Appendix A1. Political Economy Gender Gap around the World

	Men - Women	Standard Error	Scope	Source
Political Participation				
How interested would you say you personally are in politics?	0.35	(0.01)***	World	ISSP '06
"	0.42	(0.05)***	India	NES
I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country	0.35	(0.01)***	World	ISSP '06
How much did you talk about the election	0.34	(0.04)***	India	NES
Did you attend election meetings	0.56	(0.06)***	India	NES
Did you work in the campaign	0.12	(0.02)***	India	NES
People like me don't have any say about what the government does.†	-0.08	(0.01)***	World	ISSP '06
Political Economy Preferences				
On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to ...				
Tax the rich and subsidize the poor	-0.08	(0.02)***	World	WVS
"	-0.15	(0.09)*	India	WVS
Reduce income differences between the rich and the poor	-0.10	(0.01)***	World	ISSP '06
Provide a job for everyone who wants one	-0.14	(0.01)***	World	ISSP '06
Reduce the working week to create more jobs	-0.17	(0.01)***	World	ISSP '06
Ensure that everyone is provided for	-0.10	(0.02)***	World	WVS
"	-0.27	(0.08)***	India	WVS
Would you like to see more or less government spending in the following areas? More spending might require a tax increase.				
Health	-0.09	(0.01)***	World	ISSP '06
Old age pensions	-0.11	(0.01)***	World	ISSP '06
Unemployment benefits	-0.12	(0.01)***	World	ISSP '06
Household Decision Making				
To what extent do you agree or disagree?				
Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income.†	-0.14	(0.01)***	World	ISSP '12
"	-0.17	(0.06)***	India	ISSP '12
If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems	0.06	(0.01)***	World	WVS
"	0.07	(0.02)***	India	WVS

Note: Data drawn from International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) Role of Government (2006) and Family and Changing Gender Roles (2012) surveys; World Values Survey's (WVS) Wave 6 (2010--2014) survey; and Indian National Election Study's (NES) survey (1985). Differences in means (men minus women) reported for each survey question. $For^{\dagger}$, Figure 1 frames these questions in reverse. For Participation, men's lower disagreement that "People like me don't have any say…" is visualized in Figure 1 as higher agreement that "People like me *do* have any say…" Regarding Decision Making, men's greater disagreement that "Both the man and woman should contribute…" is shown in Figure 1 as higher agreement that "Women should not…" Standard errors for two-tailed t-tests in parentheses: *p<0.10; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A2. Additional Details about Meghalaya's Matrilineal and Patrilineal Tribes

Difference between Matrilineal Culture and Matriarchy

Whereas a matriarchal system is based on the possession of primary public or political power by women, with the exclusion of men, a matrilineal system allocates *private entitlements to inherit wealth only,* such that male members of the descent group often possess private power, and indeed often retain all public (political) power. In fact, Schneider and Gough (1961) argue that matrilineal and patrilineal systems are both patriarchal in the sense that "roles of men and women are identically defined in both groups, men having authoritative roles and women having responsibility for child care." The key difference between the two groups is that, although the lines of authority run through men, rules of succession vary. These run through women in matrilineal systems, and men in patrilineal socieities.

The Khasi society is not in a matriarchal society. As Bareh (1967) notes, "Khasi society is matrilineal not matriarchal since in the Khasi Jaintia Hills, the women had no right to participate in the acts of legislation, administration and judiciary." The original Khasi system also "placed restriction on the movement of women, they could not attend Durbars [traditional local assemblies, typically of elders, organized to resolve disputes and distribute common goods within the community], participate in political affairs, legislate or initiate acts of administration. Yet they had a greater hand in domestic and household affairs for they took personal care of the young ones, looked after the hearth and kitchen, locked up and set free the cattle and sheep, helped men in raising crops and vegetables, in undertaking cultivation" (Bareh, 1967: 339).

The relationship between matriliny and patriarchy among the Khasi is perceived to be mutually reinforcing by some observers. For instance, Syiem (1998) notes, "the presence and authority of maternal uncle as a major decision-maker in the affairs of the clan (kur) excludes the notion that Khasi society is a matriarchy… Male domination can be seen in various areas of Khasi social life particularly in matters of state and village administration. With few exceptions, political administration has been an exclusive male prerogative."

Origins of Meghalaya's Patrilineal and Matrilineal Tribes

Here, we start by summarizing findings from anthropology and history regarding the general advent of patrilineal kinship structures in various parts of the world, and then explain how these help us understand the case of matrilineal and patrilineal tribes' coexistence in Meghalaya.

Prior to the Neolithic Revolution, descent lines and locality norms were fluid and descent was often bilateral, that is traced through both parents (Marlowe 2000). A confluence of social norms, abundant natural resources, and the amassing of small-scale, short-term stocks of food via hunting and gathering or horticulture-based subsistence encouraged communities to share resources unbounded by concerns about fathers' investment in their children (Lerner 1986, Marlowe 2000). Under these conditions, polyamory was common, with women taking multiple sexual partners, in part serving the purpose of maximizing children's genetic fitness (Marlowe 2000, Hartung 1985). High levels of paternity uncertainty resulted from these arrangements (Ibid). Given uncertainty about a child's father, it was optimal for communities to trace descent via the female line. This supported development of matrilineal societies (Hartung 1985).

