration Authority at the time of dispatch
Street/Area/Locality				
Town/Village				
Post Office		Pin Code ☐☐☐☐☐☐		
District			State/UT	

Has been (a) accepted and the name of Shri/Shrimati/Kumari..has been

deleted from... Part No.................................... of AC No..

(b) rejected for the reason...

Date: Electoral Registration Officer

Address..

Acknowledgement/Receipt

Acknowledgement Number _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   Date _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Received the application in form 7 of Shri / Smt. / Ms. _____ [
Applicant can refer the Acknowledgement No. to check the status of application].

Name/Signature of ERO/AERO/BLO

Figure A2: Election Commission of India, Form 7.

C.2 Implementation of T1 in the field

Figure A3: Photographs of field workers assisting T1-assigned migrants in gathering documents and filling in the forms needed to register to vote locally.

Figure A4: Pictures of the local election offices where applications to register to vote are evaluated and processed.

Figure A5: Successful applicants hold up their newly minted voter ID cards, enabling them to vote locally.

D Political parties and migrant outreach

Are political parties in our study cities less likely to engage with migrants than with long-term city residents in typical elections? To address this question, we obtained proprietary data from the Centre for Developing Societies (CSDS), which conducted a representative poll of Delhi citizens following the 2015 state assembly elections there. The survey was unique in that it elicited detailed information about interactions with party workers in the lead-up to the election, broken down by political party. Specifically, the survey instrument asked: "Did any candidate, party worker or canvasser come to your house during the campaign to ask for your vote?" If the respondent answered in the affirmative, they were then asked, "Candidates or workers of which party came to you?" (they were able to list up to two parties). Respondents were additionally asked, "For how many years have you been living in Delhi?" with four response options provided. We employ the definition of recent migrants employed in Banerjee and Kumar (2017): those who have been living in Delhi for less than ten years.

We run a simple analysis to estimate whether migrants were less likely to be visited by party canvassers compared to longer-term residents (see Table A15). We find strong evidence that this is what occurred. Migrants were 14 percentage points less likely to be visited by a party worker of any stripe—a difference that is qualitatively large and statistically significant. We also examine differences in visits by the various parties. The effects are negatively signed for visits by canvassers from all the major parties, but are largest and statistically significant for those campaigning on behalf of the BJP.

These results lend credence to the claim that political parties are less likely to engage in outreach to migrant citizens, plausibly on account of their greater uncertainty about migrants' political preferences.

Table A15: Canvassing visits to recent migrants versus long-term city residents in Delhi during the 2015 Delhi state assembly elections. Survey data were obtained from the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies and are described at: bit.ly/3nCrACa. Bivariate OLS analysis with robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:			
	Party Canvasser Visited	AAP Canvasser	BJP Canvasser	INC Canvasser
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant	-0.136^{***}	-0.066	-0.089^{**}	-0.038
	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.033)
Constant	0.632^{***}	0.412^{***}	0.443^{***}	0.187^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Observations	1,994	2,060	2,060	2,060
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.0001

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

E T2 further information

Address: ████████████████████████████

Dear ███████████,

Our NGO, ████████████████, along with ████████████████, has been working hard over the past year to help migrants in parts of your constituency to become politically empowered. In particular, in the run up to the Lok Sabha elections, we have been running a voter registration drive in the city, helping thousands of migrants from other parts of India to register to vote here for the first time. This will allow them to participate fully in the upcoming elections in this city. Below we show a list and a map of the polling booth areas where we've been working to help migrants register. We're sending this letter to all candidates standing in the forthcoming election in this constituency, as well as to sitting MPs, MLAs, and municipal corporators in this area. We hope these newly empowered migrant citizens will exercise their democratic right to vote here. We wanted to let you know that these citizens are now registered to vote in your constituency! Warm regards, ████████████████████