According to Claude Meillassoux, the subjugation of women and the foundations of patrilineal descent began with the "exchange of women," which occurred prior to the development of private property (Meillassoux 1972). In hunter-gatherer and horticultural societies, group survival demanded demographic equality of men and women (Lerner 1986). However, women were biologically more vulnerable due to risk of death at childbirth, which led tribes to procure more women at times when ecological shocks

threatened the survival of the group (Lerner 1986). In effect, raids of women from outside tribes made women the first form of private property (Meillassoux 1972). Women who had been stolen from their own tribe were protected by the new tribe, but as less-than-fully-equal participants to the new tribe.

The advent of agriculture further solidified women's subjugation and forced their attachment to a new kin group as secondary citizens. In particular, labor-intensive agriculture increased the importance of women's ability to bear children, who were used instrumentally as economic assets. Given the inferior status of women "stolen" from other tribes, groups engaging in agriculture further sought to control and acquire women's reproductive capacity. Thus, the agricultural revolution intensified the trade in women across relevant tribes. Consequently, new cultural practices developed, including taboos around intra-lineage marriage as incest, patrilocal marriage norms, and enforced restrictions on women's sexuality (Lerner 1986). Overall, as tribes enforced increased control over women's bodies, they also gained higher levels of certainty over paternity, which facilitated the shift from matrilineal or bilateral descent groups to patrilineal lineage and property inheritance.

Danish anthropologist Peter Aaby adds a caveat to Meillassoux's theory by emphasizing that under favorable ecological conditions, it is possible to maintain a demographic balance of men and women and associated practices of matriliny (Aaby 1977). Ecological shocks can, however, disrupt these conditions and trigger tribal decisions to adopt patrilineal practices and norms.

Turning to Meghalaya's matrilineal and patrilineal tribes, it is thus possible that exposure to different ecological shocks at the sites where patrilineal tribes originated initiated the shift to norms prescribing patrilineal descent. In contrast, matrilineal tribes were likely not subject to similar shocks in their original locales. If so, this may explain why we observe divergent patterns of matrilineal and patrilineal inheritance practices in Meghalaya today (Hartung 1985).

Does the presence—versus absence—of ecological shocks provide a plausible explanation for Meghalaya's variation? While existing evidence is sparse, sources suggest the answer is yes. Patrilineal tribes in the state, exemplified by the Mizos, migrated from Burma in the tenth century C.E. and lived in a nomadic arrangement for centuries (Singh 2010: 804). They eventually settled in the Lushai Hills, south of Meghalaya in the seventeenth century (Dikshit and Dikshit 2011).

The precise origin of Meghalaya's two main matrilineal groups, the Khasis and Jaintias is debated, but recent genetic evidence places their first location in Central India (Reddy et al. 2007). When the Khasis arrived is uncertain. It is unlikely that they were Meghalaya's original inhabitants. However, scholars estimate they probably arrived earlier than both the Mizos and the Indo-Aryan population of Assam. The later group's entry is considered to have occurred in roughly the fourth century C.E. (Dikshit and Dikshit 2011: 277). Following their arrival in Meghalaya, the Khasis remained in the region's plateau areas. No records exist to indicate that these tribes previously performed other forms of kinship or that matriliny was adopted in response to economic imperatives. Instead, matriliny is generally assumed to be a longstanding cultural feature of these tribes (Bareh 1967).

Similar to the Mizos, the Khasis have traditionally practiced shifting cultivation in addition to horticulture, alongside growing wet paddy (Dikshit and Dikshit 2011: 360). Remarkably, large-scale agriculture never completely developed on Meghalaya's plateau lands (Dikshit and Dikshit 2011: 196; Lerner 1986: 30; Scott 2009: 50). Meghalaya's mountainous terrain has contributed to the relative isolation of numerous, distinct tribal communities. Rather than differing economic production systems driving divergent kinship norms, the region's rugged geographic terrain has likely facilitated the preservation Khasi's matrilineal cultural characteristics despite the increasing integration of other patrilineal descent groups (Dikshit and Dikshit 2011).

Appendix A3: Qualitative Research Methodology

Qualitative research played a central role in the research design of the study, helping us build the survey instrument and experimental protocol, and analyze and interpret the mechanisms driving the results of our large-*n* survey. For our qualitative data collection, we conducted 10 focus groups and 100 in-depth structured interviews with members belonging to matrilineal tribal groups (i.e., the Khasis, Garos, and Jaintias) in Shillong, the capital of Meghalaya, between 2014 and 2015. We conducted nine independent field research trips and the primary author's research assistant conducted three additional field visits to Shillong during this period in order to supervise data collection. Below, we describe the structure of and rationale for of each type of data collection effort, and explain the role that each played in our research design and analysis.

I. Focus Groups

In the first stage of this research project, our research team conducted ten focus groups over a period of five weeks (averaging two focus groups per week), beginning in February 2014. To recruit focus group subjects, we visited local churches, community organizations, and women's groups during the week, and requested the assistance of individuals who were willing to spare two hours to share their opinions regarding cultural, economic, and political topics in Meghalaya. Individuals who were willing to participate were provided instructions regarding the date, time, and location of the focus groups. We held these on weekends to facilitate broad attendance.