हमारा एन जी ओ, ████████████████████ पिछले एक साल से कड़ी मेहनत कर रहा है ताकि आपके निर्वाचन क्षेत्र में भारत के विभिन्न स्थानों/ प्रदेशों से आये हुए व्यक्तियों को राजनीतिक रूप से सशक्त बनने में मदद मिल सके। विशेष रूप से, लोकसभा चुनावों में, हम शहर में मतदाता पंजीकरण अभियान चला रहे हैं, जिससे भारत के अन्य हिस्सों से आये हुए हजारों व्यक्तियों को पहली बार यहां मतदान करने के लिए पंजीकरण करने में मदद मिली है। यह उन्हें इस शहर में आगामी चुनावों में पूरी तरह से भाग लेने की अनुमति देगा। नीचे हम एक सूची और मतदान केंद्र के क्षेत्रों का एक नक्शा दिखाते हैं जहाँ हम ऐसे व्यक्तियों को पंजीकरण करवाने में सहायता प्रदान कर रहे हैं। हम इस निर्वाचन क्षेत्र में आगामी चुनाव में खड़े होने वाले सभी उम्मीदवारों, साथ ही साथ इस क्षेत्र में बैठे सांसदों, विधायकों और नगर निगम के पार्षदों को यह पत्र भेज रहे हैं। हम आपको सुचित करना चाहते हैं कि ये नागरिक अब आपके निर्वाचन क्षेत्र में मतदान करने के लिए पंजीकृत हैं एवं हमें पूर्ण विश्वास है कि ये नागरिक मतदान के अपने लोकतांत्रिक अधिकार का प्रयोग करेंगे। ████████████████

Polling booth names (English):

- ████████████████████████

Polling booth names (Hindi):

- ████████████████

Figure A6: Example of typed letter mailed to local politicians in the lead up to the 2019 elections in T2 treated clusters. For confidentiality, identifying content is redacted and the referenced map is omitted.

Figure A7: Example of email sent to local politicians in the lead up to the 2019 elections in T2 treated clusters. For confidentiality, identifying content is redacted and the referenced map is omitted.

Figure A8: Example of WhatsApp message sent to local politicians in the lead up to the 2019 elections in T2 treated clusters. For confidentiality, identifying content is redacted.

Figure A9: Flow diagram of T2 randomization blocks. Clusters (polling stations) are assigned to T2 treatment or control within four blocks.

F   Study timeline

Figure A10: Study phasing. Red and green bars show the timing of the surveys. Blue bars show the timing of final voter registration application decisions, as reported in online administrative data.

G Indexing

Table A16: Index construction. Z-score indexes are constructed by coding component variables such that higher values are more beneficial. Component variables are then centered and standardized using the control group mean. The final index is then the average of the standardized components.

Variable type	Indexed variable label	Component variable labels	Method of indexing
Outcome	Political interest	Interest in politics at the city level (ordinal); Interest in politics at the national level (ordinal)	Z-score index
Outcome	Political trust	Trust in national government (ordinal); Trust in state government (ordinal); Trust in municipal corporation (ordinal); Trust in parties (ordinal)	Z-score index
Outcome	Contacting city officials	Contacting officials (categorical)	Sum
Outcome	Non-electoral participation	Non-electoral participation (categorical)	Sum
Outcome	Campaign exposure	Basti visits by politicians (integer); Home visit by politician or party worker (integer); Number of gifts (integer); Migrant-focused campaigning (binary); Perceived campaign intensity (ordinal)	Z-score index
Lagged DV	Political trust	Trust in national government (ordinal); Trust in state government (ordinal); Trust in municipal corporation (ordinal)	Z-score index
Lagged DV	Politician visits	Politician visits to basti, by municipal corporator, MLA, and MP	Sum

H Outliers in 'income' covariate

When cleaning the data we observed several extreme outliers in the `income` covariate. To minimize the influence of these extreme values, we winsorize the variable, setting all values above the value of the 99th percentile to the value of the 99th percentile itself. The transformed variable is used in all statistical analyses.


Figure A11: Box plots show the distribution of the raw income covariate before and after winsorizing.