The subjects of our focus groups were all members of Meghalaya's matrilineal tribes, as these were the groups whose cultural norms and priorities we understood the least at the start of our research. To understand the heterogeneity of matrilineal practices, we reached out to members of all of Meghalaya's major matrilineal tribes with long-term residence in Shillong: the Khasis, Jaintias and Garos. To capture dynamics within and across tribes, we particularly sought to contact individuals with identities crossing tribal lines: individuals whose parents originated in different matrilineal tribes (Khasi-Jaintia, Khasi-Garo, Jaintia-Garo), and those for whom one parent was a member of a matrilineal tribe and another was a member of a patrilineal group. We found that social sanctions prohibiting mixed marriages, especially across matrilineal and patrilineal groups, were higher than we initially anticipated. As a result, we located only a handful of individuals with mixed marriage profiles.

The size of the focus groups ranged between 12 and 15 individuals per group. Respondents were roughly split across genders. To enable communication and trust between participants and the enumerator leading each group, we built our team of enumerators to represent each major matrilineal tribe in Shillong and ensured that enumerators were fluent in the distinct languages spoken by each tribe as well as in English and Hindi. All individuals were over the age of 18, with a mix of citizens across generations and classes, including students and early career workers; middle-aged employees in the civil service and other professions, manual labor; and housewives of all ages and senior citizens who were either retired or had never held formal jobs.

The focus group discussions were largely free-flowing and covered a range of subjects. We wished to ascertain what specific aspects of matrilineal culture were most relevant to the tribal groups in Meghalaya, what traditions were most widely practiced, whether these traditions had

changed over time, and how these traditions differed across matrilineal and patrilineal groups in the region. Next, we probed respondents about economic structures both within the household and in the community at large, attempting to understand employment trends, inheritance and wealth management practices, and household decision making norms. In particular, we sought to identify and understand the importance of similarities and differences in gender-specific economic roles. Third, we asked subjects to describe their relationships—both in individual and communal terms—with the government and the state, as well as to explain the policy issues that they felt were most important and relevant to the local context. We reserved time at the end of each focus group to elicit open-ended suggestions from subjects regarding topics that they deemed important to both matrilineal and patrilineal groups in Shillong.

Discussions in these focus groups helped us identify the core empirical areas of inquiry for our subsequent study, develop our multi-methods research design, construct our sample frame and comparison sets, and design both the qualitative interview questionnaire and large-*n* survey questionnaire. We did not rely on the focus groups for interpreting the subsequent data that we collected or obtaining inferential leverage from our evidence and findings. Instead, the focus groups provided us with key insights into a society that has largely been understudied in scholarly work, and permitted us to design and embark on the study's core research.

II. Qualitative Interviews

We conducted qualitative interviews to shed light on the mechanisms behind our large-*n* survey results. For context, the large-*n* survey was designed to elicit data from representative samples of matrilineal and patrilineal women and men in Shillong, and to subject our theoretical conjectures to experimental and behavioral tests. The centerpiece of this empirical strategy is the paired comparisons that we conduct across genders and groups, which are aimed at probing whether there are differences in how the political economy gender gap operates across matrilineal and patrilineal societies.

In our qualitative interviews, we adopt a different analytical approach. Our goal has been not to uncover differences across matrilineal and patrilineal groups, but rather to obtain in-depth ethnographic evidence to probe the mechanisms that may explain why there is a convergence or divergence in the preferences and behavior of men and women in matrilineal groups.

Sampling Strategy:
Our research team randomly selected one out of Shillong's 27 wards as the site for our qualitative interviews. This ward was subsequently excluded from the sampling frame for the quantitative surveys. Within the ward, our research team picked one address, using a random number generator, from the list of addresses in government directories. Our research team then visited every tenth dwelling in the neighborhood and requested to conduct a long-form interview with the adult respondent with the nearest forthcoming birthday within the household. If interviews were declined, the team visited the next tenth dwelling.

Sampling Frame:
This strategy yielded a sample that was 56 percent female and 44 percent male. The vast majority of respondents belonged to the Khasi tribe (93 percent), with the remainder identifying

as Garos and Jaintiyas. The average age in our sample is 39 years. The birthplaces of respondents were varied, with members of our sample originally hailing from all regions of Meghalaya.

Timeline:
Our qualitative interviews proceeded in two stages. First, starting in March 2014, we conducted 64 semi-structured interviews using a questionnaire that we designed based on the insights that we gleaned from our focus groups. We paused at this point to identify important trends in this first set of interviews, including gleaning insights from areas where respondents were answering in greater depth as well as from other areas where responses were either terse or less informative. For example, some questions probed respondents to share their opinions on India's relations with China, regarding which respondents had few opinions. There were also questions about forms of redistribution on which nearly all respondents agreed the administrative state should not be involved, such as refugee resettlement. We eliminated these questions from later interviews. This allowed our team to dedicate more time during the second set of interviews to eliciting long-form responses to existing questions. We conducted these subsequent 36 interviews in August 2015.

Research Team:
For the first round of the qualitative interviews, our research team comprised one male enumerator and one female enumerator, along with one supervisor. For the second round of the qualitative interviews, our research team comprised one male enumerator and two female enumerators, along with one supervisor. All team members were recruited from the local community, but from different neighborhoods of Shillong. Our supervisor hailed from the India-based research firm, MORSEL Inc.

Process:
Our interview questionnaire was prepared in English and then translated and reverse translated into Khasi, Mizo and Hindi. Respondents were given the choice of conducting their interviews in Khasi, Mizo, English, or Hindi.

Substance and Interpretation:
The qualitative interviews probed respondents on a number of questions related to their political practices, levels of political participation and engagement, policy preferences, household decision-making structures, family histories, cultural beliefs, and demographic characteristics. Our primary analytical approach is to compare the responses of men and women within the lineage groups in our sample in order to explore the determinants of their differing gender gaps in political participation and in political economy preferences. In doing so, we attempt to better understand the nature and role of three mechanisms: first, culturally-determined, gender-specific wealth entitlements; second, gendered opportunity sets that may operate independently of culture, including gender-specific investments in children's education and labor force opportunities; and third, gender-specific attitudes including political ideology or risk aversion.

Appendix A4. Sampling Methodology

To obtain an exhaustive list of local inhabitants, we first requested permission from the ward and block headmen (*Rangbah Shnongs* and *Rangbah Dongs)* to gather this information and conduct our survey in their jurisdiction. In those localities where we gained permission, we next confirmed and improved this information via visits with local Anganwadis and ASHA workers,[1] who had detailed, up to date information on each local inhabitant thanks to biannual home visits to every local household. Our enumerators digitized this information and estimated each individual's ethnic background according to their last name. We then coded bins of groups adhering to similar social norms using the following categories: matrilineal societies, northeast Indian patrilineal societies, and patrilineal societies from other parts of India. Stratified random sampling procedures are explained in the main text.

Following our experience running a pilot survey in January of 2015, we factored in a high refusal and absentee rate of 50%. Consequently, enumerators received lists of potential respondents containing twice the number of names required from the relevant locality.[2] To obtain balance, we identified via fieldwork and subsequently oversampled those PSUs containing high concentrations of our three low-frequency types: poor matrilineal men and wealthy patrilineal men and women.

[1] Community-based voluntary workers of the Integrated Child Development Service Programme, which began in 1975. Anganwadi workers monitor children's growth, organize supplementary feeding and immunization sessions, treat minor ailments and refer cases to medical facilities (Chattopadhyay 2004). Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHA) were established through the Government of India's community health worker (CHW) program. These women function as service extenders in the existing mainstream health system (similar tasks to those of Anganwadi workers) and act as 'cultural mediators' between the existing health system and local people (Scott and Shanker 2010).

[2] If the individual listed was not at home at the time of the enumerator's visit and was not easily available by appointment, enumerators were allowed to interview one of the household members present, in compliance with strict specifications. The chosen member had to be of the same sex as the originally selected individual and closest in age, either older or younger than the listed individual. Enumerators sequentially alternated between the two permutations of this last rule to ensure a balanced age distribution.

Appendix A5. Shillong Municipality: Location of Kinship Groups Sampled in Survey



Source: Indian administrative data extracted from the GADM database (www.gadm.org), version 2.5, July 2015.

Appendix A6. Summary Statistics by Gender

	Matrilineal		Patrilineal		Difference		
Variable	mean	N	mean	N	mean	SE	p-value
Men							
Number of siblings	4.52	854	4.39	868	-0.13	0.10	0.22
Age	33.56	854	36.08	868	2.53	0.69	0.00
Marriage year	1996	345	1995	463	-0.70	0.94	0.46
Number of daughters	0.61	854	0.66	868	0.05	0.05	0.37
Any education	1.00	854	1.00	868	0.00	0.00	.
Education beyond primary	0.94	854	0.89	868	-0.05	0.01	0.00
High wages (2 if > average)	1.06	854	1.07	868	0.01	0.03	0.75
Wealth variables							
Wealth index (Assets, 0-6)	2.44	854	2.44	868	-0.00	0.06	0.94
Land title	0.07	854	0.14	868	0.07	0.01	0.00
Women							
Number of siblings	4.71	850	4.71	838	0.00	0.11	0.99
Age	35.88	850	35.99	838	0.11	0.68	0.87
Marriage year	1994	505	1994	607	0.14	0.84	0.86
Number of daughters	0.91	850	0.93	838	0.02	0.06	0.73
Any education	1.00	850	1.00	838	0.00	0.00	.
Education beyond primary	0.88	850	0.72	838	-0.16	0.02	0.00
High wages (2 if > average)	0.64	850	0.64	838	-0.01	0.03	0.84
Wealth variables							
Wealth index (Assets, 0-6)	2.43	850	1.75	838	-0.68	0.07	0.00
Land title	0.27	850	0.06	838	-0.21	0.02	0.00

Notes: Wealth index is coded as the summation of 6 binary measures of asset ownership, where a person receives a "1" for owning at least one of each asset and a "0" otherwise. The six asset categories are: car, two-wheeler/motorbike, refrigerator, mobile phone with internet connection, land title, and house. “Difference” indicates the difference in means going from matrilineal to patrilineal groups.

Appendix A7. Balance test of pre-treatment covariates (Table 1)

	Control		Treatment		Difference		
Variable	mean	N	mean	N	mean	SE	p-value
Number of siblings	4.58	1697	4.58	1713	0.00	0.08	0.96
Age	35.38	1697	35.38	1713	0.00	0.48	1.00
Marriage year	1995	943	1995	977	-0.45	0.62	0.47
Number of daughters	0.78	1697	0.78	1713	-0.00	0.04	0.96
Any education	1.00	1697	1.00	1713	0.00	0.00	.
Education beyond primary	0.86	1697	0.86	1713	0.00	0.01	0.85
High wages (2 if > average)	0.85	1697	0.86	1713	-0.01	0.02	0.75
Wealth variables							
Wealth index (Assets, 0-6)	2.27	1697	2.27	1713	0.01	0.05	0.91
Land title	0.14	1697	0.14	1713	-0.00	0.01	0.85

Notes: differences in pre-treatment covariates between control and treatment groups for Table 1.