I Internal validity

I.1 Balance

Table A17: T1 balance test for subjects included in T1 analyses. OLS regression. All covariates are measured at baseline. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:
	T1 treatment indicator
Female	0.016 (0.025)
Age	−0.001 (0.001)
Muslim	0.017 (0.028)
SC/ST	0.001 (0.025)
Primary education	−0.010 (0.026)
Income (INR 000s)	0.002 (0.002)
Married	−0.038 (0.029)
Length of residence in city	0.002* (0.001)
Owns home in city	0.058** (0.025)
Hadn't voted previously	0.044 (0.041)
How likely to vote in city if registered	−0.010 (0.060)
Political interest	−0.040 (0.041)
Sense of political efficacy	−0.031 (0.031)
Political trust index	0.004 (0.015)
Shared meal with non-coethnic	−0.012 (0.034)
Has hometown voter ID	0.013 (0.037)
Returned to vote in hometown	0.047 (0.042)
More at home in hometown	0.013 (0.034)
Straight-line distance to home district	0.00002 (0.00003)
Still receives hometown schemes	−0.006 (0.024)
Owns hometown property	0.001 (0.026)
Pr(>F) of H0: joint orthogonality	0.408
Observations	2,120
Adjusted R^2	0.0004

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A18: T2 balance test for subjects included in T2 analyses. Weighted least squares regression. Clusters weighted equally. Model includes block fixed effects. All covariates are measured at baseline. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:
	T2 treatment indicator
Politician visits	-0.008 (0.035)
Female	0.018 (0.039)
Age	0.001 (0.002)
Muslim	0.121 (0.078)
SC/ST	0.003 (0.056)
Primary education	0.001 (0.042)
Income (INR 000s)	0.011^{**} (0.004)
Married	0.007 (0.049)
Length of residence in city	0.002 (0.002)
Owns home in city	0.004 (0.058)
$\Pr(>F)$ of H0: joint orthogonality	0.406
No. of clusters	87
Observations	1,969
Adjusted R^2	0.017

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

I.2 Attrition rates by treatment condition

Table A19: Comparison of attrition rates across T1 treatment arms using OLS regression. The analysis includes all subjects randomized to T1 treatment or control. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:
	Attrition Indicator
Assigned to T1 treatment	−0.007 (0.011)
Observations	2,306
Adjusted R^2	−0.0003

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A20: Comparison of attrition rates across T2 treatment arms using weighted least squares regression. Clusters are weighted equally. Models include block fixed effects. The analysis includes all subjects randomized to T2 treatment or control. (Note that this number is smaller than that for the T1 attrition analysis as baseline geo-coordinates were unavailable for some subjects; hence they were not assigned to clusters or randomized.) Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Dependent variable:
	Attrition Indicator
Assigned to T2 treatment	−0.021 (0.021)
No. of clusters	87
Observations	2,131
Adjusted R^2	0.003

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

J   Administrative data on T1 application processing

Because our field team helped applicants to submit the voter registration forms online, we were able to track the progress of each submitted case. Specifically, the Election Commission's online portal provides the dates that applications were received and assigned to a Booth Level Officer (BLO). It also gives the final date when the application was either accepted or rejected. (No reasons are given for rejection.) In Figure A12, we present histograms of the time lapse for each of these various stages, as well as the median times.

Figure A12: This figure displays the distributions of the time elapsed between the application submission dates and various stages in the application processing, as reported in the online portal of the Election Commission of India. The sample is for experimental subjects assigned to T1 who submitted applications. Red vertical lines display the median value. Note, cases that took longer than 200 days to process are excluded.

K   Deviations from pre-analysis plan

The study pre-analysis plan (PAP) was filed at the Evidence in Governance and Politics registry before the researchers accessed the endline data and prior to any data analysis being conducted. There were two deviations from the pre-registered plan. First, the observational data analyses described on pp. 6–7 of the PAP were not implemented as there was insufficient variation in the outcome variable of interest (whether eligible subjects wished to acquire a city-based voter ID card) to make these tests feasible. This substantive finding is highlighted in the paper. Second, in the endline data, there were 38 missing values for the variable, `e_campaign5_exposure_hardwork`. This is one of five variables used in the construction of the index variable, `e_campaign_exposure`. For the purposes of constructing this index variable, the 38 missing values of `e_campaign5_exposure_hardwork` were imputed by sampling at random from the non-missing values of that variable within the cluster (polling station) to which the respondent belonged.

All remaining pre-registered experimental analyses in this paper are implemented in conformity with the PAP.

L   Additional ethical considerations

In this section, we detail features of our experimental design and implementation that went above and beyond the minimal requirements needed to secure Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. We note that exceeding IRB requirements has long been advocated by ethicists in the discipline (e.g. Tolleson-Rinehart 2008; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2008; Teele 2014; Fujii 2012), and indeed, we heeded the general principles outlined in existing guidelines when designing our research study. Below, we outline additional ways in which we sought to conduct our study to the highest ethical standards, highlighting several pieces of scholarship that influenced our research design and fieldwork.