Appendix A8. Balance test of pre-treatment covariates (Table 2)

	Control		Treatment		Difference		
Variable	mean	N	mean	N	mean	SE	p-value
Number of siblings	4.55	1766	4.62	1644	-0.07	0.08	0.33
Age	35.20	1766	35.57	1644	-0.38	0.48	0.44
Marriage year	1995	985	1995	935	-0.27	0.62	0.67
Number of daughters	0.78	1766	0.77	1644	0.01	0.04	0.71
Any education	1.00	1766	1.00	1644	0.00	0.00	.
Education beyond primary	0.86	1766	0.86	1644	-0.00	0.01	0.88
High wages (2 if > average)	0.85	1766	0.86	1644	-0.01	0.02	0.63
Wealth variables							
Wealth index (Assets, 0-6)	2.28	1766	2.25	1644	0.03	0.05	0.54
Land title	0.14	1766	0.14	1644	-0.00	0.01	0.89

Notes: differences in pre-treatment covariates between control and treatment groups for Table 2.

Appendix A9. Balance test of pre-treatment covariates (Table 3)

	Control		Treatment		Difference		
Variable	mean	N	mean	N	mean	SE	p-value
Number of siblings	4.56	1147	4.56	1121	0.00	0.09	0.97
Age	35.27	1147	35.08	1121	0.19	0.59	0.75
Marriage year	1995	642	1995	612	-0.08	0.76	0.92
Number of daughters	0.74	1147	0.82	1121	-0.08	0.05	0.11
Any education	1.00	1147	1.00	1121	0.00	0.00	.
Education beyond primary	0.87	1147	0.86	1121	0.01	0.01	0.48
High wages (2 if > average)	0.84	1147	0.86	1121	-0.02	0.03	0.49
Wealth variables							
Wealth index (Assets, 0-6)	2.22	1147	2.25	1121	-0.03	0.06	0.58
Land title	0.12	1147	0.14	1121	-0.02	0.01	0.21

Notes: differences in pre-treatment covariates between control and treatment groups for Table 3.

Appendix A10. Balance test of pre-treatment covariates (Table 4)

	Control		Treatment		Difference		
Variable	mean	N	mean	N	mean	SE	p-value
Number of siblings	4.66	1125	4.49	1137	0.17	0.09	0.06
Age	34.99	1125	35.44	1137	-0.44	0.59	0.45
Marriage year	1995	628	1994	625	1.18	0.77	0.12
Number of daughters	0.76	1125	0.73	1137	0.03	0.05	0.48
Any education	1.00	1125	1.00	1137	0.00	0.00	.
Education beyond primary	0.87	1125	0.86	1137	0.01	0.01	0.70
High wages (2 if > average)	0.86	1125	0.86	1137	-0.00	0.03	0.93
Wealth variables							
Wealth index (Assets, 0-6)	2.26	1125	2.28	1137	-0.02	0.06	0.79
Land title	0.14	1125	0.13	1137	0.01	0.01	0.51

Notes: differences in pre-treatment covariates for control vs. treatment groups for Table 4.

Appendix A11. Political Participation

	Patrilineal	Matrilineal
Panel 11a: Voter Turnout		
Men	0.63	0.83
Observations	868	854
Women	0.52	0.92
Observations	838	850
Men - Women	0.11	-0.09
	(0.02)***	(0.02)***
Patrilineal – Matrilineal Gender Gap	0.20	(0.03)
	(0.03)***	
Panel 11b: Trust in Local Legislators		
Men	0.56	0.75
Observations	868	854
Women	0.47	0.83
Observations	838	850
Men - Women	0.09	-0.08
	(0.02)***	(0.02)***
Patrilineal – Matrilineal Gender Gap	0.16	
	(0.03)***	
Panel 11c: Trust in Local Parties		
Men	0.48	0.45
Observations	868	854
Women	0.41	0.58
Observations	838	849
Men - Women	0.07	-0.13
	(0.02)***	(0.02)***
Patrilineal – Matrilineal Gender Gap	0.20	
	(0.03)***	
Panel 11d: Perceptions of Officials' Accountability		
Men	0.66	0.51
Observations	868	854
Women	0.39	0.63
Observations	838	850
Men - Women	0.27	-0.12
	(0.02)***	(0.02)***
Patrilineal – Matrilineal Gender Gap	0.39	
	(0.03)***	

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. "Voter Turnout" refers to voter turnout for the latest State Legislative Assembly Elections.

Appendix A12a: Voter Turnout in Legislative Assembly Elections, OLS Regressions

	1	2
Female	-0.11***	-0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Matrilineal Group	0.20***	0.22***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female X Matrilineal	0.20***	0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	3410	3410
Demographic Controls	No	Yes

Notes: Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A12b: Trust in Local Legislators, OLS Regressions

	1	2
Female	-0.09***	-0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Matrilineal Group	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female X Matrilineal	0.16***	0.16***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	3410	3410
Demographic Controls	No	Yes

Appendix A12c: Trust in Local Political Parties, OLS Regressions

	1	2
Female	-0.07***	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Matrilineal Group	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female X Matrilineal	0.20***	0.20***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	3409	3409
Demographic Controls	No	Yes

Appendix A12d: Perceptions of Local Officials' Accountability, OLS Regressions

	1	2
Female	-0.27***	-0.25***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Matrilineal Group	-0.15***	-0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female X Matrilineal	0.39***	0.37***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	3410	3410
Demographic Controls	No	Yes

Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A13. Effect of Personal Cost Treatment on Policy Preferences, with Varied Controls

	Patrilineal	Patrilineal	Matrilineal	Matrilineal
Men				
Explicit cost to policy	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.04**	-0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant (control)	0.98	0.95	0.93	1.02
Observations	868	868	854	854
Women				
Explicit cost to policy	-0.00	0.00	-0.04***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant (control)	0.99	1.03	0.99	0.77
Observations	838	828	850	850
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Social Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: Dependent variable takes a value of 1 (support increase in government funding for essential services for the poor) or 0 (do not support increase in funding). Respondents answered the question: "In Meghalaya, many people lack access to essential services like water and electricity. Do you support an increase in the funding of government programs that provide essential services for the poor [*Treatment:* even if this means that the government must raise money from people like you?]." Demographic controls: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Social controls include marital status, co-residence with an elder parent, religiosity, whether the respondent has held position in local government, and whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement: "It is important that individuals have the choice to leave their marriage." Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A14. Effect of Personal Cost Treatment on Policy Preferences, Ordered Logit

	1	2
Explicit cost to policy	-1.03**	-1.03**
	(0.45)	(0.45)
Female	0.10	0.16
	(0.56)	(0.57)
Matrilineal Group	-1.54***	-1.55***
	(0.43)	(0.43)
Cost to policy X Female	0.91	0.90
	(0.72)	(0.72)
Cost X Matrilineal	0.51	0.50
	(0.51)	(0.51)
Female X Matrilineal	1.98**	1.94**
	(0.78)	(0.78)
Cost X Female X Matr	-1.98**	-1.98**
	(0.94)	(0.94)
Observations	3410	3410
Demographic Controls	No	Yes

Note: Dependent variable takes a value of 1 (support increase in government funding for essential services for the poor) or 0 (do not support increase in funding). Respondents answered the question: "In Meghalaya, many people lack access to essential services like water and electricity. Do you support an increase in the funding of government programs that provide essential services for the poor [*Treatment:* even if this means that the government must raise money from people like you?]." Demographic controls: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Appendix A15. Text of Postcard Experiment

You have been provided with a set of cards, each printed with a specific survey number. Hand the respondent the card printed with their survey number.

Say to respondent: "You have the chance to raise your voice about an issue that matters in Shillong. Your response will help us to understand what really matters to people in Shillong. Please choose whether you support or do not support the following. The card is already stamped and addressed to the survey company. All you need to do is post it. If you wish to post this card, please do so within the next month."

[The postcard text follows, with the experimental treatment in bold face italics.]

Dear Sir/Madam,

I **support** ☐
I **oppose** ☐

_____ raising the level of funding for government programmes that help the poor and the unemployed with training, employment and social services***, even if this means that the government must raise money from people like me***.

Appendix A16. Effect of Postcard Treatment on Policy Preferences, Ordered Logit

	1	2
Explicit cost to policy	-2.14*	-2.23**
	(1.10)	(1.12)
Female	15.23***	15.39***
	(1.01)	(1.02)
Matrilineal Group	-1.97*	-1.90
	(1.18)	(1.20)
Cost to policy X Female	-13.80***	-14.31***
	(1.32)	(1.32)
Cost to policy X Matrilineal	1.43	1.46
	(1.36)	(1.37)
Female X Matrilineal	1.97*	2.43**
	(1.18)	(1.19)
Cost to policy X Female X Matrilineal	-2.91*	-3.01*
	(1.57)	(1.59)
Observations	410	410
Demographic Controls	No	Yes

Note: Dependent variable takes 1 (support increase in government funding for essential services for the poor) or 0 (don't support increase in funding). Respondents were told: "Please choose whether you support or do not support the following. The card is already stamped and addressed to the survey company. All you need to do is post it." Postcard text explained in paper's body. We report results for all postcards received. Additional analysis is available upon request. Results are comparable for inclusion of distance to the nearest post office, logged distance to nearest post office, and for inclusion of a binary indicator of post office presence in one's ward (neighborhood). Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A17. Robustness Check: Does Treatment Status Predict Receipt of a Postcard?