First, there is an emerging consensus among political scientists that experiments fielded in the midst of an election should be designed to minimize the possibility of swaying aggregate electoral outcomes (e.g. which candidate or party ultimately wins a seat; see Desposato 2014). The American Political Science Association's "Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research" notes that, "in general, political science researchers should not compromise the integrity of political processes for research purposes without the consent of individuals that are directly engaged by the research process" (13). In an important recent contribution, Slough (2020) develops a formal model that yields the following recommendations for researchers seeking to abide by this principle. These include: keeping the number of experimental subjects—i.e. voters—comparatively small; avoiding races whose margin of victory is expected to be close; fielding experiments in larger districts where single-member simple plurality rules are in force; and crafting interventions that reduce the chances of spillovers (Slough 2020: 32-3). As noted in the main text, our interventions were situated and implemented to make it highly improbable that any overall electoral results would be affected, in line with these proposals.

Second, a number of prominent ethical guidance documents underscore the importance of partnering with local stakeholders. In particular, the American Political Science Association's "Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research" recommends that "researchers should consider the broader social impacts of the research process when deciding whether to engage in the partnership" (13). Humphreys (2015: 89) notes that "the key idea is that if an intervention is ethical for implementing agencies with respect to the ethical standards of their sphere—which may differ from the ethical standards of researchers—then responsibility may be divided between researchers and implementers, with research ethics standards applied to research components and partner standards applied to manipulations." As described in the paper, we partnered with a local NGO that had been working to promote city-based voter registration among urban migrants for several years. This NGO took the lead role in designing and piloting the interventions, engaging with community leaders, offering contextual input on the design of the study, and providing training assistance and materials to help bring the intervention to scale. Training materials, along with field protocols, were reviewed and approved by the researchers to ensure adherence to ethical and scientific best practices. We further relied on the services of a locally-based research firm that had extensive experience working in the cities where the interventions occurred. It is important to emphasize that our NGO partner, as well as a

host of other similar organizations (many of which we consulted in the design of our study), was already conducting similar interventions and would have continued to conduct similar interventions with or without our collaboration. In short, our role as academics in the research partnership was to scientifically evaluate an intervention that was already in existence.

Third, Asiedu et al (2021) call attention to what they term "policy equipoise," based on the clinical principle that "the expert community must not have certainty that any arm in a trial is better therapeutically than any other arm." They note that in settings where there is not uncertainty about which arm will achieve normatively desirable results compared to another arm, randomization of an intervention may still be ethical on certain grounds, such as scarcity of intervention supply. We approached our experimental design with these principles in mind. There was considerable uncertainty regarding the efficacy of both interventions. Additionally, given the resource-intensive nature of the voter registration intervention as well as the budget constraints facing us and our partners, in no sense were we withholding registration resources that would otherwise have been allocated to subjects in the comparison group.

Fourth, we were closely attuned to the treatment of our field teams as well as the imperative to engage in "knowledge transfers" to local populations (cf. Teele 2014). Based on extensive scoping and piloting, we established that the communities where we were working were substantially safe environments in which to carry out research, entailing no appreciable risk to field workers. On knowledge and skills transfers, we were able to enlist the support of research assistance from graduate students at a local university; the students used fieldwork on the project to fulfill one of the requirements for their masters degree program. Field teams were overseen by a professional project manager and compensated at standard local rates for such fieldwork.

Finally, our research was designed to be policy-relevant. Highlighting the growing policy impact of much social scientific work, Tolleson-Rinehart (2008: 507-8) notes that "how the knowledge of such improvements can be shared . . . is increasingly urgent." To boost the overall benefits of experimental research, the broad and proactive dissemination of research findings is critical. For example, Cronin-Furman and Lake (2018: 612) encourage researchers to ask: "Have you made a plan to ensure that your research results are disseminated back to the affected community in ways that are meaningful or valuable to them?" In keeping with this recommendation, we will publicize the results of our study to a wide policy audience— including NGO actors working on migrant advocacy, in addition to bureaucrats at the front lines of electoral administration, for whom our study may hold lessons.

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