	Patrilineal	Matrilineal
Men		
Treatment	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant (control)	0.09	0.08
Observations	868	854
Women		
Treatment	0.00	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant (control)	0.12	-0.18
Observations	838	850
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes

Note: Dependent variable takes a value of 1 (sent in a postcard) or 0 (did not send in a postcard). Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Each OLS regression includes a control for distance from the nearest post office. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A18. Effect of Postcard Treatment on Policy Preferences, with Varied Controls

	Patrilineal	Patrilineal	Matrilineal	Matrilineal
Men				
Explicit cost to policy	-0.12**	-0.10*	-0.09	-0.14
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Constant (control)	0.98	1.34	0.88	1.40
Observations	101	101	50	50
Women				
Explicit cost to policy	-0.04	-0.03	-0.14***	-0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant (control)	1.00	1.19	1.00	0.55
Observations	112	112	147	147
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Social Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: Dependent variable takes a value of 1 (support increase in government funding for essential services for the poor) or 0 (do not support increase in funding). Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Social controls: marital status, co-residence with an elder parent, religiosity, whether the respondent has held position in local government, and whether the respondent agrees or disagrees "It is important that individuals have the choice to leave their marriage." Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A19. Robustness Check: Heckman Model

	Patrilineal		Matrilineal	
	Heckman Outcome Model: Supports Policy	**Heckman Selection Model: Sent in Postcard**	**Heckman Outcome Model: Supports Policy**	**Heckman Selection Model: Sent in Postcard**
Men				
Explicit cost to policy	-0.12**		-0.09	
	(0.05)		(0.10)	
Distance from post office		-0.00		-0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Constant (control)	0.95	-1.19	0.65	-1.53
ρ		0.08		0.31
		(0.64)		(0.61)
Observations	868	868	854	854
Women				
Explicit cost to policy	-0.04		-0.14***	
	(0.02)		(0.04)	
Distance from post office		-0.00		-0.03***
		(0.00)		(0.01)
Constant (control)	0.99	-1.11	0.99	-0.84
ρ		0.03		0.02
		(0.67)		(0.55)
Observations	838	838	850	850
Demographic Controls	No	No	No	No

Note: Dependent variable takes a value of 1 (support increase in government funding for essential services for the poor) or 0 (do not support increase in funding). The selection model predicts which individuals self-select into sending in a postcard. Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A20a. Gendered Wealth Treatment Effect on Decision-making Preferences

	Patrilineal	Patrilineal	Matrilineal	Matrilineal
Men				
Wife is the main earner	0.01	0.01	-0.17***	-0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant (control)	0.62	0.67	0.87	0.99
Observations	577	577	564	564
Women				
Wife is the main earner	-0.04*	-0.03*	-0.09***	-0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant (control)	0.49	0.62	0.43	0.36
Observations	560	560	567	567
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This question asks respondents: "Imagine a typical husband and wife in your community. The wife stays at home while the husband earns money. [The control] *or* The husband stays at home while the wife earns money. [The treatment] Let's assume the two of them disagree over a costly household purchase. Should the man be the person to make the final decision? Dependent variable takes a value of 1 (husband should make the final decision) or 0 (the husband should not be the one to make the final decision). Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A20b. Effect of Gendered Wealth Treatment Effect on Preferences, Ordered Logit

	1	2
Wife is main earner	0.07	0.07
	(0.17)	(0.17)
Female	-0.69***	-0.75***
	(0.17)	(0.17)
Matrilineal Group	0.31*	0.36**
	(0.18)	(0.18)
Wife main earn X Female	-0.37	-0.38
	(0.24)	(0.24)
Wife main X Matrilineal	-1.50***	-1.51***
	(0.25)	(0.25)
Female X Matrilineal	-0.80***	-0.79***
	(0.25)	(0.25)
Wife main X Fem X Matr	0.81**	0.80**
	(0.37)	(0.37)
Observations	2268	2268
Demographic Controls	No	Yes

Notes: This question asks respondents: "Imagine a typical husband and wife in your community. *The wife stays at home while the husband earns money.* [The control] *or The husband stays at home while the wife earns money*. [The treatment] Let's assume the two of them disagree over a costly household purchase. Should the man be the person to make the final decision?" Dependent variable takes a value of 1 (The husband should make the final decision) or 0 (The husband should not be the one to make the final decision). Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A21a. Public Goods Distribution Channel Treatment Effect on Preferences

	Patrilineal	Patrilineal	Matrilineal	Matrilineal
Men				
Costly distribution	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.09**	-0.08**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant (control)	0.34	0.54	0.48	0.48
Observations	578	578	568	568
Women				
Costly distribution	-0.06	-0.06	-0.16***	-0.16***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant (control)	0.50	0.81	0.61	0.24
Observations	556	556	560	560
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This question asks respondents to choose between two policies, one where the government will give Rs. 1,000 per month in cash to household heads of poor families to improve their welfare versus another where the government will spend Rs. 1,000 per month (the baseline) or Rs. 700 per month (the cost treatment) on programs to improve the welfare of poor families. Dependent variable takes a value of 1 (support resources distribution by the government) or 0 (support distribution by the household head). Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A21b. Public Goods Distribution Treatment Effect on Preferences, Ordered Logit

	1	2
Costly gov't distribution	-0.32*	-0.34*
	(0.18)	(0.18)
Female	0.69***	0.69***
	(0.17)	(0.17)
Matrilineal Group	0.62***	0.60***
	(0.17)	(0.17)
Costly gov't dist X Female	0.10	0.10
	(0.25)	(0.25)
Costly X Matrilineal	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.25)	(0.25)
Female X Matrilineal	-0.18	-0.16
	(0.24)	(0.24)
Costly X Female X Matr	-0.41	-0.40
	(0.35)	(0.35)
Observations	2262	2262
Demographic Controls	No	Yes

Note: This question asks respondents to choose between two policies, one where the government will give Rs. 1,000 per month in cash to household heads of poor families to improve their welfare versus another where the government will spend *Rs. 1,000 per month* (the control) *or Rs. 700 per month* (the cost treatment) on programs to improve the welfare of poor families. Dependent variable takes a value of 1 (Support resource distribution by the government) or 0 (Support distribution by the household head). Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A22. Effect of Cost Treatment on Preferences | Cultural Wealth

	Patrilineal		Matrilineal	
	High Wealth	Low Wealth	High Wealth	Low Wealth
Men				
Explicit cost to policy	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant (control)	0.89	0.95	0.87	0.99
Observations	350	518	420	434
Women				
Explicit cost to policy	-0.02	0.01	-0.04***	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant (control)	1.01	1.02	0.98	0.94
Observations	192	646	465	385
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Dependent variable, treatment, and robust standard errors as in A14. High culturally determined wealth is defined as self-reporting that one personally owns land, one's house, or a car. Low wealth is defined as self-reporting that one owns none of these. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A23a. Mean Voter Turnout, Legislative Assembly Elections, with Varied Controls

	Patrilineal		Matrilineal	
Male	0.09***	0.07***	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant (control)	0.12	0.23	0.57	0.91
Observations	1706	1696	1704	1704
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of either 0 or 1, where 0 indicates not voting in Meghalaya's most recent MLA election and 1, voting. Female respondents are the baseline category for comparison. Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Social controls include marital status, co-residence with an elder parent, religiosity, whether the respondent has held position in local government, and whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement: "It is important that individuals have the choice to leave their marriage." Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A23b. Mean Trust in Local Legislators, with Varied Controls

	Patrilineal		Matrilineal	
Male	0.10***	0.10***	-0.08***	-0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant (control)	0.39	0.85	0.40	0.70
Observations	1706	1696	1704	1704
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Dependent variable takes either 0 or 1, where 0 indicates one does not trust local legislators to do the right thing for people in Shillong and 1, trust. Female respondents are the baseline category for comparison. Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Social controls include marital status, co-residence with an elder parent, religiosity, whether the respondent has held position in local government, and whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement: "It is important that individuals have the choice to leave their marriage." Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A23c. Mean Trust in Local Political Parties, with Varied Controls

	Patrilineal		Matrilineal	
Male	0.08***	0.08***	-0.14***	-0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant (control)	0.36	0.66	0.26	0.54
Observations	1706	1696	1703	1703
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of either 0 or 1, where 0 indicates one does not trust political parties to do the right thing for people in Shillong and 1, trust. Female respondents are the baseline category for comparison. Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Social controls include marital status, co-residence with an elder parent, religiosity, whether the respondent has held position in local government, and whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement: "It is important that individuals have the choice to leave their marriage." Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A23d. Mean Perceptions of Local Officials' Accountability, with Varied Controls

	Patrilineal		Matrilineal	
Male	0.28***	0.32***	-0.14***	-0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant (control)	0.49	1.12	0.26	0.54
Observations	1706	1696	1703	1703
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of either 0 or 1, where 0 indicates it is not possible for the respondent to hold local politicians accountable for the functions they are supposed to be performing and 1, that this is possible. Female respondents are the baseline category for comparison. Demographic controls include: age, educational level, wealth index, and religion. Social controls include marital status, co-residence with an elder parent, religiosity, whether the respondent has held position in local government, and whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement: "It is important that individuals have the choice to leave their marriage." Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix A24: Immigration & Meal-sharing Preferences

	Patrilineal	Matrilineal
Appendix 24a: Immigration		
Men	0.14	-0.89
Observations	868	854
Women	0.04	-0.91
Observations	837	850
Men – Women	0.10***	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Patrilineal – Matrilineal Gender Gap	0.08**	
	(0.04)	
Appendix 24b: Meal-sharing		
Men	1.34	0.30
Observations	868	854
Women	1.04	0.35
Observations	838	850
Men – Women	0.30***	-0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Patrilineal – Matrilineal Gender Gap	0.34***	
	(0.04)	
	Non-voter	**Voter**
Appendix 24c: Matrilineal Meal-sharing & Political Participation		
Matrilineal men	0.47	0.27
Observations	143	711
Matrilineal women	0.45	0.34
Observations	64	768
Men – Women	0.02	-0.07***
	(0.10)	(0.03)
Non-voter – Voter Gender Gap	0.09	
	(0.10)	

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p<0.10; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. "Immigration" refers answers to the question: "Do you think the number of immigrants from outside Meghalaya who are permitted to enter Meghalaya should be increased, decreased, or left the same as it is now?" Responses range from -1 to 1, where 1 indicates "Increased," 0 indicates "Left as it is now," and -1 indicates "Decreased." Panel B, "Meal-sharing" refers to answers to the question: "How often do you invite someone who is not of your tribe or community to eat with you in your home?" Here "Never" is coded as 0, "Yearly" as 1, "Monthly" as 2, "Weekly" as 3 and "Daily" as 4. "Non-voter" or "Voter" status is determined based on answers to the question: "Did you vote in Meghalaya's most recent MLA [Member of Legislative Assembly] election? Yes or No." Throughout, "Men – Women" refers to two-tailed t-tests of the difference in the responses of men versus women within a given society (matrilineal or patrilineal). "Patrilineal – Matrilineal Gender Gap" relies on OLS regressions to analyze the interaction of gender and lineage group. "Non-voter – Voter Gender Gap" similarly relies on OLS regressions to analyze the interaction of gender and voter status in the latest MLA elections.